Investment coordination failures and the confidence channel of fiscal policy

Este trabalho desenvolve um novo "canal de Confiança" da política fiscal e caracteriza a política ótima quando esse canal é levado em consideração. Para esse objetivo, utilizamos um modelo estático com (i) concorrência monopolística, (ii) custos de ajustamento fixos para investir, (iii) complementaridade estratégica devido a informação imperfeita com respeito a produtividade agregada, e (iv) bens privados como substitutos imperfeitos de bens privados. Este arcabouço acomoda a possibilidade de falhas de coordenação nos investimentos, mas apresenta um equilíbrio único. Mostramos que a política fiscal tem efeitos importantes na coordenação. Um aumento dos gastos do governo leva a uma maior demanda por bens privados. Mais importante, este também afeta as expectativas de ordem superior com relação a demanda das demais firmas, que amplifica os efeitos do aumento inicial da demanda devido a complementaridade estratégica nas decisões de investimento. Como as demais firmas estão se deparam com uma demanda maior, espera-se que estas invistam mais, que por sua vez, aumenta a demanda individual de cada firma, que aumenta os incentivos a investir. Denominamos isto como o "canal de confiança" da política fiscal. Sob a ameaça de falhas de coordenação, a política fiscal ótima prescreve produzir além do ponto em que o benefício marginal resultante do consumo de bens públicos é igual ao custo marginal desses bens. Este benefício adicional vem do fato de que a política fiscal pode ampliar a coordenação dos investimentos.

Welfare and growth effects of alternative fiscal rules for infrastructure investment in Brazil

This article studies the interplay between fiscal rules, public investment and growth in Brazil. It is investigated if it would make sense to raise public investment and, if so, under which fiscal rule it is best to do it — whether through tax financing, debt financing, or a reduction of public consumption. We construct and simulate a competitive general equilibrium model, calibrated to Brazilian economy, in which public capital is a component of the production function and public consumption directly affects individuals’ well-being. After assessing the impacts of alternative fiscal rules, the paper concludes that the most desirable financing scheme is the reduction of public consumption, which dominates the others in terms of output and welfare gains. The model replicates the observed growth slowdown of the Brazilian economy when we increase taxes and reduce public capital formation to the levels observed after 1980 and shows that the growth impact of the expansion of tax collection in Brazil was much larger than that of public investment compression.

On the impossibility of prisoner's dilemmas in adversarial preference games

Why don't agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisonerís dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PDís are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or jealousy may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results ñ including the possibility of conflict inducing growth.

Common agency with informed principals

We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.

Reelection incentives and political corruption : evidence from Brazil’s municipal audit reports

This paper uses a unique dataset of political corruption, constructed from municipal audit reports obtained from Brazil’s randomized anti-corruption program, to test whether reelection incentives affect the level of rent extraction of incumbent politicians. In order to identify reelection incentives, we use the existence of a term limit in Brazil’s municipal elections. We find that in municipalities where mayors are in their second and final term, there is significantly more corruption compared to similar municipalities where mayors are in their first-term. In particular, in municipalities with second-term mayors there is, on average, R$188,431 more diversion of resources and the incidence of irregularities is 23% higher. We also find more pronounced effects where the costs of rent-extraction are lower (municipalities without media and judicial presence), and the density of pivotal voters is higher (more political competition). Finally, we show that first-term mayors, while less corrupt, have a larger incidence of poor administration suggesting that there may exist a trade-off between corruption and quality in public good provision.

The impact of mayor leadership on education: evidence from Brazil

What are the impacts of female mayors on education? It is well known that in Brazil, like in many other countries around the globe, women are underrepresented in political posts. Understanding the impacts of this discrepancy on policy choice and redistribution across many areas of inquiry is, therefore, an important research endeavor. Extant literature shows a strong link between women and the economic development of the areas they govern, specifically that they provide public goods relevant to the needs of women constituents. However, despite the efforts to explore the impacts of gender political leaders, we still do not know what is the consequence of gender on policy outcomes. Exploring a rich dataset on Brazilian municipalities, I intend to enrich the literature on the role of female politicians on politics. I employ a regression discontinuity design using Brazilian elections and indicators on education based on the basic education development index (IDEB), education expenditures and local policies. I find that municipalities where a woman enters into power do not perform better on education and do not present more investments or policies to improve education.

Ferramentas de controle interno da controladoria geral da União: instrumentos de fiscalização da gestão, controle social e combate a corrupção

