Consequences of financial restatements for auditors and top executives

This dissertation consists of three essays and investigates issues related to the impact of financial restatements on auditor change, shareholder actions, and executive turnover in the post-Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) period. For the first essay, we examined auditor change at 569 restatement firms and 5,605 control firms for 2004. We found that restatement announcements significantly increased the likelihood of auditor resignation and dismissal in the post-SOX period. The second essay examines shareholder voting on auditor ratifications in 2006 following restatement announcements by SEC registrants in 2005. The proportion of votes not supporting auditor ratification is low even in the presence of a restatement. However, we find that shareholders are more likely to vote against auditor ratification after a restatement when compared to votes at (a) films without restatements, or (b) restating firms in the preceding period. The third essay examines the consequences of financial restatements on the turnover of chief financial officers (CFO). We find that restatement announcements do significantly increase the likelihood of CFO turnover no matter whether the departure is voluntary or forced in nature. Also, the significant relationship is present even after controlling for the effect of CEO turnover.

Secondary stakeholders as agents of influence: Three essays on political risk, reputation, and multinational performance

Organizational researchers have recently taken an interest in the ways in which social movements, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other secondary stakeholders attempt to influence corporate behavior. Scholars, however, have yet to carefully probe the link between secondary stakeholder legal action and target firm stock market performance. This is puzzling given the sharp rise in NGO-initiated civil lawsuits against corporations in recent years for alleged overseas human rights abuses and environmental misconduct. Furthermore, few studies have considered how such lawsuits impact a target firm’s intangible assets, namely its image and reputation. Structured in the form of three essays, this dissertation examined the antecedents and consequences of secondary stakeholder legal activism in both conceptual and empirical settings. ^ Essay One argued that conventional approaches to understanding political risk fail to account for the reputational risks to multinational enterprises (MNEs) posed by transnational networks of human rights NGOs employing litigation-based strategies. It offered a new framework for understanding this emerging challenge to multinational corporate activity. Essay Two empirically tested the relationship between the filing of human rights-related civil lawsuits and corporate stock market performance using an event study methodology and regression analysis. The statistical analysis performed showed that target firms experience a significant decline in share price upon filing and that both industry and nature of the lawsuit are significantly and negatively related to shareholder wealth. Essay Three drew upon social movement and social identity theories to develop and test a set of hypotheses on how secondary stakeholder groups select their targets for human rights-related civil lawsuits. The results of a logistic regression model offered support for the proposition that MNE targets are chosen based on both interest and identity factors. The results of these essays suggest that legal action initiated by secondary stakeholder groups is a new and salient threat to multinational business and that firms doing business in countries with weak political institutions should factor this into corporate planning and take steps to mitigate their exposure to such risks.^

S Corporations Can Benefit Many Closely-Held Hospitality Firms

In his discussion - S Corporations Can Benefit Many Closely-Held Hospitality Firms - by John M. Tarras, Assistant Professor, School of Hotel, Restaurant & Institutional Management at Michigan State University, Assistant Professor Tarras initially offers: “Organization as an S corporation has many advantages for hospitality firms since passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The author discusses those advantages and lists the disadvantages as well.” In the opening paragraphs Tarras alludes to the relationship between hospitality firms, S corporations, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and then defines what an S corporation is. “An S corporation is a form of business entity that combines many of the tax advantages of partnerships with the legal attributes of a corporation, including limited liability for its shareholders. Its name is obtained from a subchapter of the Internal Revenue Code. Except for tax purposes, the S corporation is treated in the same manner as any regular corporation. Like a partnership, income and losses for an S corporation are generally passed through directly to shareholders for inclusion on their individual returns. An S corporation thus avoids the double tax problem facing regular corporations.” There are certain criteria to be met and caveats to be avoided in qualifying for S corporation status. Tarras lists and cites these for you. “Due to the complicated nature of S corporations, the election may be inadvertently terminated if the eligibility requirements are violated,” Tarras expands and cites. As the article suggests at the outset, there are advantages and disadvantages to S corporation status; the author outlines some examples for you. “Traditionally, the S corporation has been used by hospitality firms wishing to avoid the "double tax" problem of a regular corporation,” Tarras informs you. “Regular corporations are taxed once at the corporate level, and again at the shareholder level when income is distributed to shareholders in the form of dividends.” Tarras advises you as to why an S corporation is an advantage in this situation. “Since the S corporation generally is not subject to any corporate taxes, it generally makes no difference whether distributions to shareholders of S corporations are characterized as compensation or dividends,” thus the double tax is avoided. This is just one such positive illustration. Assistant Professor Tarras wants you to know: “Perhaps the most important reason to consider the S corporation has to do with the downward revision of tax rates for both individuals and corporations.” He highlights a case study for you. Some of the disadvantages of S corporation affiliation are the caveats alluded to earlier. They include, “the limitation of an S corporation of 35 shareholders,” Tarras cites. “Also, there are limits as to who may own stock in an S corporation.” These are but two of the limitations of an S corporation. Tarras closes with a further glimpse of the down-sides of an S corporation.

