Labor markets and monetary policy: A new-Keynesian model with unemployement

We construct a utility-based model of fluctuations, with nominal rigidities andunemployment, and draw its implications for the unemployment-inflation trade-off and for the conduct of monetary policy.We proceed in two steps. We first leave nominal rigidities aside. We show that,under a standard utility specification, productivity shocks have no effect onunemployment in the constrained efficient allocation. We then focus on theimplications of alternative real wage setting mechanisms for fluctuations in un-employment. We show the role of labor market frictions and real wage rigiditiesin determining the effects of productivity shocks on unemployment.We then introduce nominal rigidities in the form of staggered price setting byfirms. We derive the relation between inflation and unemployment and discusshow it is influenced by the presence of labor market frictions and real wagerigidities. We show the nature of the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment stabilization, and its dependence on labor market characteristics. We draw the implications for optimal monetary policy.

The role of interbank markets in monetary policy: A model with rationing

This paper analyses the impact of asymmetric information in the interbankmarket and establishes its crucial role in the microfoundations of the monetarypolicy transmission mechanism. We show that interbank market imperfectionsinduce an equilibrium with rationing in the credit market. This has two majorimplications: first, it reconciles the irresponsiveness of business investment to theuser cost of capital with the large impact of monetary policy (magnitude effect)and, second, it shows that banks liquidity positions condition their reaction tomonetary policy (Kashyap and Stein liquidity effect).

Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets

Two-stage game models of information acquisition in stochastic oligopoliesrequire the unrealistic assumption that firms observe the precision ofinformation chosen by their competitors before determining quantities. Thispaper analyzes secret information acquisition as a one-stage game. Relativeto the two-stage game firms are shown to acquire less information. Policyimplications based on the two-stage game yield, therefore, too high taxes ortoo low subsidies for research activities. For the case of heterogeneousduopoly it is shown that comparative statics results partly depend on theobservability assumption.

Effect of irrigation water on the incidence of Salmonella spp. on lettuces produced by urban agriculture and sold on the markets in Dakar, Senegal

The aim of our survey was to assess the effect of irrigation water of the microbiological quality on the production chain of lettuce in the Dakar area. Microbiological analysis showed that 35% of irrigation water was contaminated by Salmonella spp. between the two water-types used for irrigation (groundwater and wastewater), no significant difference (p>0.05) in their degree of contamination was found. The incidence of different types of irrigation water on the contamination rate of lettuces from the farm (Pikine and Patte d'Oie) was not different either (p>0.05). However, the contamination rate of lettuce from markets of Dalifort and Grand-Yoff that were supplied by the area of Patte d'Oie was greater than those of Sham and Zinc supplied by Pikine (p<0.05). Comparison of serotypes of Salmonella isolated from irrigation water and lettuce showed that irrigation water may affect the microbiological quality of lettuce. Manures, frequently used as organic amendment in cultivating lettuce are another potential source of contamination. These results showed that lettuce may constitute effective vectors for the transmission of pathogens to consumers. Extensive treatment of the used wastewater and/or composting of manure could considerably reduce these risks.

Bank liquidity, interbank markets and monetary policy

A major lesson of the recent financial crisis is that the interbank lending marketis crucial for banks facing large uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs. Thispaper studies the efficiency of the interbank lending market in allocating funds. Weconsider two different types of liquidity shocks leading to different implications foroptimal policy by the central bank. We show that, when confronted with a distributional liquidity-shock crisis that causes a large disparity in the liquidity held amongbanks, the central bank should lower the interbank rate. This view implies that thetraditional tenet prescribing the separation between prudential regulation and monetary policy should be abandoned. In addition, we show that, during an aggregateliquidity crisis, central banks should manage the aggregate volume of liquidity. Twodifferent instruments, interest rates and liquidity injection, are therefore required tocope with the two different types of liquidity shocks. Finally, we show that failureto cut interest rates during a crisis erodes financial stability by increasing the riskof bank runs.

Sovereign debt markets in turbulent times: Creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects

In 2007, countries in the Euro periphery were enjoying stable growth, low deficits, and lowspreads. Then the financial crisis erupted and pushed them into deep recessions, raising theirdeficits and debt levels. By 2010, they were facing severe debt problems. Spreads increased and,surprisingly, so did the share of the debt held by domestic creditors. Credit was reallocatedfrom the private to the public sectors, reducing investment and deepening the recessions evenfurther. To account for these facts, we propose a simple model of sovereign risk in which debtcan be traded in secondary markets. The model has two key ingredients: creditor discriminationand crowding-out effects. Creditor discrimination arises because, in turbulent times, sovereigndebt offers a higher expected return to domestic creditors than to foreign ones. This providesincentives for domestic purchases of debt. Crowding-out effects arise because private borrowingis limited by financial frictions. This implies that domestic debt purchases displace productiveinvestment. The model shows that these purchases reduce growth and welfare, and may lead toself-fulfilling crises. It also shows how crowding-out effects can be transmitted to other countriesin the Eurozone, and how they may be addressed by policies at the European level.

