A Novel Autonomous Observation Platform for Multi-Disciplinary Investigations at the Cape Verde Ocean Observatory (CVOO)

In order to investigate the spatial and temporal variability (daily, seasonal and inter-annual) of CO2 and O2 air-sea fluxes and their underlying processes, a dense network of observations is required. For this purpose, the Cape Verde Ocean Observatory (CVOO) provides a unique infrastructure. Information thus obtained also links biological productivity and atmospheric composition. To expand these capabilities, a novel “virtual mooring” approach for high resolution measurements, based on a modified NEMO profiling float, is pursued. This Profiling Float was equipped with O2 and pCO2 sensors for the first time, in order to collect daily depth profiles (0-200 m) in the vicinity of the ocean site. Data access and remote control is provided through Iridium satellite telemetry. Recalibrations and redeployments are carried out every 1-3 month. First, we present the new developed instrument and the innovative in situ and real-time approach behind. Second, we show the inter-disciplinary scientific objectives which will benefit from this approach as a result of the intensive partnership between IFM-GEOMAR and INDP during the last years.

Development and validation of an instrument for evaluating the ludicity of games in health education

Abstract OBJECTIVE Developing and validating an instrument to evaluate the playfulness of games in health education contexts. METHODOLOGY A methodological, exploratory and descriptive research, developed in two stages: 1. Application of an open questionnaire to 50 graduate students, with content analysis of the answers and calculation of Kappa coefficient for defining items; 2. Procedures for construction of scales, with content validation by judges and analysis of the consensus estimate byContent Validity Index(CVI). RESULTS 53 items regarding the restless character of the games in the dimensions of playfulness, the formative components of learning and the profiles of the players. CONCLUSION Ludicity can be assessed by validated items related to the degree of involvement, immersion and reinvention of the subjects in the game along with the dynamics and playability of the game.

The Importance of Using Games to Teach English in the 3rd Cycle

The title of this thesis is “The importance of using games to teach English in the 3rd Cycle”. I choose this topic because I think that games are important in the process of learning and because in my opinion not only students but people in general are more motivated to learn when they are having fun or when they are doing something that is interesting. Some authors argue that games stimulate learners to practise, to activate and extend their English vocabulary, and that most students feel more motivated to learn and learn more easily when they are having fun. Games make demands on learners’ intelligence and imagination and calls for active participation. That is exactly what 3rd Cycle students and teachers need in order to have success in their studies and work respectively. The 3rd Cycle students have covered the majority of the grammar and functions contents of the English curriculum in the previous Cycles (the 1st and 2nd Cycle) and in the 3rd Cycle the students need most of their time to put into practice what they have learned before. Games are an effective method to put in practice what they have learned before and also through games they have several contexts and different situations to explore in order to show their knowledge or their vocabulary. The 3rd Cycle students need methods that motivate them to learn and to participate in class and since they already study a specific language function. If the teacher uses an enjoyable method like games students will not get bored and they will be more motivate to participate in class.

The Vaccine Formulation Laboratory: a platform for access to adjuvants.

Adjuvants are increasingly used by the vaccine research and development community, particularly for their ability to enhance immune responses and for their dose-sparing properties. However, they are not readily available to the majority of public sector vaccine research groups, and even those with access to suitable adjuvants may still fail in the development of their vaccines because of lack of knowledge on how to correctly formulate the adjuvants. This shortcoming led the World Health Organization to advocate for the establishment of the Vaccine Formulation Laboratory at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland. The primary mission of the laboratory is to transfer adjuvants and formulation technology free of intellectual property rights to academic institutions, small biotechnology companies and developing countries vaccine manufacturers. In this context, the transfer of an oil-in-water emulsion to Bio Farma, an Indonesian vaccine manufacturer, was initiated to increase domestic pandemic influenza vaccine production capacity as part of the national pandemic influenza preparedness plan.

Cooperative games in strategic form

In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the proposer commitment procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to threats. We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.

Hot vs. cold: Sequential responses and preference stability in experimental games

In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyzewhether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions dependon the elicitation procedure. In our hot treatment thesecond player responds to the first player s observed actionwhile in our cold treatment we follow the strategy method and have the second player decide on a contingent action foreach and every possible first player move, without firstobserving this move. Our analysis centers on the degree towhich subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniaryrewards, as a response to others actions. Our results show nodifference in behavior between the two treatments. We also findevidence of the stability of subjects preferences with respectto their behavior over time and to the consistency of theirchoices as first and second mover.

The role of role uncertainty in modified dictator games

We compare behavior in modified dictator games with and without role uncertainty. Subjectschoose between a selfish action, a costly surplus creating action (altruistic behavior) and acostly surplus destroying action (spiteful behavior). While costly surplus creating actions are themost frequent under role uncertainty (64%), selfish actions become the most frequent withoutrole uncertainty (69%). Also, the frequency of surplus destroying choices is negligible with roleuncertainty (1%) but not so without it (11%). A classification of subjects into four differenttypes of interdependent preferences (Selfish, Social Welfare maximizing, Inequity Averse andCompetitive) shows that the use of role uncertainty overestimates the prevalence of SocialWelfare maximizing preferences in the subject population (from 74% with role uncertainty to21% without it) and underestimates Selfish and Inequity Averse preferences. An additionaltreatment, in which subjects undertake an understanding test before participating in theexperiment with role uncertainty, shows that the vast majority of subjects (93%) correctlyunderstand the payoff mechanism with role uncertainty, but yet surplus creating actions weremost frequent. Our results warn against the use of role uncertainty in experiments that aim tomeasure the prevalence of interdependent preferences.

Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games

By introducing physical outcomes in coalitional games we note that coalitional games and social choice problems are equivalent (implying that so are the theory of implementation and the Nash program). This facilitates the understanding of the role of invariance and randomness in the Nash program. Also, the extent to which mechanisms in the Nash program perform ``real implementation'' is examined.

Choice of partners in multiple two-person prisoner's dilemma games: An experimental study

We examine the effect of unilateral and mutual partner selection in the context of prisoner's dilemmas experimentally. Subjects play simultaneously several finitely repeated two-person prisoner's dilemma games. We find that unilateral choice is the best system. It leads to low defection and fewer singles than with mutual choice. Furthermore, with the unilateral choice setup we are able to show that intendingdefectors are more likely to try to avoid a match than intending cooperators. We compare our results of multiple games with single game PD-experiments and find no difference in aggregate behavior. Hence the multiple game technique is robust and might therefore be an important tool in the future for testing the use of mixed strategies.

On payoff heterogeneity in games with strategic complementarities

Payoff heterogeneity weakens positive feedback in binary choice models intwo ways. First, heterogeneity drives individuals to corners where theyare unaffected by strategic complementarities. Second, aggregate behaviouris smoother than individual behaviour when individuals are heterogeneous.However, this smoothing does not necessarily eliminate positive feedbackor guarantee a unique equilibrium. In games with an unbounded, continuouschoice space, heterogeneity may either weaken or strengthen positive feedback,depending on a simple convexity/concavity condition. We conclude that positivefeedback phenomena derived in representative agent models will often be robustto heterogeneity.