Two new game birds from Peru.

v.39:no.32(1959)

Forming efficient networks

In this paper, we suggest a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria give rise to efficient networks. Moreover, the payoffs received by the agents coincide with their Shapley value in an appropriately defined cooperative game.

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

A generalized assignment game

The proposed game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game to the case where each seller owns a set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of both pairwise and group stable outcomes is proved. We study the structure of the group stable set and we finally prove that the set of group stable payoffs forms a complete lattice with one optimal group stable payoff for each side of the market.

The principal-agent matching market

We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyze an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of principal-agent economies where the results fit into.

Fair procedures. Evidence from games involving lotteries

Procedural fairness plays a prominent role in the social discourse concerning the marketplace in particular, and social institutions in general. Random procedures are a simple case, and they have found application in several important social allocation decisions. We investigate random procedures in the laboratory. We find that an unbiased random procedure is an acceptable substitute for an unbiased allocation: similar patterns of acceptance and rejection result when either is inserted as a feasible proposal in a sequential battle-of-the-sexes. We also find that unbiasedness, known to be a crucial characteristic of allocation fairness, is important to procedural fairness: in the context of a random offer game, a biased outcome is more readily accepted when chosen by an unbiased random draw than by one that is biased. Procedural fairness is conceptually different than allocation fairness or attribution-based behavior, and none of the current models of fairness and reciprocity captures our results. Post hoc extension of one of these models (ERC) suggests that a deeper understanding of procedural fairness requires further investigation of competing fairness norms.

Equilibrium play and best response to (Stated) beliefs in constant sum games

We report experimental results on one-shot two person 3x3 constant sum games played by non-economists without previous experience in the laboratory. Although strategically our games are very similar to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, 80% of actions taken in our experiment coincided with the prediction of the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and 73% of actions were best responses to elicited beliefs. We argue how social preferences, presentation effects and belief elicitation procedures may influence how subjects play in simple but non trivial games and explain the diferences we observe with respect to previous work.

A simple method to purify biologically and antigenically preserved bloodstream trypomastigotes of Trypanosoma cruzi using Deae-cellulose columns

A method to purify trypanosomastigotes of some strains of Trypanosoma cruzi (Y, CL, FL, F, "Berenice", "Colombiana" and "São Felipe") from mouse blood by using DEAE-cellulose columns was standardized. This procedure is a modification of the Lanham & Godfrey methods and differs in some aspects from others described to purify T. cruzi bloodstream trypomastigotes, mainly by avoidance of prior purifications of parasites. By this method, the broad trypomastigotes were mainly isolated, accounting for higher recoveries obtained with strains having higher percentages of these forms: processing of infected blood from irradiated mice could be advantageous by increasing the recovery of parasites (percentage and/or total number) and elution of more slender trypomastigotes. Trypomastigotes purified by this method presented normal morphology and motility, remained infective to triatomine bugs and mice, showing in the latter prepatent periods and courses parasitemia similar to those of control parasites, and also reproducing the polymorphism pattern of each strain. Their virulence and pathogenicity also remained considerably preserved, the latter property being evaluated by LD 50 tests, mortality rates and mean survival time of inoculated mice. Moreover, these parasites presented positive, clear and peripheral immunofluorescence reaction at titres similar to those of control organisms, thus suggesting important preservation of their surface antigens.

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

A simple method for assessing the binding of concanavalin A to mononuclear cell surfaces: no interference of visceral leishmaniasis serum on this binding

We report a simple method for evaluating the binding of concanavalin A (ConA) to human peripheral blood mononuclear cells (PBMC). The binding is evidenced by an immunoenzymic assay using peroxidase-conjugated immunoglobulins of a rabbit anti-ConA serum. Using the method we show that sera from patients with American leishmaniasis do not interfere with binding of ConA to PBMC.

Análisis y diseño de un procesador RISC simple para adquisición y proceso de datos

Aquest projecte té com a objectiu l'anàlisi de prestacions de processadors RISC de baix cost i el disseny d'un processador RISC simple per a aplicacions de propòsit general relacionades amb l'adquisició i el procés simple de dades. Com a resultat es presenta el processador SR3C de 32 bits i arquitectura RISC. Aquest processador s'ha descrit i simulat mitjançant el llenguatge de descripció de hardware VHDL i s'ha sintetitzat en una FPGA. El processador està preparat per poder utilitzar-se en SoCs reals gràcies al compliment de l'estàndard de busos Wishbone. A més també es pot utilitzar com plataforma educativa gràcies a l'essamblador i simulador desenvolupats.

PulseCath iVAC 3LTM hemodynamic performance for simple assisted flow.

The PulseCath iVAC 3L? left ventricular assist device is an option to treat transitory left heart failure or dysfunction post-cardiac surgery. Assisted blood flow should reach up to 3 l/min. In the present in vitro model exact pump flow, depending on various frequencies and afterload was examined. Optimal flow was achieved with inflation/deflation frequencies of about 70-80/min. The maximal flow rate was achieved at about 2.5 l/min with a minimal afterload of 22 mmHg. Handling of the device was easy due to the connection to a standard intra-aortic balloon pump console. With increasing afterload (up to a simulated mean systemic pressure of 66 mmHg) flow rate and cardiac support are in some extent limited.

A simple genetic basis for complex social behaviour mediates widespread gene expression differences.

A remarkable social polymorphism is controlled by a single Mendelian factor in the fire ant Solenopsis invicta. A genomic element marked by the gene Gp-9 determines whether workers tolerate one or many fertile queens in their colony. Gp-9 was recently shown to be part of a supergene with two nonrecombining variants, SB and Sb. SB/SB and SB/Sb queens differ in how they initiate new colonies, and in many physiological traits, for example odour and maturation rate. To understand how a single genetic element can affect all these traits, we used a microarray to compare gene expression patterns between SB/SB and SB/Sb queens of three different age classes: 1-day-old unmated queens, 11-day-old unmated queens and mated, fully reproductive queens collected from mature field colonies. The number of genes that were differentially expressed between SB/SB and SB/Sb queens of the same age class was smallest in 1-day-old queens, maximal in 11-day-old queens and intermediate in reproductive queens. Gene ontology analysis showed that SB/SB queens upregulate reproductive genes faster than SB/Sb queens. For all age classes, genes inside the supergene were overrepresented among the differentially expressed genes. Consistent with the hypothesized greater number of transposons in the Sb supergene, 13 transposon genes were upregulated in SB/Sb queens. Viral genes were also upregulated in SB/Sb mature queens, consistent with the known greater parasite load in colonies headed by SB/Sb queens compared with colonies headed by SB/SB queens. Eighteen differentially expressed genes between reproductive queens were involved in chemical signalling. Our results suggest that many genes in the supergene are involved in regulating social organization and queen phenotypes in fire ants.