Strategic behaviours in healthcare : evidence from primary care and pharmaceutical markets

We analyse the strategic behaviours of agents in a market through the appropriate¬ness of their skills to the market. If agents' skills are well adapted to market and they can reach their target, they will not need to adopt strategic behaviours. The agents will behave as selfish individuals. However, if their skills are not well adapted and they cannot attain their target alone, they will adopt strategic behaviours to reach their objectives. These behaviours will have a different impact on the utilities of other agents, depending on the skills and the objectives of the agent. If these agents need other agents to reach their objectives, they will behave as altruistic individuals who internalise the utilities of other agents in reaching their objectives and will adopt cooperative behaviours. However, if these agents fear that other agents could prevent them from reaching their target because they can foresee that the skills of other agents are better adapted than their own skills, the agents will then behave as predator individuals and will adopt destructive behaviours to attain their objective. It is in the interests of these agents to manipulate information to increase disorder and dissimulate their lack of skills. They will reproduce the strategies of animals that modify their appearance to escape predators or simulate being bait to attract their prey. These agents will seek to induce chaos into the behaviours of other agents to amplify the impact of their strategies. The appropriateness of skills to the market allows an understanding of the emer-gence of networks and associated strategies. The members of a networks are inputs who are excluded when their costs are higher than their benefits. A network simul-taneously allows cooperation and selfish, predatory behaviours among its members. A network may adopt informational strategies when seeking to become the leader in a market or when it cannot survive. The creation of networks and the manipulation of information are two overlapping evolutionary strategies, with the first strategy favouring the second. In our model, an agent does not behave like a firm that aims only to maximise the profits of the firm but rather as a member of a network who adopts strategic behaviours as a function of the interests of this network. If his skills are well adapted to the market and he can innovate, he will not invest in erroneous input; in contrast, if his skills are not adapted, the agent will invest in the erroneous input of information into the market in order to survive. Therefore, when any informational asymmetries between the agents and their principals characterise the market, the price cannot be the main element that allows equilibrium to be reached in the market; instead, the appropriateness of skills to the market enables equilibrium. We will now apply these hypotheses to explain the strategic behaviours of physicians and pharmaceutical companies.

Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and Rrommate markets

We consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. In these so-called roommate markets agents are consumers and resources at the same time. Klaus (Games Econ Behav 72:172-186, 2011) introduced two new "population sensitivity" properties that capture the effect newcomers have on incumbent agents: competition sensitivity and resource sensitivity. On various roommate market domains (marriage markets, no-odd-rings roommate markets, solvable roommate markets),we characterize the core using either of the population sensitivity properties in addition to weak unanimity and consistency. On the domain of all roommate markets, we obtain two associated impossibility results.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Complements and substitutes in multilateral assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball provo que, en mercats d’assignació amb més de dos costats, agents de diferents sectors poden no ser complementaris mentre que agents del mateix sector poden no ser substituts. Shapley (1962) va provar que això mai pot succeïr quan el mercat d’assignació només té dos costats. No obstant, demostro que existeixen condicions suficients que garanteixen la substitutabilitat i la complementarietat entre agents en aquests tipus de mercats. A més, provo que, quan els béns al mercat son homogenis, el resultat de Shapley (1962) es manté.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Complements and substitutes in multilateral assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball provo que, en mercats d’assignació amb més de dos costats, agents de diferents sectors poden no ser complementaris mentre que agents del mateix sector poden no ser substituts. Shapley (1962) va provar que això mai pot succeïr quan el mercat d’assignació només té dos costats. No obstant, demostro que existeixen condicions suficients que garanteixen la substitutabilitat i la complementarietat entre agents en aquests tipus de mercats. A més, provo que, quan els béns al mercat son homogenis, el resultat de Shapley (1962) es manté.

