Determinants for political risk insurance of direct investments in emerging markets

Esta dissertação analisa os principais determinantes para investidores contratarem seguro de proteção de riscos políticos (PRI) para seus investimentos diretos, assim com o racional de sair de um PRI não renovando suas políticas. Esta dissertação contribui para a literatura existente sobre PRI, investigando os principais motivadores para PRI, tais como, riscos políticos, riscos econômicos, capacidade do patrocinador, instrumento utilizado para realizar o investimento (horizonte do investimento) determina combinações de PRI utilizando um modelo binário de resposta não linear. Um banco de dados único da Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) no período de 1990 até 2010, contendo informações sobre 693 investimentos incluindo sua cobertura para: seguro de risco de conversibilidade, seguro para risco de expropriação, riscos de guerras e distúrbios civis e riscos de quebra de contrato. Entretanto, percebemos que 47% destes seguros não permanecem ativos até o prazo originalmente contratado. Adicionalmente, instituições financeiras como garantidoras utilizam proporcionalmente mais dívida do que capital como instrumento de investimento e são largamente seguradas dentro da União Européia (EU). Por outro lado, investidores nos BRICs tendem a cobrir primariamente seus investimentos em infraestrutura. Resultados empíricos incluem que um aumento nos riscos de quebra de contrato e guerra civil estão totalmente correlacionados com a renovação de contratos de seguro, assim como um aumento da percepção de risco do pais que está recebendo o investimento.

Commodity Taxation and Social Insurance

We investigate optimal commodity taxation in a social insurance framework based on Varian (1980). We show that the tax prescriptions in this moral hazard framework are notably similar to those derive

On the cost of sympathy : a alternative model of insurance markets

The paper provides an alternative model for insurance market with three types of agents: households, providers of a service and insurance companies. Households have uncertainty about future leveIs of income. Providers, if hired by a household, perform a diagnoses and privately learn a signal. For each signal there is a procedure that maximizes the likelihood of the household obtaining the good state of nature. The paper assumes that providers care about their income and also about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature (sympathy assumption). This assumption is satisfied if, for example, they care about their reputation or if there are possible litigation costs in case they do not use the appropriate procedure. Finally, insurance companies offer contracts to both providers and households. The paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows that the sympathy assumption 1eads to a 10ss of welfare for the households due to the need to incentive providers to choose the least expensive treatment.

The sources of spinoff equity gains: takeover premiums or operating gains

Although the existence of spinoff equity gains is well documented, their source remains controversial. Arnong many potential causes, the literature suggests that spinoff equity gains could arise from expected tax benefits, expected takeover premia, operating performance improvement or from refocusing benefits. This paper investigates the link between spinoff announcement and post completion equity gains and post spinoff operating performance changes, takeover activity and refocusing benefits. The results indicate that spinoff announcement retums reflect anticipated takeover premiums as well as expected operating performance gains and refocusing benefits unrelated to operating performance. However, only the parent's operating performance gains are anticipated at the spinoff announcement. We find that post spinoff equity gains are driven mostly by operating performance changes for both parents and spun off subsidiaries. Takeover activity and unrelatedness of business lines between parent and subsidiary expIain littIe of post spinoff equity gains. OveralI, the data suggests that spinoffs equity gains mostly reflect anticipated real economic gains in terms of improved operating performance, and to a lesser extent takeover premium and refocusing benefit.

Do equity and foreign currency risk premiums display common patterns?

In da Costa et al. (2006) we have shown how a same pricing kernel can account for the excess returns of the S&:P500 over the US short term bond and of the uncovered over the covered trading of foreign government bonds. In this paper we estimate and test the overidentifying restrictiom; of Euler equations associated with "ix different versions of the Consumption Capital Asset Pricing I\Iodel. Our main finding is that the same (however often unreasonable) values for the parameters are estimated for ali models in both nmrkets. In most cases, the rejections or otherwise of overidentifying restrictions occurs for the two markets, suggesting that success and failure stories for the equity premium repeat themselves in foreign exchange markets. Our results corroborate the findings in da Costa et al. (2006) that indicate a strong similarity between the behavior of excess returns in the two markets when modeled as risk premiums, providing empirical grounds to believe that the proposed preference-based solutions to puzzles in domestic financiaI markets can certainly shed light on the Forward Premium Puzzle.

Do insurance defrauders want to be punished?