A administração pública exerce o seu poder de fiscalização por intermédio dos controles externo e interno, nos níveis federal, estadual e municipal, atuando como representante do papel no lugar do cidadão na gestão dos bens públicos. A correta utilização dos recursos públicos tem sido motivo de preocupação da administração pública, não só quanto à existência de corrupção de agentes públicos e políticos, mas também pela má gestão, pela falta de eficácia, eficiência, efetividade e economicidade quando da execução de recursos por meio das políticas públicas. O objetivo desta pesquisa foi analisar a questão da governança na administração pública, sua eficiência no sentido amplo, na vertente do controle interno e controle social como forma de combate à corrupção. Este estudo buscou analisar o controle social nas ações investigativas do governo federal brasileiro, realizadas pela Controladoria Geral da União (CGU), por intermédio das Demandas Externas que são instrumentos de controle interno desenvolvidos pela CGU, são ferramentas de auditoria utilizadas no controle que proporcionam a fiscalização imediata por representantes de entidades e cidadãos, gerando relatórios e pedidos de informações para que o gestor se manifeste sobre impropriedades e irregularidades na execução de políticas públicas. As demandas externas processadas pela Controladoria Geral da União e estão ligadas diretamente ao momento de fiscalização prévia e concomitante, também se relacionam com a questão do controle social enfatizando a participação popular, podendo ser iniciadas não somente a partir de denúncias formuladas pelos órgãos do poder público e imprensa, mas a partir do próprio cidadão que diretamente exerce seu poder de fiscalização, havendo o uso desse instrumento aumentado significativamente nos últimos anos, principalmente por meio da internet. A relevância do estudo é importante na verificação da inciativa dessas demandas, outrora sempre feita por parte de órgãos da estrutura burocrática do Estado, começa a fomentar o cidadão à participação, isso aumenta o controle social e o accountability vertical.

ACRE: uma experiência inovadora de Governança?

About two decades ago Brazil has been suffered some important political changes on its government and supporter systems. In these changes the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers support) has been researched significant results as much legislation as executive ways. These conquests propitiate a structure for it to get an alternative motion in order to manage public goods by petista government way. Trying to examinate this we can study the Partido dos Trabalhadores government experience in Acre (1999-2002) to know about why the PT government characteristics are different from the others. To do this we assumed to conjecture a popular participation with priorities inversion and ethics in public resources administration. These are the elements of PT government way. This way we started our work making an evaluation of its bibliography. Them we do a field inquiry to analyses documents of the government projects (budget rules law, papers, approved laws, IBGE, PNUD, TSE) and semi-structured interviews with some characters of recent political Acres life. The scheme and the analysis about these givens disclose that weren t confirmed our hypothesis in part, since PT remained old local politics habitus. In other side the executive administration on PT government has got to inflect the Governance . Further on an efficient management as World Bank dispossess but PT absolve many requests of progressive sectors as well it expanded the society participation to resolutions process. By a cabinets enlargement. So it rescues a total administrative course which is printed in the called petista government way. Personally we think so it means important advancements in this Acre government way

A cooperação em crianças de rede pública de Natal/RN:uma abordagem evolucionista

Cooperation is a well known behavior and influenced by all cultures. Probably selective pressures brought advantages to individuals that cooperate, and then this behavior is current in human societies. Most of it is studied about cooperation and natural selection was understood by the game theory, a mathematical approach that helps to understand the conflict and cooperation. We believe that natural selection and game theory could facilitate understanding these behaviors and two theoretical articles were written regarding this view. It was also found that most of data about cooperation was obtained in (with) adults. Since game theory is effective to understand this phenomenon, and to be used and understood, two games were used with five and eleven year old children: the common pool and public goods games. The results are presented in four empirical articles. We found that children respond to social dilemmas of game theory like the adults do. They adjust their rounds regarding the feedback obtained of their partness; in the beginning they cooperate and reduce the degree of cooperation along (throughout) the following session; in the absence of punition the level of opportunism increased, mainly in larger groups; boys and girls behave differently when donate. This research suggest that cooperation has an evolutionary basis in human and it is since earlier in the behavioral pattern shown by adults.

A influência do feedback verbal na cooperação em crianças

Human cooperation is a hallmark of this species due to its wide extension to genetically unrelated individuals and complex division of labor. It is considered an evolutionary puzzle, because the theory of evolution by natural selection predicts that self-interested individuals tend to be selected. Different theories have been proposed to explain the evolution of cooperation, which the most important are kin selection and reciprocal altruism. Considering the evolutionary continuity between species, humans and other primates have several common traits that help to promote cooperation between individuals of these species. Two features, however, seem to be particularly humans: inequality aversion and preferences in relation to others. Although human cooperation is not necessarily related to morality, cooperative traits are the basis for moral tendencies. The development of human morality is a combination of early prosocial tendencies, cooperative skills displayed at different ages, social learning and cultural transmission of norms. The social stimulus seems to be particularly important in promoting cooperative behavior in children and adults. In order to study the influence of social stimuli, as verbal feedback, on children cooperation, a study was conducted with children in a public goods game. 407 children from public schools in Natal / RN, divided into 21 groups, between six and nine years, participated in eight rounds of this game. After each round, seven groups received praise for larger donations, seven groups have been criticized by smaller donations, and the other seven received no comment. Children cooperated more when criticized, without significant differences between sexes, although young children have cooperated more negative than older children. The results are likely related to the anticipation and avoidance of punishment associated with the feedback (although this did not occur), and greater sensitivity to the authority in younger children. Nevertheless, the cooperation decreased in all groups until the last day of play. The results suggest an early sensitivity to moral punishment, whose role in the maintenance of social relations must have been important in the evolution of cooperation in humans

Tributación en América Latina: en busca de una nueva agenda de reformas

Incluye Bibliografía

Retos de la política fiscal en Centroamérica

Incluye Bibliografía

Globalizing talent and human capital: implications for developing countries

Includes bibliography

Violence against women in couples: Latin America and the Caribbean. A proposal for measuring its incidence and trends

Includes bibliography