Interbank Competition with Costly Screening

We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker s (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loans are largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market effciency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks have differing screening abilities.

Financial Repression in a Natural Experiment: Loan Allocation and the Change in the Usury Laws in 1714

If financial deepening aids economic growth, then financial repression should be harmful. We use a natural experiment – the change in the English usury laws in 1714 – to analyze the effects of interest rate restrictions. We use a sample of individual loan transactions to demonstrate how the reduction of the legal maximum rate of interest affected the supply and demand for credit. Average loan size and minimum loan size increased strongly, and access to credit worsened for those with little ‘social capital.’ While we have no direct evidence that loans were misallocated, the discontinuity in loan receipts makes this highly likely. We conclude that financial repression can undermine the positive effects of financial deepening.

The Simple Economics of Conglomeration with Bankruptcy Costs: Separate or Joint Financing?

Which projects should be financed through separate non-recourse loans (or limited- liability companies) and which should be bundled into a single loan? In the pres- ence of bankruptcy costs, this conglomeration decision trades off the benefit of co- insurance with the cost of risk contamination. This paper characterize this tradeoff for projects with binary returns, depending on the mean, variability, and skewness of returns, the bankruptcy recovery rate, the correlation across projects, the number of projects, and their heterogeneous characteristics. In some cases, separate financing dominates joint financing, even though it increases the interest rate or the probability of bankruptcy.

Análise de Crédito e Avaliação de Riscos em Instituições Bancárias

É indubitável que o sistema financeiro é parte integrante de qualquer sociedade. Através da sua função de intermediação, as instituições financeiras recebem recursos dos agentes superavitários e emprestam aos agentes deficitários mediante promessa de pagamento futuro. Num banco, que tem intermediação financeira como sua principal actividade, o crédito consiste em disponibilizar ao cliente recursos em valores sob a forma de financiamento e ou empréstimo mediante uma promessa de pagamento numa data acordada entre as partes. A discussão e implementação dos acordos de BASILEIA, nomeadamente o Basileia II, veio dar uma nova forma a esse relacionamento sector bancário/clientes determinando as regras no que respeita a concessão de crédito e gestão de risco, estabelecendo os limites de crédito associado ao grau de risco das operações. Surge então, por parte das instituições uma maior preocupação em gerir o crédito e os riscos inerentes a cada operação, apostando em ferramentas e metodologias adequadas ao processo creditício. As instituições bancárias passam a criar departamentos de risco, colocando a gestão de crédito e de risco nas mãos de profissionais especializados, agindo sob regras e padrões internacionais uniformizados. There is no doubt that the financial system is an integral part of any society. Through their intermediary role, financial institutions receive funds from surplus agents and lend to deficit agents, with promises of future payment. Banks, with their primary activity being the financial intermediation, the credit is provided to customers in the form of funding or loans and a promise of payment on a date agreed between the parties. The discussion and implementation of the Basel Accord, Basel II in particular, has given a new form to that relationship banking/customer, setting out the rules regarding the granting of credit and risk management, establishing credit limits associated with the degree of risk of operations. Banking institutions got more and more concerned with credit and risk management, in all of their operations, using tools and methodologies that are designed to meet the needs of crediting processes. Banking institutions are creating departments of risk, putting the management of credit risk in the hands of trained professionals, acting under internationally uniform rules and standards

Processos de Reconhecimento, Mensuração e Contabilização do Rédito

O reconhecimento e mensuração do rédito tornaram-se cada vez mais complexos devido a factores como a concorrência internacional e a rápida evolução dos modelos empresariais. O rédito é a componente do rendimento proveniente da actividade operacional da empresa, daí ser de suprema importância determinar-se o momento em que o mesmo deve ser reconhecido bem como os critérios adequados para mensurá-lo. Neste trabalho debruçamo-nos sobre os processos de reconhecimento e mensuração do rédito. Este trabalho foi elaborado em duas partes, na primeira, efectuou-se uma revisão às normas de referência ao tratamento do rédito, com o objectivo de esclarecer algumas questões que suscitam grandes dúvidas, quer no meio académico, quer no meio profissional como é o exemplo do tratamento a dar ao rédito proveniente dos contratos de construção de imóveis numa empresa do ramo imobiliário. Na segunda parte do trabalho, elaborou-se um estudo de caso sobre a empresa TECNICIL Imobiliária, precisamente para verificar na prática o tratamento dado ao rédito proveniente dos acordos de construção levados a cabo por esta entidade. E desse estudo podemos concluir que a entidade não observa o tratamento prescrito pelas normas de referência, particularmente a IFRIC 15 – Acordos para Construção de Imóveis e IAS 18 – Rédito. There is no doubt that the financial system is an integral part of any society. Through their intermediary role, financial institutions receive funds from surplus agents and lend to deficit agents, with promises of future payment. Banks, with their primary activity being the financial intermediation, the credit is provided to customers in the form of funding or loans and a promise of payment on a date agreed between the parties. The discussion and implementation of the Basel Accord, Basel II in particular, has given a new form to that relationship banking/customer, setting out the rules regarding the granting of credit and risk management, establishing credit limits associated with the degree of risk of operations. Banking institutions got more and more concerned with credit and risk management, in all of their operations, using tools and methodologies that are designed to meet the needs of crediting processes. Banking institutions are creating departments of risk, putting the management of credit risk in the hands of trained professionals, acting under internationally uniform rules and standards.

