Promoting the agenda for a social Economic and Monetary Union: Attention, credibility and coalition-building. Bruges Political Research Paper No. 37, November 2014

In the aftermath of the crisis, new instruments of economic governance have been adopted at the EU level. Until recently, these have been strongly dominated by what I assume to be the ECFIN coalition. However, at least since 2011, this coalition’s supremacy has been challenged by the competing coalition’s (EPSCO) willingness to rebalance the economic governance so that social concerns are better taken into account. Hence, drawing on the agenda-setting literature in the EU context, this working paper aims at retracing the process that has led to put this issue of the social dimension of the EMU on to the EU political agenda. Three hypotheses are made concerning the rise of this issue, the strategies employed by agenda-setters, and the policy subsystem of the economic governance. First, this study shows that the interest in this issue has been gradually fostered ‘from below’, at the level of the European Parliament and the European Commission. Second, due to its ‘high politics’ nature, this issue could only be initiated ‘from above’ (European Council) and then expanded to lower levels of decision-making (Commission). Specifically, DG EMPL has managed to attract attention to this issue and to build its credibility in dealing with it by strategically framing the issue and directing it towards the EPSCO venue. Finally, I analyze the outcome of this agenda-setting process by assessing to what extent the two new social scoreboards which form part of this social dimension have been taken into account during the 2014 European semester. The result of this analysis is that the new economic governance has not been genuinely rebalanced insofar as its dominant policy core remains that of the ECFIN coalition.

The EU's migrant strategy: a welcome new impetus. EPC Commentary, 19 May 2015

The publication of the Commission's agenda on migration comes at a difficult time: first and foremost in humanitarian terms on account of the recurrent and intolerable tragedies taking place in the Mediterranean, which demand a rapid response; and secondly, in political terms, if we consider both the economic situation (the crisis) and the political situation (the rise of far-right and anti-European parties) which makes all debate and action in this field rather tricky. In this context, the Juncker Commission faced a sensitive challenge because it needed to act quickly but had only limited room for manoeuvre. While certain guidelines had already been revealed at the European Council meeting on 23 April, the publication of the agenda has provided the Commission with an opportunity to recall and to specify the actions it wishes to undertake in the immediate, medium, and long terms. There are three aspects to the agenda worth highlighting: its innovation, its confirmation, and its long-term vision.

The Common Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives. Egmont Paper No. 79, May 2015

FOREWORD. When one looks at the present state of the CSDP, one cannot help but look on with disenchantment at the energy that appears to have abandoned both institutions and Member States. Commentators increasingly take for granted that nothing much should be expected from this field of EU policy. The reasons for this state of mind are well known: the recent economic and financial strains, which have impacted all EU action since 2008, means that most of the Member States will struggle to keep their defence budgets at their present level in the future, and we may even see reductions. Furthermore, and to put it mildly, most of the recent CSDP operations have also experienced a lack of enthusiasm. Adding to this overall trend, the EU is far from presenting a common vision of what security and defence should really mean. Many of the Member States do not want to be involved in all of today’s international turmoils, and they rarely share the strategic culture which inspires those Member States who see themselves as having special responsibilities in dealing with these crises. In the end it may be that Member States diverge fundamentally on the simple question of whether it is relevant for the EU to engage in most of the ‘hot’ crises Europe faces; many prefer to see Europe as a soft power, mostly dedicated to intervening on less dramatic fronts and more inclined to mend than to fight. For whatever reason given, it remains that if there is a lack of common understanding on what CSDP should really be about, it should not come as a surprise if this policy is presently in stalemate. As an additional blow, the Ukrainian crisis, which dragged on for the whole of last year, could only add to the downward spiral the EU has been experiencing, with a new Russia aggressively confronting Europe in a manner not too distant from the Cold War days. This attitude has triggered the natural reaction among EU Member States to seek reassurances from NATO about their own national security. Coupled with the return of France a few years ago into the integrated military command, NATO’s renewed relevance has sent a strong message to Europe about the military organisation’s credibility with regard to collective defence. Surprisingly, this overall trend was gathering momentum at the same time as other more positive developments. The European Council of December 2013 dedicated its main session to CSDP: it underlined Europe’s role as a ‘security provider’ while adopting a very ambitious road map for Europe in all possible dimensions of the security sector. Hence the impression of a genuine boost to all EU institutions, which have been invited to join efforts and give CSDP a reinvigorated efficiency. In the same way, the increasing instability in Europe’s neighbourhood has also called for more EU operations: most recently in Iraq, Libya, Northern Nigeria or South Sudan. Pressure for further EU engagement has been one of the most constant features of the discussions taking place around these crises. Moreover, a growing number of EU partners in Asia, Latin America or Eastern Europe have shown a renewed eagerness to join CSDP missions in what sounds like a vote of confidence for EU capacities. What kind of conclusion should be drawn from this contradictory situation? Probably that the EU has much more potential than it can sometimes figure out itself, if only it would be ready to adapt to the new global realities. But, more than anything else, an enhanced CSDP needs from all Member States strong political will and a clear vision of what they want this policy to be. Without this indispensable ingredient CSDP may continue to run its course, as it does today. It may even grow in efficiency but it will keep lacking the one resource that would definitely help it overcome all the present shortcomings that have prevented Europe from finding its true role and mission through the CSDP. Member States remain central to EU security and defence policy. This is why this collection of essays is so valuable for assessing in no uncertain way the long road that lies ahead for any progress to be made. Pierre VIMONT Senior Associate at Carnegie Europe Former Executive Secretary-General of the European External Action Service

