Buying behavior and competition in the software market

In the actual world, the impact of the software buying decisions has a rising relevance in social and economic terms. This research tries to explain it focusing on the organizations buying decisions of Operating Systems and Office Suites for personal computers and the impact on the competition between incumbent and alternative players in the market in these software categories, although the research hypotheses and conclusions may extend to other software categories and platforms. We concluded that in this market beside brand image, product features or price, other factors could have influence in the buying choices. Network effect, switching costs, local network effect, lock-in or consumer heterogeneity all have influence in the buying decision, protecting the incumbent and making it difficult for the competitive alternatives, based mainly on product features and price, to gain market share to the incumbent. This happens in a stronger way in the Operating Systems category.

Root-locus practical sketching rules for fractional-order system

For integer-order systems, there are well-known practical rules for RL sketching. Nevertheless, these rules cannot be directly applied to fractional-order (FO) systems. Besides, the existing literature on this topic is scarce and exclusively focused on commensurate systems, usually expressed as the ratio of two noninteger polynomials. The practical rules derived for those do not apply to other symbolic expressions, namely, to transfer functions expressed as the ratio of FO zeros and poles. However, this is an important case as it is an extension of the classical integer-order problem usually addressed by control engineers. Extending the RL practical sketching rules to such FO systems will contribute to decrease the lack of intuition about the corresponding system dynamics. This paper generalises several RL practical sketching rules to transfer functions specified as the ratio of FO zeros and poles. The subject is presented in a didactic perspective, being the rules applied to several examples.

Multidimensional scaling for orthodontic root resorption

The paper investigates the risk factors for the severity of orthodontic root resorption. The multidimensional scaling (MDS) visualization method is used to investigate the experimental data from patients who received orthodontic treatment at the Department of Orthodontics and Dentofacial Orthopedics, Faculty of Dentistry, “Carol Davila” University of Medicine and Pharmacy, during a period of 4 years. The clusters emerging in the MDS plots reveal features and properties not easily captured by classical statistical tools. The results support the adoption of MDS for tackling the dentistry information and overcoming noise embedded into the data. The method introduced in this paper is rapid, efficient, and very useful for treating the risk factors for the severity of orthodontic root resorption.

Root locus of fractional linear systems

In this paper an algorithm for the calculation of the root locus of fractional linear systems is presented. The proposed algorithm takes advantage of present day computational resources and processes directly the characteristic equation, avoiding the limitations revealed by standard methods. The results demonstrate the good performance for different types of expressions.

Quantity-setting competition with differentiated goods under uncertain demand

We consider a quantity-setting duopoly model, and we study the decision to move first or second, by assuming that the firms produce differentiated goods and that there is some demand uncertainty. The competitive phase consists of two periods, and in either period, the firms can make a production decision that is irreversible. As far as the firms are allowed to choose (non-cooperatively) the period they make the decision, we study the circumstances that favour sequential rather than simultaneous decisions.

Cournot competition between a non-profit firm and a for-profit firm with uncertainty

In this paper, we consider a Cournot competition between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a homogeneous goods market, with uncertain demand. Given an asymmetric tax schedule, we compute explicitly the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we analyze the effects of the tax rate and the degree of altruistic preference on market equilibrium outcomes.

Simultaneous decisions or leadership in an international competition

In this paper, we study an international market with demand uncertainty. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize the revenue. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. The uncertainty is resolved between the decisions made by the home government and by the firms. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.

Maximum-revenue tariff with different roles in a price-setting competition

Published also at Lecture Notes in Engineering and Computer Science

Manutenção de colônia de anopheles darlingi root, 1926, em laboratório

Descreve-se a instalação e manutenção inicial de uma colônia de An. darlingi, no município de Araraquara, SP, como parte do programa de pesquisas em malária da Superintendência de Controle de Endemias - SUCEN. Participando-se de experiência semelhante descrita por CORRÊA na década de 70, apresenta as modificações sugeridas por outros autores e pela experiência de seis meses de funcionamento. A perspectiva c dc desenvolvimento de uma colônia com simplificações de técnicas e equipamentos. São dadas informações sobre alimentação de larvas e alados, duração dos estádios larvais, mortalidade e acasalamento.

