938 resultados para Collective bargaining.
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Contemporary research into the sociology of taste has, following Bourdieu (1984), primarily emphasised the role of social position, or more broadly as implicated int he reproduction of social inequality. We argue that although important, such a preoccupation with the social distribution of objectified tastes--for example in music, literature, and art--has been at the expense of investigating the everyday perceptual schemes and resources used by actors to accomplish a judgement of taste. Our argument is traced using a range of classical and contemporary literature which deals with the personal/collective tension in taste, aesthetics and fashion. We use data from a recent national survey to investigate how a sample of ordinary fashion. We use data from a recent national survey to investigate how a sample of ordinary actors understand the categories of 'good' and 'bad' taste. The analysis shows a strong collective strand in everyday definitions of taste, often linked to moral codes of interpersonal conduct. Also, taste is largely defined by people as a strategy for managing relations with others, and as a mode of self-discipline which relies on the mastery of a number of general principles that are resources for people to position their own tastes within an imagined social sphere. This paper proposes a schematic model which accounts for the range of discriminatory resources used to make judgements of taste.
Industrial agreements and work/family provisions: Trends and prospects under 'enterprise bargaining'
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We model the behavior of an ion trap with all ions driven simultaneously and coupled collectively to a heat bath. The equations for this system are similar to the irreversible dynamics of a collective angular momentum system known as the Dicke model. We show how the steady state of the ion trap as a dissipative many-body system driven far from equilibrium can exhibit quantum entanglement. We calculate the entanglement of this steady state for two ions in the trap and in the case of more than two ions we calculate the entanglement between two ions by tracing over all the other ions. The entanglement in the steady state is a maximum for the parameter values corresponding roughly to a bifurcation of a fixed point in the corresponding semiclassical dynamics. We conjecture that this is a general mechanism for entanglement creation in driven dissipative quantum systems.
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Abstract The European Union (EU) is one of the world´s leading donors in official development assistance (ODA) to give a strong weight in the relationship with recipient partner countries, in particular with those that are more dependent on it. Besides the material weight of its funding, the EU has retained historical ties and influence in diplomatic, political and economic terms in many of its ODA recipient partner countries (particular in Sub-Saharan Africa). Since the 2000s, the EU development policy has not only undergone major structural changes in its institutional framework but also has started to face a new international aid scenario. This paper explores why a normative-based EU development policy is being challenged by reformed EU institutions and a new global order, and how the EU is attempting to respond to this context in face of the deepest recession since the end of the Second World War.
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Swarm Intelligence (SI) is a growing research field of Artificial Intelligence (AI). SI is the general term for several computational techniques which use ideas and get inspiration from the social behaviours of insects and of other animals. This paper presents hybridization and combination of different AI approaches, like Bio-Inspired Techniques (BIT), Multi-Agent systems (MAS) and Machine Learning Techniques (ML T). The resulting system is applied to the problem of jobs scheduling to machines on dynamic manufacturing environments.
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This paper provides a longitudinal, empirical view of the multifaceted and reciprocal processes of organizational learning in a context of self-managed teams. Organizational learning is seen as a social construction between people and actions in a work setting. The notion of learning as situated (Brown & Duguid 1989, Lave& Wenger 1991, Gherardi & al. 1998, Easterby-Smith & Araujo 1999, Abma 2003) opens up the possibility for placing the focus of research on learning in the community rather than in individual learning processes. Further, in studying processes in their social context, we cannot avoid taking power relations into consideration (Contu & Willmott 2003). The study is based on an action research with a methodology close to the ‘democratic dialogue’ presented by Gustavsen (2001). This gives a ground for research into how the learning discourse developed in the case study organization over a period of 5 years, during which time the company abandoned a middle management level of hierarchy and the teams had to figure out how to work as self-managed units. This paper discusses the (re)construction of power relations and its role in organizational learning. Power relations are discussed both in vertical and horizontal work relations. A special emphasis is placed on the dialectic between managerial aims and the space for reflection on the side of employees. I argue that learning is crucial in the search for the limits for empowerment and that these limits are negotiated both in actions and speech. This study unfolds a purpose-oriented learning process, constructing an open dialogue, and describes a favourable context for creative, knowledge building communities.