A model of shadow banking

We present a model of shadow banking in which financial intermediaries originate and trade loans, assemble these loans into diversified portfolios, and then finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: i) outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, ii) intermediary assets and leverage move together as in Adrian and Shin (2010), and iii) intermediaries increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce their idiosyncratic risk through diversification, as in Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2010). Under rational expectations, the shadow banking system is stable and improves welfare. When investors and intermediaries neglect tail risks, however, the expansion of risky lending and the concentration of risks in the intermediaries create financial fragility and fluctuations in liquidity over time.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need toborrow from banks. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitiveequilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added to provide entrepreneurs withadditional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of thisadditional market is that it must be non-exclusive, in the sense that entrepreneurs must be ableto simultaneously borrow from many different lenders operating in it. This makes it possible toattain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new market while separating them in themarket for bank loans.

2007 Annual Report of the Iowa Railway Finance Authority

The Iowa Railway Finance Authority (IRFA) was created in 1980 by the 68th General Assembly to provide for the financing of rail facilities, and to enhance and continue the operation of essential rail facilities. IRFA was authorized to offer financial assistance for the acquisition, rehabilitation, construction, refinancing, extension, replacement, maintenance, repair or leasing of any rail facility. The 2005 legislative session amended Iowa Code 327H.20 by assigning all repayments of IRFA and other Iowa DOT rail assistance loans to the Rail Revolving Loan and Grant Fund. In 2006, a state appropriation of $235,000 was added to the program. In 2007, $2 million was appropriated to support rail development and job growth.

Country portfolios

Capital flows to developing countries are small and are mostly take the form of loans rather than direct foreign investment. We build a simple model of North-South capital flows that highlights the interplay between diminishing returns, production risk and sovereign risk. This model generates a set of country portfolios and a world distribution of capital stocks that resemble those in the data.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects needto borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, thecompetitive equilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurswith additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic ofthese additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it doesnot condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attainefficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the marketsfor monitored loans.

Monetary policy shocks and transmission in Italy: A VAR analysis

This paper provides updated empirical evidence about the real and nominal effects of monetary policy in Italy, by using structural VAR analysis. We discuss different empirical approaches that have been used in order to identify monetary policy exogenous shocks. We argue that the data support the view that the Bank of Italy, at least in the recent past, has been targeting the rate on overnight interbank loans. Therefore, we interpret shocks to the overnight rate as purely exogenous monetary policy shocks and study how different macroeconomic variables react to such shocks.

How enforcement institutions affect markets

In an experiment we study market outcomes under alternative incentive structures for third-party enforcers. Our transactions resemble an anonymous credit market where lenders can give loans and borrowers can repay them. When borrowers default, judges are free to enforce repayment but are themselves paid differently in each of three treatments. First, paying judges according to lenders votes maximizes surplus and the equality of earnings. In contrast, paying judges according to borrowers votes triggers insufficient enforcement, destroying the market and producing the lowest surplus and the most unequal distribution of earnings. Lastly, judges paid the average earnings of borrowers and lenders achieve results close to those based on lender voting. We employ a steps-of-reasoning argument to interpret the performances of different institutions. When voting and enforcement rights are allocated to different classes of actors, the difficulty of their task changes, and arguably as a consequence they focus on high or low surplus equilibria.

Educational opportunity and the college premium

Since World War II, the United States government has made improved accessto higher education a priority. This e¤ort has substantially increasedthe number of people who complete college. We show that by reducing theeffective interest rate on borrowing for education, such policies canactually increase the gap in wages between those with a college educationand those without. The mechanism that drives our results is the signaling role of education first explored by Spence (1973). We argue that financialconstraints on education reduce the value of education as a signal. Wesolve for the reduced form relationship between the interest rate and thewage premium in the steady state of a dynamic asymmetric information model.In addition, we discuss evidence of decreases in borrowing costs for educationfinancing in the U.S.

Serial defaults, serial profits: Returns to sovereign lending in Habsburg Spain, 1566-1600

Philip II of Spain accumulated debts equivalent to 60% of GDP. He also defaulted four times onhis short-term loans, thus becoming the first serial defaulter in history. Contrary to a commonview in the literature, we show that lending to the king was profitable even under worst-casescenario assumptions. Lenders maintained long-term relationships with the crown. Lossessustained during defaults were more than compensated by profits in normal times. Defaultswere not catastrophic events. In effect, short-term lending acted as an insurance mechanism,allowing the king to reduce his payments in harsh times in exchange for paying a premium intranquil periods. © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

The lender of last resort: A 21st Century approach

The object of this paper is to analyze rigorously the role of a Lender ofLast Resort by providing a framework where the distinction betweeninsolvency and illiquidity is not clearly cut. Determining the optimalLender of Last Resort policy requires a careful modeling of the structureof the interbank market and of the closure policy. In our set up, theresults depend upon the existence of moral hazard. If the main source ofmoral hazard is the banks lack of incentives to screen loans, then theLender of Last Resort may have to intervene to improve the e¢ciency of anunsecured interbank market; if instead, the main source of moral hazard isloans monitoring, then the interbank market should be secured and theLender of Last Resort should never intervene.