Inter-sectoral health policy in Portugal : competition, cooperation and control

Comunicação apresentada na «19th International Conference on Health Promoting Hospitals and Health Services», Turku, Finlândia de 1 a 3 de Junho de 2011.

Does a Tougher Competition Policy Reduce or Promote Investment?

The question of how interventions from the Competition Authority (CA) affect investment is not a straightforward one: a tougher competition policy might, by reducing the ability to exert market power, either stimulate firms to invest more to counter the restrictions on their actions, or make firms invest less because of the reduced ability to have a return on investment. This tension is illustrated using two models. In one model investment is own-cost-reducing whereas in the other investment is anti-competitive. Anti-competitive investments are defined as investments that increase competitors’ costs. In both models the optimal level of investment is reduced with a tougher competition policy. Furthermore, while in the case of an anti-competitive investment a tougher authority necessarily leads to lower prices, in the case of a cost- reducing investment the opposite may happen when the impact of the investment on cost is sufficiently high. Results for total welfare are ambiguous in the cost- reducing investment model, whereas in the anti-competitive investment model welfare unambiguously increases due to a tougher competition polic

TOXOCARIASIS: SEROLOGICAL DIAGNOSIS BY INDIRECT ANTIBODY COMPETITION ELISA

Toxocariasis is caused by infection of man by Toxocara canis and Toxocara cati larvae, the common roundworm of dogs and cats. Because larvae are difficult to detect in tissues, diagnosis is mostly based on serology. Non specific reactions are observed mainly due to cross-reactivity with Ascaris sp antigens. This investigation aimed at developing and evaluating an indirect antibody competition ELISA (IACE) employing a specific rabbit IgG anti-Toxocara canis excretory-secretory antigens as the competition antibody, in order to improve indirect ELISA specificity performed for toxocariasis diagnosis. For that, the rabbit IgG was previously absorbed by Ascaris suum adult antigens. Sensitivity and specificity of IACE were first evaluated in 28 serum samples of mice experimentally infected with T. canis embryonated eggs. Adopting cut-off value established in this population before infection, sensitivity and specificity were 100% after 20 days post-inoculation. For human population IACE was evaluated using sera from 440 patients with clinical signs of toxocariasis and the cut-off value was established with 60 serum samples from apparently healthy individuals. Using as reference test the indirect ELISA performed by Adolfo Lutz Institute, sensitivity was 60.2%, specificity was 98% and concordance was 77.3%. Repeatability of IACE was evaluated by the inter-reactions variation coefficient (2.4%).

Quantity-setting competition under uncertain demand

We consider a quantity-setting duopoly model, and we study the decision to move first or second, by assuming that. the firms produce homogeneous goods and that. there is some demand uncertainty. The competitive phase consists of two periods, and in either period, the firms can make a production decision that is irreversible. As far as the firms are allowed to choose (non-cooperatively) the period they make the decision, we study the circumstances that favour sequential rather than simultaneous decisions.

Asymmetric taxation in a competition between nonprofit and for-profit firms

This paper considers a Cournot competition between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a homogeneous goods market, with uncertain demand. Given an asymmetric tax schedule, we compute explicitly the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we analize the effects of the tax rate and the degree of altruistic preference on market equilibrium outcomes.

Quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly

In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods, linear and symmetric demand and with unknown costs. In our model, the two firms play a non-cooperative game with two stages: in a first stage, firm F 1 chooses the quantity, q 1, that is going to produce; in the second stage, firm F 2 observes the quantity q 1 produced by firm F 1 and chooses its own quantity q 2. Firms choose their output levels in order to maximise their profits. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that there is exactly one perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game. We analyse the variations of the expected profits with the parameters of the model, namely with the parameters of the probability distributions, and with the parameters of the demand and differentiation.