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The activity of growing living bacteria was investigated using real-time and in situ rheology-in stationary and oscillatory shear. Two different strains of the human pathogen Staphylococcus aureus-strain COL and its isogenic cell wall autolysis mutant, RUSAL9-were considered in this work. For low bacteria density, strain COL forms small clusters, while the mutant, presenting deficient cell separation, forms irregular larger aggregates. In the early stages of growth, when subjected to a stationary shear, the viscosity of the cultures of both strains increases with the population of cells. As the bacteria reach the exponential phase of growth, the viscosity of the cultures of the two strains follows different and rich behaviors, with no counterpart in the optical density or in the population's colony-forming units measurements. While the viscosity of strain COL culture keeps increasing during the exponential phase and returns close to its initial value for the late phase of growth, where the population stabilizes, the viscosity of the mutant strain culture decreases steeply, still in the exponential phase, remains constant for some time, and increases again, reaching a constant plateau at a maximum value for the late phase of growth. These complex viscoelastic behaviors, which were observed to be shear-stress-dependent, are a consequence of two coupled effects: the cell density continuous increase and its changing interacting properties. The viscous and elastic moduli of strain COL culture, obtained with oscillatory shear, exhibit power-law behaviors whose exponents are dependent on the bacteria growth stage. The viscous and elastic moduli of the mutant culture have complex behaviors, emerging from the different relaxation times that are associated with the large molecules of the medium and the self-organized structures of bacteria. Nevertheless, these behaviors reflect the bacteria growth stage.
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Current Manufacturing Systems challenges due to international economic crisis, market globalization and e-business trends, incites the development of intelligent systems to support decision making, which allows managers to concentrate on high-level tasks management while improving decision response and effectiveness towards manufacturing agility. This paper presents a novel negotiation mechanism for dynamic scheduling based on social and collective intelligence. Under the proposed negotiation mechanism, agents must interact and collaborate in order to improve the global schedule. Swarm Intelligence (SI) is considered a general aggregation term for several computational techniques, which use ideas and inspiration from the social behaviors of insects and other biological systems. This work is primarily concerned with negotiation, where multiple self-interested agents can reach agreement over the exchange of operations on competitive resources. Experimental analysis was performed in order to validate the influence of negotiation mechanism in the system performance and the SI technique. Empirical results and statistical evidence illustrate that the negotiation mechanism influence significantly the overall system performance and the effectiveness of Artificial Bee Colony for makespan minimization and on the machine occupation maximization.
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A PhD Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the NOVA - School of Business and Economics
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L'oeuvre de Moscovici se résume à une tentative de rapprochement du psychique et du social, ne serait-ce que parce que la rationalité et l'irrationalité sont transversales auz comportaments individuels et à l'activité sociale. En ce sens, l'individu n'est pas plus du ressort de la seule psychologie que la societé ne l'est de la seule sociologie. Simplifier la realité reviendrait à simplifier la connossaince de celle-ci. La psycho-sociologie de Moscovici nous invite donc à prendre en compte l'homme dans sa complétude, en tant que mixte de logique et de sentiments, de raison et de passions. On comprendra alors l'importance du paradigme écologique dans les sciences sociales comme forme de compréhension de ce qui relie l'homme à une entité plus vaste, le renvoyant aussi bien à la nature et à son ascendance animale qu'à la techinque et à sa destinée post-humaine.
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We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. When agreement is reached the traders leave the market. Traders who do not come to an agreement return next period in which they will be matched again, as long as their deadline has not expired yet. New traders enter exogenously in each period. We assume that traders within a pair know each other's deadline. We define and characterize the stationary equilibrium configurations. Traders with longer deadlines fare better than traders with short deadlines. It is shown that the heterogeneity of deadlines may cause delay. It is then shown that a centralized mechanism that controls the matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized mechanism is not as good for traders with long deadlines, it is shown that in a model where all traders can choose which mechanism to
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We consider the collective incentives of buyers and sellers to form cartels in markets where trade is realized through decentralized pairwise bargaining. Cartels are coalitions of buyers or sellers that limit market participation and compensate inactive members for abstaining from trade. In a stable market outcome, cartels set Nash equilibrium quantities and cartel memberships are immune to defections. We prove that the set of stable market outcomes is non-empty and we provide its full characterization. Stable market outcomes are of two types: (i) at least one cartel actively restrains trade and the levels of market participation are balanced, or (ii) only one cartel, eventually the cartel that forms on the long side of the market, is active and it reduces trade slightly below the opponent's.
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We study pair-wise decentralized trade in dynamic markets with homogeneous, non-atomic, buyers and sellers that wish to exchange one unit. Pairs of traders are randomly matched and bargaining a price under rules that offer the freedom to quit the match at any time. Market equilbria, prices and trades over time, are characterized. The asymptotic behavior of prices and trades as frictions (search costs and impatience) vanish, and the conditions for (non) convergence to walrasian prices are explored. As a side product of independent interest, we present a self-contained theory of non-cooperative bargaining with two-sided, time-varying, outside options.
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We analyze a continuous-time bilateral double auction in the presence of two-sided incomplete information and a smallest money unit. A distinguishing feature of our model is that intermediate concessions are not observable by the adversary: they are only communicated to a passive auctioneer. An alternative interpretation is that of mediated bargaining. We show that an equilibrium using only the extreme agreements always exists and display the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (perfect Bayesian) equilibra which yield intermediate agreements. For the symmetric case with uniform type distribution we numerically calculate the equilibria. We find that the equilibrium which does not use compromise agreements is the least efficient, however, the rest of the equilibria yield the lower social welfare the higher number of compromise agreements are used.