We analyze a Principal-Agent model of an insurer who faces an adverse selection problem. He is unable to observe if his client has a high risk or a low risk of having an accident. At the underwriting of the contract, the insurer requests the client to declare his risk. After that, the former can costly audit the truthfulness of this announcement. If the audit confirms a false declaration, the insurer is legally allowed to punish the defrauder. We characterize the efRcient contracts when this punishment is bounded from above by a legal restriction. Then, we do some comparative statics on the efRcient contracts and on the agent's utility. The most important result of this paper concerns the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment. We prove that there exists a uni que value of this legal limit that maximizes the expected utility of a high risk type. Facing this particular value of the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment, the insurer will effectively audit a low risk reporto We also show that this particular value increases with the probability of facing a high risk policyholder. Therefore, when this probability is sufRciently high, the nullity of the contract is not enough. From the point of view of a potential defrauder, the law should allow harder sanctions. This is an striking result because the nullity of the contract is a common sanction for this kind of fraud in the USA and in some European countries.

Project portfolio management: an analysis from the insurance industry IT area

This paper aims to bring more information related to the critical question "how IT areas of insurance companies are defining and delivering their strategic initiatives Portfolios?" and make conclusions based on the collected data. To reach these interpretations, it is composed of a theoretical investigation on the theme, a strategy delineation for the research methodology and a conclusion presentation based on the findings. In this last part, this study concluded that explored organization does not applied a sufficient number of best practices answering the critical question as "the company is not mature on this subject".

Optimal unemployment insurance for couples

This work analyzes the optimal design of an unemployment insurance program for couples, whose joint search problem in the labor market differ significantly from the problem faced by single agents. We use a version of the sequential search model of the labor market adapted to married agents to compare optimal constant policies for single and married agents, as well as characterize the optimal constant policy when the agency faces single and married agents simultaneously. Our main result is that an agency that gives equal weights to single and married agents will want to give equal utility promises to both types of agents and spend more on the single agent.

Conflito de agência no consórcio DPVAT: uma análise à luz da nova economia institucional sob a perspectiva da teoria da agência

Diferentes arranjos institucionais resultam em diferentes incentivos para a realização de trocas econômicas. Com efeito, estruturas regulatórias implementadas em determinado contexto histórico-econômico podem resultar em consequências diversas daquelas originariamente pretendidas, impondo ao regulador a necessidade de constante monitoramento e de intervenções com vistas a diagnosticar e corrigir ou minimizar possíveis distorções nas relações entre os atores envolvidos. Assim, esta dissertação tem por objetivo analisar o funcionamento do Consórcio do Seguro DPVAT como mecanismo de conexão entre seus diversos stakeholders. Pretende-se analisar a existência de conflitos de interesses derivados das diversas relações entre as partes interligadas – geradas pelo arranjo institucional firmado para a gestão dos recursos arrecadados com os prêmios pagos pelos proprietários de veículo automotor para o Seguro de Danos Pessoais Causados por Veículos Automotores de Via Terrestre, ou por sua carga, a Pessoas Transportadas ou Não (DPVAT) – que possam suscitar intervenção regulatória no sentido de evitá-los, ou, ao menos, mitigá-los. A pesquisa é conduzida a partir da identificação dos comportamentos esperados de agentes econômicos autointeressados, tendo por referência os pressupostos da Nova Economia Institucional sob a perspectiva da Teoria da Agência, e do exame das principais mudanças legislativas havidas na estrutura do seguro obrigatório de trânsito no Brasil nos últimos 50 anos. Na sequência, com base em elementos teóricos e empíricos, foram identificados e analisados três conflitos de agência entre os stakeholders do Consórcio DPVAT: o primeiro seria aquele havido entre a entidade gestora do Consórcio DPVAT (agente) e as sociedades seguradoras consorciadas (principal); o segundo conflito observado refere-se à relação mantida entre a entidade gestora do Consórcio DPVAT (agente) e o órgão regulador (principal); e, por fim, o conflito de agência existente entre a seguradora que administra o referido consórcio (agente) e os proprietários de veículo automotor (principal).

Financial guarantees in Brazilian life insurance and pension plans

Recently regulated Brazilian life and pension products offer a benefit structure composed of minimum guaranteed annual rate, in°ation adjustment according to a price index and participation on an investment fund performance. We present a valuation model for these products. We establish a fair condition relationship between minimum guarantees and participation rates, and explore its behavior over a space of maturities, interest rates, and also fund and price index volatilities and correlation. Besides consistency to reference models, we found that the effect of the fund volatility is conditioned to the price index volatility level and the correlation between them.

Public policy for pensions, health and sickness insurance

Includes bibliography

Public policy for pensions, health and sickness insurance: potential lessons from Sweden for Latin America

Includes bibliography

Insurance underwriter or financial development fund: what role for reserve pooling in Latin America?

Includes bibliography

Prevention and insurance of conflict and terrorism: issues and evidence for Latin America

Includes bibliography

Medical care equity for older persons in Chile: the role of the insurance sector

Includes bibliography