Planning Buy-Sell Agreements In The Hospitality Industry

In the article - Planning Buy-Sell Agreements In The Hospitality Industry - by John M. Tarras, Assistant Professor, School of Hotel, Restaurant and Institutional Management at Michigan State University, the author initially observes: “The vast majority of hospitality firms (restaurants, hotels, etc.) would be considered closely-held corporations. As such, they have unique planning problems compared to large, publicly-traded hospitality firms. One area of special concern to the closely-held hospitality firm is the planning and adoption of a buy-sell agreement.” The above thesis statement outlines the heart of the article; the buy-sell agreement in regard to smaller [closely held, as Tarras calls them] corporations. The theory is narrow and pro-active, spanning the gap between personal-to-corporate stock manipulations. “The primary purpose of a buy-sell agreement is to contribute to the orderly transfer of a shareholder's stock in a hospitality firm upon some future incident [typically retirement, withdrawal of a shareholder, disability, or death], as Tarras defines the concept. “The hospitality firm or the other shareholders would be committed to purchase the departing shareholder's stock at an agreed upon price and method, and to ensure that ample cash will be obtainable for such an impending sale. The buy-sell agreement provides a market for the shareholder or the shareholder's estate for the sale of otherwise illiquid stock,” the author further provides as canons of buy-sell agreements. In defining the buy-sell agreement with restrictive clauses, Tarras demonstrates, “…many closely-held hospitality firms desire to limit ownership to those individuals, either family or principal corporate employees, who are essential to the well-being of the firm.” Tarras says, another element of the buy-sell agreement is to furnish the departing shareholder with liquidity. “…there typically is some form of cash down payment with the remainder denoted by an interest-bearing promissory note [usually 5 to 15 years],” he informs. “The departing shareholders may require that the hospitality firm pledge the assets of the firm and that the remaining shareholders personally guarantee the promissory note.” “…the most frequent reason for establishing buy-sell agreements is for estate planning purposes,” Tarras says. There are tax advantages and liabilities for both the seller and buyer of stock via the buy-sell agreement, and the author enumerates many of these. One, big advantage of the buy-sell agreement is that it provides for the running of the company with a minimum of disruption through the stock-cash transition process, Tarras offers.

A transatlantic case: the derivative action as a corporate governance tool

The derivative action as a minority shareholder protection device seems to be almost a dead-letter law in the British Isles as compared with the United States. Whether it can or should be revived through legislative reform and judicial interpretation presents us with important governance questions at first instance, but also raises questions regarding the importance of law, as distinct from non-legally enforceable norms, to the development of corporate governance systems, in particular regarding the director-shareholder relationship.

Efeitos da fusão num grupo grupo de empresas do mesmo setor

Mestrado em Controlo de Gestão e dos Negócios

From privatisation to nationalisation: Repsol-YPF, 1999–2012

In April 2012 Argentinean Government nationalized 51% of Repsol shares in YPF. Expropiation of YPF is a new step in a broad list of protectionist and interventionist decisions, such as the nationalization of Aerolíneas Argentinas, nationalization of private pension plans, or the amendments of the Central Bank regulations to make the use of reserves more flexible. Institutions set the rules of the game for citizens and companies, allowing incentives and creating expectations. Nationalization of the above mentioned Argentinean companies has created legal uncertainty bringing a relevant increase in the risk premium as a result. Privatization of YPF and its later nationalization, together with the company shareholder composition, and resulting international disputes will be addressed in this article.

O impacto da integração pós-fusão de empresas municipais na relação utente/prestador de serviço público: um case-study

Dissertação de Mestrado, Finanças Empresariais, Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Algarve, 2016

Liderazgo Responsable: Una revisión de la literatura

El objetivo del presente artículo es profundizar en los conceptos de liderazgo responsable y responsabilidad social empresarial, basándose en un marco referencial y bibliográfico pertinente para la investigación. Para ello, se realizó una exhaustiva búsqueda de referencias bibliográficas, tales como artículos científicos, publicaciones académicas y estudios de caso, que ayudaron a dar un acercamiento conceptual al tema principal. Se encontraron diferentes aproximaciones conceptuales sobre el liderazgo responsable y la importancia que tiene en términos de responsabilidad social, algunas teorías del liderazgo, estilos de liderazgo responsable, la satisfacción laboral y por ultimo una serie de casos empresariales que ponen estos conceptos en práctica.