Solidarity and asylum seekers: member states agreed to disagree. EPC Commentary, 29 June 2015

At the June 2015 European Council, European leaders were meant to come to an agreement in order to help Italy and Greece cope with the increasing number of migrants and asylum seekers arriving on their shores. They were invited to give their agreement on a proposal from the European Commission to set up a mandatory relocation scheme, i.e. a scheme defining the precise number of asylum seekers that should be relocated to each member state over the next two years.

Flashlight Europe N°6–June 2015. Waiting for the Five Presidents’ Report on the Future of the Monetary Union: What do we need to know?

At the European Summit on 25-26 June Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, will be presenting a report on the future of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It has been drawn up by the presidents of the EU Commission, the European Council, the European Central Bank, the European Parliament, and the Eurogroup, and is a sequel to the “Four Presidents’ Report” on the same topic that was compiled without the participation of the President of the European Parliament and presented in 2012. In this Flashlight we provide answers to key questions about the forthcoming report.

Will Cameron get what he wants? Anticipating reactions to Britain’s EU reform proposals. CEPS Commentary, 29 October 2015

After months of speculation about the British Prime Minister’s specific demands in terms of the “renegotiation” of the UK’s relationship with the EU, David Cameron has bowed to pressure from the heads of state or government of the other EU member states and committed himself to setting out the UK’s specific “concerns” in writing by early November. While we cannot be certain of the contents of David Cameron’s missive to the EU, his recent pronouncements before Parliament set out an agenda whose contours have become quite clear. In this Commentary the authors consider how far the other EU member states might be willing to accommodate Cameron’s demands and provide him with the political capital he seeks to lead the ‘in’ campaign. They distinguish four different attitudes among EU countries, and advocate a constructive approach that sets the scene for a Convention after 2017 – one that opens the treaty for a revision that could accommodate both the British demands for an ‘opt-out’ from ever closer union and gives leeway to those who wish to integrate further. Putting emphasis on strengthening the single market in the more immediate term would allow the Prime Minister to show his home audience that he is a leading reformer and that the EU gives oxygen to the British economy.This is an obvious area where he might be able to seal deals during the UK’s Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2017. The authors also consider what the European Council Conclusions on the UK’s wish list for EU reform might look like, given that any treaty revision before the time set for the UK referendum is unattainable. They present the results of a two-day simulation exercise involving a cross-section of national experts and present mock European Council Conclusions on the areas of ever closer union; the role of national parliaments; competitiveness; economic and monetary integration; and the free movement of labour.

Dear Donald … Yours, David. CEPS Commentary, 12 November 2015

The cordial letter of November 10th from the British Prime Minister to the President of the European Council is an important document. It sets the stage for deliberations on whether the UK stays in the EU, or quits in an historic act of destructive disintegration for the EU that condemns the UK to what has fittingly been called “the spectre of geo-political irrelevance”. Overall the letter is looking like a plausible move towards settling the Brussels part of the Prime Minister’s manifest objective to keep the UK in the EU, argues Michael Emerson in this CEPS Commentary. But there is one major part of the debate that is underdeveloped so far: the clarification of the scenarios and consequences of secession. Eurosceptics have not detailed their positions on how to manage the secession, but what is becoming clearer is that all conceivable options are far more problematic than the status quo.

The EU deal to avoid Brexit: Take it or leave. CEPS Special Report No. 131/February 2016

Beyond the drama of the European Council summit of 18-19 February 2016, what became clear was the fundamental desire on the part of the leaders of all 28 EU member states to agree a deal on the British government’s demands for a renegotiated settlement on the UK’s relationship within the European Union. The deal has provided David Cameron with the political capital he needed to call a date for the in/out referendum and to lead a campaign for the UK to stay in the EU. Yet, for all the technical reforms packed into it, the deal is neither a crowd pleaser nor a vote winner. It does, however, mark a watershed acknowledgement that EU integration is not a one-directional process of ‘ever closer union’. In this CEPS Special Report, Stefani Weiss and Steven Blockmans analyse the substance of the “Decision of the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European Council, concerning a New Settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union” and shed light on its legal character. They contextualise this EU deal to avoid Brexit, and draw on the conclusions reached in a simulation of European Council negotiations between representatives of think tanks in the European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN), conducted by CEPS and the Bertelsmann Stiftung in October 2015.

