Memoires de l'Academie des Sciences, Agriculture, Arts et Belles-Lettres (Aix)

Tom 4 1840

Recueil de mémoires et autres pièces de prose et de vers : qui ont été lus dans les séances de la Société des amis des sciences, des lettres, de l'agriculture et des arts, à Aix.

Tom 1 1819

Memoires de l'Academie des Sciences, Agriculture, Arts et Belles-Lettres (Aix)

Tom 5 1844

Mémoires presentés a L'Institut des Sciences, Lettres et Arts, par divers savants èt lus dans ses assemblées : Sciences, Mathématiques et Physiques

11

Memoires de l'Academie (Royale) des Sciences, Belles-Lettres et Arts de Savoie.

6 (Serie 1)

Memoires de l'Academie (Royale) des Sciences, Belles-Lettres et Arts de Savoie.

11 (Serie 1)

Memoires de la Société (Royale) des sciences, de l'agriculture et des arts à Lille.

2nd ser., v. 1 (1854)

Memoires de la Société (Royale) des sciences, de l'agriculture et des arts à Lille.

1852

Mémoires de l'Academie (Royale) des Sciences, Belles-Lettres et Arts de Lyon.

1

Mémoires de l'Academie (Royale) des Sciences, Belles-Lettres et Arts de Lyon.

2

Mémoires de l'Academie (Royale) des Sciences, Belles-Lettres et Arts de Lyon.

9

Mémoires de l'Academie (Royale) des Sciences, Belles-Lettres et Arts de Lyon.

7

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

Agronomia i agrònoms a la Reial Acadèmia de Ciències Naturals i Arts de Barcelona (1766-1808)

Aquest treball estudia l’activitat agronòmica de la Reial Acadèmia de Ciències Naturals i Arts de Barcelona durant el període que abasta des de 1766 fins a 1808. Se centra en l’anàlisi de la documentació generada per la Direcció d’Agricultura d’aquesta institució, fent èmfasi en l’estudi del perfil biogràfic i intel•lectual dels homes que hi van estar al capdavant, i en la producció científica que van arribar a dur a terme. El treball enumera i analitza les propostes tècniques per millorar l’agricultura que des d’aquesta corporació es van sotmetre a debat. En aquest sentit, es destaquen les aportacions en temes com la vinya, els nous conreus o el debat sobre la situació de la ramaderia al país.

All-pay auction equilibria in contests

We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the one of the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Since these conditions are fulfilled for a wide array of situations, the predictions of this equilibrium are very robust to the specific details of the contest. An application of this result contributes to fill a gap in the analysis of the popular Tullock rent- seeking game because it characterizes properties of an equilibrium for increasing returns to scale larger than two, for any number of contestants and in contests with or without a common value. Keywords: (non-) deterministic contest, all-pay auction, contest success functions. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D44 (Auctions).