IFRS and Asymmetrical Information: Empirical Evidence from the Finnish Stock Markets

Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on selvittää kansainvälisiin tilinpäätösstandardeihin siirtymisen vaikutuksia epäsymmetriseen informaatioon Suomen osake-markkinoilla. Suomalaisten tilinpäätöskäytäntöjen ja kansainvälisten standardien eroja on selvitetty ensin laadullisin menetelmin,jonka jälkeen on tehty asymmetrisen informaation markkinapohjaisiin mittareihinperustuva kvantitatiivinen tutkimus. Yleisiin eroavaisuuksiin liittyvän selvityksen lisäksi on tutkittu erikseen erityisesti standardimuutoksen vaikutusta älylliseen pääomaan liittyvään informaation asymmetriaan. Empiirisessä osiossa älyllisen pääoman epäsuoraksi mitaksi on valittu kehitys- ja tutkimusmenojen suhde taseen loppusummaan. Kuten oletus oli, sekä laadullisen että empiirisen osion tulokset viittaavat siihen, että IFRS:n myötä informaatioympäristö on parantunut. Uudet standardit vaativat laajempaa ja tarkempaa informaation julkaisua liittyen älylliseen pääomaan, mikä ei ole kuitenkaan havaittavissa valituissa mittareissa

Resource-based approach to new product development at the intersection of industries. Two case studies in telecommunications

Työn tavoitteena on selvittää mitkä ovat tärkeimmät aineettomat resurssit, joita tarvitaan teollisuuksien risteyskohdassa tapahtuvassa tuotekehityksessä. Teollisuuksien risteyskohdissa syntyvät tuotteet ovat usein radikaaleja, mikä tekee tuotteista mielenkiintoisia, paljon liiketoimintapotentiaalia tarjoavia. Tämä tutkimus lähestyy tuotekehitystä resurssipohjaisesta näkökulmasta. Myös tietämyspohjaista ja suhdepohjaista näkemystä hyödynnetään korostamaan keskittymistä aineettomiin resursseihin. Tutkimuksessa rakennetaan viitekehys, jossa tutkitaan eri resurssikategorioita. Valitut kategoriat ovat teknologiset, markkinointi-, johtamiseen ja hallinnointiin liittyvät ja suhdepohjaiset resurssit. Empiirisessä osassa tutkitaan kahta uutta tuotekonseptia, jotka ovat syntyneet teollisuuksien risteyskohdissa. Empiirisen osan tavoitteena on määritellä tutkimuksen kohteena olevia alustavia tuotekonsepteja tarkemmin ja selvittää millaisia resursseja näiden toteuttamiseen tarvitaan. Myös tarvittavien resurssien nykytila selvitetään ja pohditaan tulisiko puuttuvia resursseja kehittää yrityksen sisällä vai hankkia ne ulkopuolelta. Tutkimus toteutettiin asiantuntijahaastatteluin. Kahden tapaustutkimuksen perusteella näyttäisi siltä, että suhdepohjaiset resurssit ovat erittäin tärkeitä teollisuuksien risteyskohdissa tapahtuvassa tuotekehityksessä. Myös teknologiset resurssit ovat tärkeitä. Markkinointiresurssien tärkeys riippuu lopullisesta tuotekonseptista, kun taas johtamiseen ja kehittämiseen liittyvät resurssit ovat tärkeitänäiden konseptien luomisessa.

Weak Form Tests of Efficient Market Hypothesis: Evidence from CEE-Countries and Russian Stock Markets

Tämän tutkielman tavoitteena on selvittää Venäjän, Slovakian, Tsekin, Romanian, Bulgarian, Unkarin ja Puolan osakemarkkinoiden heikkojen ehtojen tehokkuutta. Tämä tutkielma on kvantitatiivinen tutkimus ja päiväkohtaiset indeksin sulkemisarvot kerättiin Datastreamin tietokannasta. Data kerättiin pörssien ensimmäisestä kaupankäyntipäivästä aina vuoden 2006 elokuun loppuun saakka. Analysoinnin tehostamiseksi dataa tutkittiin koko aineistolla, sekä kahdella aliperiodilla. Osakemarkkinoiden tehokkuutta on testattu neljällä tilastollisella metodilla, mukaan lukien autokorrelaatiotesti ja epäparametrinen runs-testi. Tavoitteena on myös selvittääesiintyykö kyseisillä markkinoilla viikonpäiväanomalia. Viikonpäiväanomalian esiintymistä tutkitaan käyttämällä pienimmän neliösumman menetelmää (OLS). Viikonpäiväanomalia on löydettävissä kaikilta edellä mainituilta osakemarkkinoilta paitsi Tsekin markkinoilta. Merkittävää, positiivista tai negatiivista autokorrelaatiota, on löydettävissä kaikilta osakemarkkinoilta, myös Ljung-Box testi osoittaa kaikkien markkinoiden tehottomuutta täydellä periodilla. Osakemarkkinoiden satunnaiskulku hylätään runs-testin perusteella kaikilta muilta paitsi Slovakian osakemarkkinoilla, ainakin tarkastellessa koko aineistoa tai ensimmäistä aliperiodia. Aineisto ei myöskään ole normaalijakautunut minkään indeksin tai aikajakson kohdalla. Nämä havainnot osoittavat, että kyseessä olevat markkinat eivät ole heikkojen ehtojen mukaan tehokkaita