The role of coronial autopsies in a context of decreasing hospital autopsies: An investigation of the issues

This article scrutinises the argument that decreasing hospital autopsy rates are outside the control of medical personnel, based as they are on families’ unwillingness to consent to autopsy procedures, and that, as a consequence, the coronial autopsy is the appropriate alternative to the important medical and educational role of the autopsy. It makes three points which are well supported by the research. First, that while hospital autopsy rates are decreasing, they have been doing so for more than 60 years, and issues beyond the simple notion of consent, like funding formulae in hospitals, increased technology and fear of litigation by doctors are all playing their part in this decline. Secondly, the issue of consent has as much to do with families not being approached as with families declining to give consent. This is well supported by recent changes in hospital policy and procedures which include senior medical personnel and detailed consent forms, both of which have been linked to rising consent rates in recent years. Finally, the perception that coronial autopsies are beyond familial consent has been challenged recently by legislative changes in both Australia and the United States of America which allow objections based on religion and culture to be heard by coroners. For these reasons, it is argued that medical personnel need to focus on increasing hospital autopsy rates, while also addressing the complex ethical issues associated with conducting medical research within the context of the coronial autopsy.

Omissions, causation and responsibility

In this paper I discuss a recent exchange of articles between Hugh McLachlan and John Coggon on the relationship between omissions, causation and moral responsibility. My aim is to contribute to their debate by isolating a presupposition I believe they both share, and by questioning that presupposition. The presupposition is that, at any given moment, there are countless things that I am omitting to do. This leads them both to give a distorted account of the relationship between causation and moral or (as the case may be) legal responsibility, and, in the case of Coggon, to claim that the law’s conception of causation is a fiction based on policy. Once it is seen that this presupposition is faulty, we can attain a more accurate view of the logical relationship between causation and moral responsibility in the case of omissions. This is important because it will enable us, in turn, to understand why the law continues to regard omissions as different, both logically and morally, from acts, and why the law seeks to track that logical and moral difference in the legal distinction it draws between withholding life-sustaining measures and euthanasia.

The human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 : a multidisciplinary workshop

Event report following a multidisciplinary workshop at the Economic and Social Research Council's Genomics Policy and Research Forum, which took place at the University of Edinburgh on 20 January 2011.

Surrogacy : is it harder to relinquish genes?

Surrogacy has produced some positive outcomes creating an opportunity for otherwise childless couples to live their dream of parenthood. However it has also been problematic, particularly where the surrogate mother fails to relinquish a child born as a result of the surrogacy arrangement. This article examines whether a surrogate mother, who is genetically related to the child she delivers, is less likely to relinquish the child than one who has no genetic ties. An examination of empirical evidence provides support for this argument. Legislation and case law in three jurisdictions, Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom, is examined to determine which, if any, of these jurisdictions take into account the existence, or otherwise, of a genetic link between the surrogate mother and the child she bears. The article concludes that surrogacy legislation should, subject to exceptional circumstances, encourage surrogacy arrangements where the child and the surrogate are not genetically related.

Me and my body : the relevance of the difference for the distinction between withdrawing life support and euthanasia

In this paper I discuss David Shaw’s claim that the body of a terminally ill person can be conceived as a kind of life-support, akin to an artificial ventilator. I claim that this position rests upon an untenable dualism between the mind and the body. Given that dualism continues to be attractive to some thinkers, I attempt to diagnose the reasons why it continues to be attractive, as well as to demonstrate its incoherence, drawing on some recent work in the philosophy of psychology. I conclude that, if my criticisms are sound, Shaw’s attempt to deny the distinction between withdrawal and euthanasia fails.

A communitarian theory of the education rights of students with disabilities

There is a lack of writing on the issue of the education rights of people with disabilities by authors of any theoretical persuasion. While the deficiency of theory may be explained by a variety of historical, philosophical and practical considerations, it is a deficiency which must be addressed. Otherwise, any statement of rights rings out as hollow rhetoric unsupported by sound reason and moral rectitude. This paper attempts to address this deficiency in education rights theory by postulating a communitarian theory of the education rights of people with disabilities. The theory is developed from communitarian writings on the role of education in democratic society. The communitarian school, like the community within which it nests, is inclusive. Schools both reflect and model the shape of communitarian society and have primary responsibility for teaching the knowledge and virtues which will allow citizens to belong to and function within society. Communitarians emphasise responsibilities, however, as the corollary of rights and require the individual good to yield to community good when the hard cases arise. The article not only explains the basis of the right to an inclusive education, therefore, but also engages with the difficult issue of when such a right may not be enforceable.

Reasonable adjustment and the assessment of students with disabilities: Australian legal issues and trends

Student assessment is particularly important, and particularly controversial, because it is the means by which student achievement is determined. Reasonable adjustment to student assessment is of equal importance as the means of ensuring the mitigation, or even elimination, of disability related barriers to the demonstration of student achievement. The significance of reasonable adjustment is obvious in the later years of secondary school, and in the tertiary sector, because failure to adjust assessment may be asserted as the reason a student did not achieve as well as anticipated or as the reason a student was excluded from a course and, as a result, from future study and employment opportunities. Even in the early years of schooling, however, assessment and its management are a critical issue for staff and students, especially in an education system like Australia’s with an ever increasing emphasis on national benchmarks testing. This paper will explain the legislation which underpins the right to reasonable adjustment in education in Australian schools. It will give examples of the kinds of adjustment which may be made to promote equality of opportunity in the area of assessment. It will also consider some of the controversies which have confronted, or which, it may be speculated, are likely to confront Australian education institutions as they work towards compliance with reasonable adjustment laws.