Improving Transition Outcomes: Youth Leadership Forum Alumni Survey

Results from a survey conducted in cooperation with Iowa's Youth Leadership Forum.

Shared knowledge

Agents use their knowledge on the history of the economy in orderto choose what is the optimal action to take at any given moment of time,but each individual observes history with some noise. This paper showsthat the amount of information available on the past evolution of theeconomy is an endogenous variable, and that this leads to overconcentrationof the investment, which can be interpreted as underinvestment in research.It presents a model in which agents have to invest at each period in one of$K$ sectors, each of them paying an exogenous return that follows a welldefined stochastic path. At any moment of time each agent receives an unbiasednoisy signal on the payoff of each sector. The signals differ across agents,but all of them have the same variance, which depends on the aggregate investmentin that particular sector (so that if almost everybody invests in it theperceptions of everybody will be very accurate, but if almost nobody doesthe perceptions of everybody will be very noisy). The degree of hetereogeneityacross agents is then an endogenous variable, evolving across time determining,and being determined by, the amount of information disclosed.As long as both the level of social interaction and the underlying precisionof the observations are relatively large agents behave in a very preciseway. This behavior is unmodified for a huge range of informational parameters,and it is characterized by an excessive concentration of the investment ina few sectors. Additionally the model shows that generalized improvements in thequality of the information that each agent gets may lead to a worse outcomefor all the agents due to the overconcentration of the investment that thisproduces.

Leadership in cardiac surgery.

Despite the efficacy of cardiac surgery, less invasive interventions with more uncertain long-term outcomes are increasingly challenging surgery as first-line treatment for several congenital, degenerative and ischemic cardiac diseases. The specialty must evolve if it is to ensure its future relevance. More importantly, it must evolve to ensure that future patients have access to treatments with proven long-term effectiveness. This cannot be achieved without dynamic leadership; however, our contention is that this is not enough. The demands of a modern surgical career and the importance of the task at hand are such that the serendipitous emergence of traditional charismatic leadership cannot be relied upon to deliver necessary change. We advocate systematic analysis and strategic leadership at a local, national and international level in four key areas: Clinical Care, Research, Education and Training, and Stakeholder Engagement. While we anticipate that exceptional individuals will continue to shape the future of our specialty, the creation of robust structures to deliver collective leadership in these key areas is of paramount importance.

Endogenous price leadership

We consider a linear price setting duopoly game with di®erentiatedproducts and determine endogenously which of the players will lead andwhich will follow. While the follower role is most attractive for each firm, we show that waiting is more risky for the low cost firm so that,consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten(1988), allow the conclusion that only the high cost firm will choose towait. Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader.

Endogenous price leadership

We consider a linear price setting duopoly game with differentiated products and determine endogenously which of the players will lead and which will follow. While the follower role is most attractive for each firm, we show that waiting is more risky for the low cost firm so that, consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), allow the conclusion that only the highcost firm will choose to wait. Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader.

Endogenous Stackelberg leadership

We consider a linear quantity setting duopoly game and analyzewhich of the players will commit when both players have the possibility todo so. To that end, we study a 2-stage game in which each player caneither commit to a quantity in stage 1 or wait till stage 2. We show thatcommitting is more risky for the high cost firm and that, consequently,risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), allowthe conclusion that only the low cost firm will choose to commit.Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous Stackelberg leader.

Leadership and individual differences: at the cusp of a renaissance

In this introductory editorial, we provide a brief overview of the history of individual difference research in leadership. We explain the major challenges that trait research faced, and why it was revived primarily because of methodological advancements. Next, we argue that leadership individual difference research is at a cusp of a renaissance. We explain why we are at this cusp and what researchers should do reify the renaissance in terms of theoretical extensions of trait models, the application of robust methodological advancements, and the development of process models linking distal (i.e., traits) predictors to proximal predictors (e.g., behaviors, skills, attitudes), and the latter to leader outcomes. We then summarize the papers we accepted for the special issue, and conclude with an optimistic note for leadership individual difference research.

Predictors of leadership: The usual suspects and the suspect traits

In this chapter, I review literature on traits (i.e., individual differences) and their links to leader outcomes. I present an integrated model, the ascription-actuality trait theory, to explain two routes to leader outcomes that stem from traits: the route that objectively matters and the route that appears to matter but objectively may not. I discuss the history of trait research and provide criteria by which we should judge the validity of trait models. Finally, I review trait models that are the most predictive of leadership outcomes and identify those that are non-starters.

An evolutionary model explaining the Neolithic transition from egalitarianism to leadership and despotism.

The Neolithic was marked by a transition from small and relatively egalitarian groups to much larger groups with increased stratification. But, the dynamics of this remain poorly understood. It is hard to see how despotism can arise without coercion, yet coercion could not easily have occurred in an egalitarian setting. Using a quantitative model of evolution in a patch-structured population, we demonstrate that the interaction between demographic and ecological factors can overcome this conundrum. We model the coevolution of individual preferences for hierarchy alongside the degree of despotism of leaders, and the dispersal preferences of followers. We show that voluntary leadership without coercion can evolve in small groups, when leaders help to solve coordination problems related to resource production. An example is coordinating construction of an irrigation system. Our model predicts that the transition to larger despotic groups will then occur when: (i) surplus resources lead to demographic expansion of groups, removing the viability of an acephalous niche in the same area and so locking individuals into hierarchy; (ii) high dispersal costs limit followers' ability to escape a despot. Empirical evidence suggests that these conditions were probably met, for the first time, during the subsistence intensification of the Neolithic.