Spatio-temporal pattern formation in microemulsions under different physical and chemical conditions

Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg, Fakultät für Naturwissenschaften, Dissertation, 2016

Studies on skeleton formation in reptiles. Olivier Rieppel.

n.s. no.68(1992)

Protoptychus hatcheri Scott, 1895 : the mammalian faunas of the Washakie Formation, Eocene age, of southern Wyoming. William D. Turnbull --.

n.s. no.21(1991)

The mammalian faunas of the Washakie Formation, Eocene age, of southern Wyoming. Steven M. McCarroll, John J. Flynn, William D. Turnbull --.

n.s. no.33(1996)

Two new rodent genera from the Oligocene White River formation (family Heteromyidae) / William G. Reeder --

v.10:no.35(1960)

An adianthine litoptern from the Deseado formation of Patagonia / by Bryan Patterson --. Results of the Marshall Field paleontological expeditions to Argentina and Bolivia, 1922-27.

v.8:no.2(1940)

A new phororhacoid bird from the Deseado formation of Patagonia / by Bryan Patterson. Results of the Marshall Field paleontological expeditions to Argentina and Bolivia, 1922-27.

v.8:no.8(1941)

Ectoprocta (Bryozoa) from the Permian Kaibab Formation, Grand Canyon National Park, Arizona / Frank K. McKinney --.

n.s. no.13(1983)

Sedimentary structures from the Carbondale Formation (Middle Pennsylvanian) of Northern Illinois / Charles W. Shabica --.

v.33:no.29(1978)

The mammalian faunas of the Washakie Formation, Eocene age, of southern Wyoming. William D. Turnbull --.

n.s. no.47(2002)

Fauna of the Vale and Choza : a new Trematopsid amphibian from the Vale formation / Everett Claire Olson --

v.10:no.26(1956)

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements

We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game is the grand coalition, provided the initial number of firms is high enough and they are sufficiently patient.