931 resultados para wage inequality
Resumo:
We use aggregate GDP data and within-country income shares for theperiod 1970-1998 to assign a level of income to each person in theworld. We then estimate the gaussian kernel density function for theworldwide distribution of income. We compute world poverty rates byintegrating the density function below the poverty lines. The $1/daypoverty rate has fallen from 20% to 5% over the last twenty five years.The $2/day rate has fallen from 44% to 18%. There are between 300 and500 million less poor people in 1998 than there were in the 70s.We estimate global income inequality using seven different popularindexes: the Gini coefficient, the variance of log-income, two ofAtkinson s indexes, the Mean Logarithmic Deviation, the Theil indexand the coefficient of variation. All indexes show a reduction in globalincome inequality between 1980 and 1998. We also find that most globaldisparities can be accounted for by across-country, not within-country,inequalities. Within-country disparities have increased slightly duringthe sample period, but not nearly enough to offset the substantialreduction in across-country disparities. The across-country reductionsin inequality are driven mainly, but not fully, by the large growth rateof the incomes of the 1.2 billion Chinese citizens. Unless Africa startsgrowing in the near future, we project that income inequalities willstart rising again. If Africa does not start growing, then China, India,the OECD and the rest of middle-income and rich countries diverge awayfrom it, and global inequality will rise. Thus, the aggregate GDP growthof the African continent should be the priority of anyone concerned withincreasing global income inequality.
Resumo:
We use CEX repeated cross-section data on consumption and income, to evaluate the nature of increased income inequality in the 1980s and 90s. We decompose unexpected changes in family income into transitory and permanent, and idiosyncratic and aggregate components, and estimate the contribution of each component to total inequality. The model we use is a linearized incomplete markets model, enriched to incorporate risk-sharing while maintaining tractability. Our estimates suggest that taking risk sharing into account is important for the model fit; that the increase in inequality in the 1980s was mainly permanent; and that inequality is driven almost entirely by idiosyncratic income risk. In addition we find no evidence for cyclical behavior of consumption risk, casting doubt on Constantinides and Duffie s (1995) explanation for the equity premium puzzle.
Resumo:
Was the increase in income inequality in the US due to permanent shocks or merely to an increase in the variance of transitory shocks? The implications for consumption and welfare depend crucially on the answer to this question. We use CEX repeated cross-section data on consumption and income to decompose idiosyncratic changes in income into predictable life-cycle changes, transitory and permanent shocks and estimate the contribution of each to total inequality. Our model fits the joint evolution of consumption and income inequality well and delivers two main results. First, we find that permanent changes in income explain all of the increase in inequality in the 1980s and 90s. Second, we reconcile this finding with the fact that consumption inequality did not increase much over this period. Our results support the view that many permanent changes in income are predictable for consumers, even if they look unpredictable to the econometrician, consistent withmodels of heterogeneous income profiles.
Resumo:
We present a new general concentration-of-measure inequality and illustrate its power by applications in random combinatorics. The results find direct applications in some problems of learning theory.
Wage structures and family economies in the Catalan textile industry in an age of nascent capitalism
Resumo:
This paper deals with changes in managerial practices in Catalonia in anage of nascent capitalism (1830-1925) and adaptive family strategies inorder to face the absence of state welfare. During the 19 t h Century andin the absence of recorded labor contracts, human resources of the firmwere organized by means of implicit contracts and informal labor markets.With the advent of scientific organization of labor, wage per hour workedbegan to be recorded. This is why in the 1920s the perfect competitionmodel applies to our case. On the other hand, in the same period, and inthe absence of state welfare, ideas stemming from cooperative game theoryapply to the pattern of household income formation. Kin related networkswere used to improve the living standards of the household. In thisparticular direction we also show that there was a demonstration effectby means of which migrant s living standards were higher than those ofnatives.
Resumo:
Why was England first? And why Europe? We present a probabilistic model that builds on big-push models by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), combined with hierarchical preferences. The interaction of exogenous demographic factors (in particular the English low-pressure variant of the European marriage pattern)and redistributive institutions such as the old Poor Law combined to make an Industrial Revolution more likely. Essentially, industrialization is the result of having a critical mass of consumers that is rich enough to afford (potentially) mass-produced goods. Our model is then calibrated to match the main characteristics of the English economy in 1750 and the observed transition until 1850.This allows us to address explicitly one of the key features of the British IndustrialRevolution unearthed by economic historians over the last three decades the slowness of productivity and output change. In our calibration, we find that the probability of Britain industrializing is 5 times larger than France s. Contrary to the recent argument by Pomeranz, China in the 18th century had essentially no chance to industrialize at all. This difference is decomposed into a demographic and a policy component, with the former being far more important than the latter.