EU-Turkey plan for handling refugees is fraught with legal and procedural challenges. CEPS Commentary, 10 March 2016

EU-Turkey relations in the scope of the ongoing refugee crisis were at the heart of the European Council meeting of 7 March 2016. Among the set of initiatives proposed, the following two have attracted the most attention: First, for every Syrian readmitted by Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian from Turkey would be resettled in an EU member state. This has come to be known as the ‘one for one’ resettlement approach. Second, all new irregular migrants and asylum-seekers crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands would be returned to Turkey without offering any guarantee of protection.

Future of the EU27: What to expect from this summer’s period of reflection. CEPS Commentary, 18 July 2016

As the UK’s brutal political fallout of Brexit continues to astound the world, leaders in the other member states are wrestling with the EU’s new reality. They deemed it too early to draw conclusions at the June European Council. Instead, the heads of state and government declared a period of political reflection on the future of an EU with 27 member states. They will meet again informally on September 16th in Bratislava. The question is: What impetus can they give to reforms to remain united and deal with the challenges of the 21st century?

Editorial

This time of year we look back at the year that has passed and make plans for the next year. I like to reflect on things that I have learnt and people that I have met, especially those who facilitated that learning. In 2009 I went to various conferences, The BCLA conference in Manchester, The Romanian Optical Society meeting in Brasov, Transylvania (where the university is actually on Vlad Tepes Street), The European Council for Optometry and Optics (ECOO) in Brno, Czech Republic, The American Academy of Optometry (AAO) in Orlando USA, The International Association of Contact Lens Educators (IACLE) meeting in Tianjin China and finally The Vereinigung Deutscher Contactlinsen-Spezialisten (VDCO) meeting in Jena. All were interesting places and thoroughly all were enjoyable conferences with their own highlights but I wanted to focus on Jena and one person I met there and his inspirational search for knowledge and the contributions he made in the field of contact lenses. Jena itself is a fascinating place and should be on the ‘must visit’ list of anyone involved in eye care. It is the birth place of Carl Zeiss of course and where he started his company. It is also the birth place of Ernst Abbe (physicist and optometrist and expert lens maker), and Otto Schott (chemist and technologist who made high quality glass. There are many road signs bearing witness to these famous pioneers. The optical museum is worth spending a few hours looking around too. I was invited to speak at the VDCO at the kind invitation from colleagues at the Jena School of Optometry, Professor Wolfgang Sickenberger and Professor Sebastian Marx. At this meeting I met 87-year-old Willi KAUE who was being awarded the Adolf Wilhelm Müller-Welt prize by the VDCO for contribution to contact lenses over his 60-year career. At the age of 15 Willi Kaue took up an apprenticeship to become an Optician in Germany in 1937. At this time he first heard about the scleral glass lenses made by the Carl Zeiss Company in Jena. This started his lifelong fascination which was to become his passion but not yet his career. During the war he was enlisted into military service but immediately after was back to his former career. In 1950 Willi corrected his own 3.5 dioptres of myopia with a plastic scleral lens. His fascination strengthened as for the first time he himself could experience a wider field of view than his spectacles gave him, less aberrations and less retinal minification. He also appreciated the fact that contact lenses did not cause pressure on the nose or ears and did not slide down his nose plus remained optically centred with his eye movements. He decided that form now on he would make fitting contact lenses his career. He travelled to London to learn more about contact lenses and how to fit them but initially did not find many willing teachers and to start with became largely self-taught. He wanted to know how to make scleral lenses. So far he only knew that pulverized polymethyl methacrylate (PMMA) was pressed and moulded. In 1951 he met Berlin optician Otto Marzock. He made his only scleral lenses from using military PMMA windshields. His process involved lathe cutting the lenses and resulted in lenses that were thinner than moulded ones. Willi developed a manufacturing method, using a rotary diamond drill, starting form the outer edge and towards the centre at a constant cut speed. This enabled him to make more reproducible lenses and in less time. His enthusiasm in the field was clear from the travels he made in the pursuit of advancement - travelling around Europe, South America, North America and Asia. In 1963 he visited George Nissel in Hemel Hempstead, England. Constantly thriving towards innovations Willi came across the new Naturalens from the USA made from HEMA at a congress in Marseille in 1969. Amongst his contributions to the field, was his own technique of fitting ocular prosthetics, using an alginate impression of the orbit. I was fortunate enough to have dinner with Willi Kaue and learnt more about his fascinating career through the patient interpreting skills of Hilmar Bussacker (the 2008 winner of the same award and the 2007 winner of the European Federation of the Contact Lens and IOL Industries Award). I look forward to 2010 with eager anticipation as to what I may learn and who I might meet!!! Copyright © 2009 British Contact Lens Association. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The 3 per cent Barcelona Target: A Critical Appraisal of the Failure of the Lisbon Strategy’s Knowledgebased Economy and Society Project

