Consequences of financial restatements for auditors and top executives

This dissertation consists of three essays and investigates issues related to the impact of financial restatements on auditor change, shareholder actions, and executive turnover in the post-Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) period. For the first essay, we examined auditor change at 569 restatement firms and 5,605 control firms for 2004. We found that restatement announcements significantly increased the likelihood of auditor resignation and dismissal in the post-SOX period. The second essay examines shareholder voting on auditor ratifications in 2006 following restatement announcements by SEC registrants in 2005. The proportion of votes not supporting auditor ratification is low even in the presence of a restatement. However, we find that shareholders are more likely to vote against auditor ratification after a restatement when compared to votes at (a) films without restatements, or (b) restating firms in the preceding period. The third essay examines the consequences of financial restatements on the turnover of chief financial officers (CFO). We find that restatement announcements do significantly increase the likelihood of CFO turnover no matter whether the departure is voluntary or forced in nature. Also, the significant relationship is present even after controlling for the effect of CEO turnover.