Resumo:
We lay out a model of wage bargaining with two leading features:bargaining is ex post to relevant investments and there isindividual bargaining in firms without a Union. We compareindividual ex post bargaining to coordinated ex post bargainingand we analyze the effects on wage formation. As opposed to exante bargaining models, the costs of destroying the employmentrelationship play a crucial role in determining wages. Highfiring costs in particular yield a rent for employees. Ourtheory points to a employer size-wage effect that is independentof the production function and market power. We derive a simpleleast squares specification from the theoretical model thatallow us to estimate components of the wage premium fromcoordination. We reject the hypothesis that labor coordinationdoes not alter the extensive form of the bargaining game. Laborcoordination substantially increases bargaining power butdecreases labor's ability to pose costly threats to the firm.
Resumo:
This paper shows how recently developed regression-based methods for the decomposition ofhealth inequality can be extended to incorporate heterogeneity in the responses of health to the explanatory variables. We illustrate our method with an application to the GHQ measure of psychological well-being taken from the British Household Panel Survey. The results suggest that there is an important degree of heterogeneity in the association of health to explanatory variables across birth cohorts and genders which, in turn, accounts for a substantial percentage of the inequality in observed health.
Resumo:
In this paper we examine the determinants of wages and decompose theobserved differences across genders into the "explained by differentcharacteristics" and "explained by different returns components"using a sample of Spanish workers. Apart from the conditionalexpectation of wages, we estimate the conditional quantile functionsfor men and women and find that both the absolute wage gap and thepart attributed to different returns at each of the quantiles, farfrom being well represented by their counterparts at the mean, aregreater as we move up in the wage range.
Resumo:
A generalized rise in unemployment rates for both college and high-schoolgraduates, a widening education wage premium, and a sharp increase incollege education participation are characteristic features of thetransformations of the U.S. labor market between 1970 and 1990. This paperinvestigates the interactions between these changes in the labor marketand in educational attainment. First, it develops an equilibrium searchand matching model of the labor market where education is endogenouslydetermined. Second, calibrated versions of the model are used to studyquantitatively whether either a skill-biased change in technology or amismatch shock can explain the above facts. The skill-biased shock accountsfor a considerable part of the changes but fails to produce the increasein unemployment for the educated labor force. The mismatch shock explainsinstead much of the change in the four variables, including the wage premium.
Resumo:
This paper presents a method for the measurement of changes in health inequality and income-related health inequality over time in a population.For pure health inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) andincome-related health inequality (as measured by the concentration index),we show how measures derived from longitudinal data can be related tocross section Gini and concentration indices that have been typicallyreported in the literature to date, along with measures of health mobilityinspired by the literature on income mobility. We also show how thesemeasures of mobility can be usefully decomposed into the contributions ofdifferent covariates. We apply these methods to investigate the degree ofincome-related mobility in the GHQ measure of psychological well-being inthe first nine waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). Thisreveals that dynamics increase the absolute value of the concentrationindex of GHQ on income by 10%.
Resumo:
We derive a new inequality for uniform deviations of averages from their means. The inequality is a common generalization of previous results of Vapnik and Chervonenkis (1974) and Pollard (1986). Usingthe new inequality we obtain tight bounds for empirical loss minimization learning.
Resumo:
In 1993, Iowa Workforce Development (then the Department of Employment Services) conducted a survey to determine if there was a gender gap in wages paid. The results of that survey indicated that females were paid 68 cents for every dollar paid to males. Another study was conducted in 1999 which found that females made approximately 73 cents for every dollar made by males in Iowa. These calculations took into account the average number of hours respondents worked weekly. In January 2008, Iowa Workforce Development (IWD) was contacted by the Iowa Commission on the Status of Women (ICSW) to request that IWD conduct research to update the 1999 gender wage equity study to determine if the wage disparity between males and females has changed since the 1999 study. This study was completed by IWD using 2007/2008 Laborshed data consisting of responses from 5,669 employed respondents. Of the respondents, 59.6 percent (3,379) were female, 40.3 percent (2,285) were male, and 0.1 percent (5) refused to identify their gender. Statewide sampling was provided by the University of Northern Iowa’s Institute for Decision Making based on the population per ZIP code. The results of the survey show that females who are paid an hourly wage earn 21.8 percent (78.2 cents for every dollar) less than males earn and females who are salaried earn 21.6 percent less than males. Additional survey results detail the occupational categories, industries and the education and experience levels. All of these characteristics contribute to the disparity.
Resumo:
Four general equilibrium search models are compared quantitatively. Thebaseline framework is a calibrated macroeconomic model of the US economydesigned for a welfare analysis of unemployment insurance policy. Theother models make three simple and natural specification changes,regarding tax incidence, monopsony power in wage determination, and therelevant threat point. These specification changes have a major impacton the equilibrium and on the welfare implications of unemploymentinsurance, partly because search externalities magnify the effects ofwage changes. The optimal level of unemployment insurance dependsstrongly on whether raising benefits has a larger impact on searcheffort or on hiring expenditure.
Resumo:
We generalize the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) model of the labor marketwith a more realistic structure for the stochastic process of theshocks to the worker-firm match. In this way we can acommodate theempirical observation that hazard rates of job termination decrease andaverage wages increase with job tenure. Besides being able to fit bettersome observables of the model, the changes we introduce are nontrivialfor the analysis of policies as well.