Ten years after the unanimous approval of the Lisbon Strategy at a special meeting of the European Council on 23-24 March 2000 in Lisbon, it will be inevitable for the European Council, the European Commission and the majority of the EU member states to face with its fi asco and to account for the reasons of their fundamental policy, governance and economic failures in 2010. The recent turbulence of the global economy offers some excuses for the underperformance of the main objectives of the Lisbon Strategy in the essential social and economic domains, like job creation, economic growth, and environmental sustainability. Negative growth rates, macroeconomic and fi nancial instability, the contraction of the internal and external markets of the European economy, drop in demand for capital investment, goods and services, sinking corporate revenues, depreciation of corporate assets, increasing private and public indebtedness, falling rate of employment, weakening social cohesion, widening social inequality, and so forth not only deprive the majority of the EU member states of fulfi lling the main objectives of the Lisbon Strategy but also drive them into worse social and economic conditions in many policy domains than they were in 2000.

El Norte de Africa y el Sahel y la Estrategia Global de Seguridad de la Unión Europea

El objetivo del artículo es exponer una adecuada y necesaria redefinición de la política de la UE hacia el Norte de África y el Sahel, tanto en términos geográficos como en términos estratégicos de acuerdo con lo expuesto en la nueva Estrategia Global Europea. En este sentido, se revisarán los postulados y la evolución de la antigua Estrategia Europea de Seguridad (EES) y su consiguiente Política de Vecindad (ENP), en comparación con la recién lanzada Estrategia. La nueva Estrategia es concebida como una guía para el desarrollo de la política exterior y de seguridad que la UE ha de llevar a cabo, inter alia, en su periferia. Lamentablemente su concepción de esta zona regional resulta anclada en el pasado.

La Unión Europea y la OTAN en el marco de la nueva Estrategia Global de Seguridad de la Unión Europea

El artículo analiza la relación entre la Unión Europea y la OTAN en cuestiones de defensa, según se ha reflejado en las estrategias de seguridad de la Unión Europea, con particular atención a la Estrategia Global de la Unión Europea presentada en 2016. Se estudia la Estrategia de Seguridad Europea de 2003, el Informe de Implementación de 2008, y las nuevas aproximaciones al contexto internacional y a la seguridad europea que se reflejan en la Estrategia Global. Se analiza también el papel de la OTAN, así como la evolución de la política de seguridad de los Estados Unidos hacia Europa durante la Administración Obama. Finalmente se discute el posible futuro de la Política Común de Seguridad y Defensa de la UE (PCSD) después del Bréxit, así como las consecuencias para su relación con la OTAN.

"Europe-as-hegemony" and discourses in Turkey after 1999: Dialogue with the Europeanisation literature

It is not a prophecy to say that one of the most common concepts that those working on "Europe" would encounter at various points in different capacities would be "Europeanisation". This buzzword has also been crucial in understanding and explaining for Turkey's European orientation path, which acquired a new dimension and has been carried to a more substantive and institutional level with the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 when Turkey was granted formal candidacy status in its application to join the EU. Especially after this date, the concept of "Europeanisation" and the literature attached to it have almost automatically been employed to assess the relationship between Turkey and different aspects of European integration. For this aim, firstly, I present a tri-fold picture of the European studies. According to this categorisation, the studies dealing with the notion of „Europe‟ could be categorised into three groups: the studies which takes "Europe" as a fixed concept ("Europe-as-fixity"), those which subscribe to a notion of "Europe" solely as a construct ("Europe-as-construct") and the studies which take "Europe" as a contestation ("Europe-as-contestation"). After critically locating the Europeanisation literature within this categorisation, I argue that there is both a historical and epistemological need for the Europeanisation literature to address to the conflictual nature of the notion by focusing on how the discourses on "Europe" hegemonised the Turkish political terrain after 1999 and I introduce the notion of "Europe-as-hegemony". The overall argument is that the hegemony of "Europe" does not originate from the automaticity of the relationship between the European and domestic level as stipulated by the Europeanisation literature, but rather from the power of discourses on "Europe" and their ability to hegemonise the political realm. In this respect, this paper offers a novel approach to the Europeanisation literature with a particular focus on the Turkish context where the political is not only given and constructed but is also reflexive and open to contestation and negotiation.