An Instrumental analysis of the European Union´s capability to act in conflict response

Since its origins, the European Union has striven to be an actor on the International scene and a place in conflict Management. Yet the EU’s lack of activity cannot be justified by a mere lack of capacities. The EU counts with numerous political, economic, and, since 2003, civil and military instruments that should allow it to precede a comprehensive conflict response. This publication consists of a description of these instruments and an analysis of the final use that the Union makes of them in the different stages of a conflict. Examples will show us the EU’s main weakness in providing a comprehensive and timely response when a conflict breaks out.

Companies in Conflict Situations: Advancing the Research Agenda. Seminar proceedings. Barcelona, october 2011

Seminar proceedings about the Seminar “Companies in Confict Situations”, organized by ICIP, with the aim of reflecting on the causes, the dynamics and the consequences of the participation of companies in armed conflicts. Over thirty international experts will be participating in the conferences to analyze the role and responsibilities of companies in connection with the international arms market (especially regarding small arms, light weapons and conventional weapons), the provision of military and security services, and the exploitation of, and trade in, natural resources.

War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict

We construct a dynamic theory of civil conflict hinging on inter-ethnic trust and trade. The model economy is inhabitated by two ethnic groups. Inter-ethnic trade requires imperfectly observed bilateral investments and one group has to form beliefs on the average propensity to trade of the other group. Since conflict disrupts trade, the onset of a conflict signals that the aggressor has a low propensity to trade. Agents observe the history of conflicts and update their beliefs over time, transmitting them to the next generation. The theory bears a set of testable predictions. First, war is a stochastic process whose frequency depends on the state of endogenous beliefs. Second, the probability of future conflicts increases after each conflict episode. Third, "accidental" conflicts that do not reflect economic fundamentals can lead to a permanent breakdown of trust, plunging a society into a vicious cycle of recurrent conflicts (a war trap). The incidence of conflict can be reduced by policies abating cultural barriers, fostering inter-ethnic trade and human capital, and shifting beliefs. Coercive peace policies such as peacekeeping forces or externally imposed regime changes have instead no persistent effects.

Conflict resolution and evolution of social structures in insect societies

In colonies of social Hymenoptera (which include all ants, as well as some wasp and bee species), only queens reproduce whereas workers generally perform other tasks. The evolution of worker's reproductive altruism can be explained by kin selection, which states that workers can indirectly transmit copies of their genes by helping the reproduction of relatives. The relatedness between queens and workers may however be low, particularly when there are multiple queens per colony, which limits the transmission of copies of workers genes and increases potential conflicts between colony members. In this thesis, we investigated the link between social structure variations and conflicts, and explored the mechanisms involved in variation of colony queen number in ants. According to kin selection, workers should rear the brood they are most related to. In social Hymenoptera, males are haploid whereas females (workers and queens) are diploid. As a result, workers can be up to three times more related to females than males in some colonies, where they should consequently favour the production of females. In contrast, queens are equally related to daughters and sons in all types of colonies and therefore should favour a balanced sex ratio. In a meta-analysis across all studies of social Hymenoptera, we showed that colony sex ratio is generally largely influenced by workers. Hence, the evolution of social structures where queens and workers are equally related to males and females may contribute to decrease the conflict between the two castes over colony sex ratio. Another conflict between queens and workers can occur over male production. Many species contain workers that still have the ability to lay haploid eggs. In some social structures, workers are on average more related to sons of queens than to sons of other workers. As a result, workers should eliminate worker-laid eggs to favour queen-laid eggs. We showed that in the ant Formica selysi, workers eliminate more worker-laid than queen-laid eggs, independently of colony social structure. These results therefore suggest that worker policing can evolve independently from relatedness, potentially because of costs of worker reproduction at the colony-level. Colony queen number is a key parameter that influences relatedness between group members. Queen body size is generally linked to the success of independent colony foundation by single queens and may influence the number of queens in the new colony. In the ant F. selysi, single-queen colonies produce larger queens than multiple-queen colonies. We showed that this association results from genes or maternal effects transmitted to the eggs. However, we also found that queens produced in colonies of the two social forms did not differ in their general ability to found new colonies independently. Queen body size may also influence queen dispersal ability and constrain small queens to be re-adopted in their original nest after mating at proximity. We tested the acceptance of new queens in another ant species, Formica paralugubris, which has numerous queens per colony. Our results show that workers do not discriminate between nestmate and foreign queens, and more generally accept new queens at a limited rate. To conclude, this thesis shows that mechanisms influencing variation in colony queen number and the influence of these changes on conflict resolution are complex. Data gathered in this thesis therefore constitute a solid background for further research on the evolution and the maintenance of complex organisations in insect societies.

Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars

This paper analyzes the relationship between ethnic fractionalization, polarization, and conflict. In recent years many authors have found empirical evidence that ethnic fractionalization has a negative effect on growth. One mechanism that can explain this nexus is the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on rent-seeking activities and the increase in potential conflict, which is negative for investment. However the empirical evidence supporting the effect of ethnic fractionalization on the incidence of civil conflicts is very weak. Although ethnic fractionalization may be important for growth, we argue that the channel is not through an increase in potential ethnic conflict. We discuss the appropriateness of indices of polarization to capture conflictive dimensions. We develop a new measure of ethnic heterogeneity that satisfies the basic properties associated with the concept of polarization. The empirical section shows that this index of ethnic polarization is a significant variable in the explanation of the incidence of civil wars. This result is robust to the presence of other indicators of ethnic heterogeneity, other sources of data for the construction of the index, and other data structures.

Transitory Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict

I examine whether civil conflict is triggered by transitory negative economic shocks. My approach follows Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) in using rainfall as an exogenous source of economic shocks in Sub-Saharan African countries. The main difference is that my empirical specifications take into account that rainfall shocks are transitory. Failure to do so may, for example, lead to the conclusion that civil conflict is more likely to break out following negative rainfall shocks when conflict is most probable following years with exceptionally high rainfall levels.

A Construção Acção Colectiva em Processos de Desenvolvimento Sócio-Territorial

Pretende-se dar um contributo para a compreensão dos processos de construção da acção colectiva em projectos de desenvolvimento sócio-territorial. A partir de um estudo de caso sobre a implementação do Programa Especial de Realojamento (P.E.R.) no concelho de Cascais e das dinâmicas sociais, politicas e territoriais que estiveram presentes, procura-se analisar os elementos desencadeadores e estruturadores da reconstrução dos laços sociais, e da regeneração das dinâmicas locais. Os resultados apontam para a importância que o território assume, enquanto espaço de complexas interacções, na afirmação de múltiplos actores. Actores que ao longo de um processos de desenvolvimento, e das interacções que aí ocorrem, se caracterizam por ser mutantes, constituindo-se, evoluindo e diversificando. Os actuais apelos a novas formas de pensar e agir em sociedade remete para a necessidade de uma acção, que se constrói na complexidade e imponderabilidade dos factores de desenvolvimento, e se legitima num conhecimento e relação de proximidade entre os actores em presença.

Civil conflict and human capital accumulation: The long-term effects of political violence in Perú

This paper provides empirical evidence of the persistent effect of exposure to political violence on humancapital accumulation. I exploit the variation in conflict location and birth cohorts to identify the longandshort-term effects of the civil war on educational attainment. Conditional on being exposed toviolence, the average person accumulates 0.31 less years of education as an adult. In the short-term,the effects are stronger than in the long-run; these results hold when comparing children within thesame household. Further, exposure to violence during early childhood leads to permanent losses. I alsoexplore the potential causal mechanisms.

Estimating the effect of transitory economic shocks on civil conflict

This note tries to clarify some remaining issues in the debate on the effect of income shocks oncivil conflict. Section 1 discusses the discrepant findings on the effect of rainfall shocks oncivil conflict in Miguel and Satyanath (2010, 2011) and Ciccone (2011). Section 2 develops aninstrumental variables approach to estimate the effect of transitory (rainfall-driven) incomeshocks on civil conflict and contrasts the conclusions with those of Miguel, Satyanath, andSergenti (2004) and Miguel and Satyanath (2010, 2011). Throughout, the note uses the data ofMiguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti to focus on the methodological issues at the core of the debate(for results using the latest data see Ciccone, 2011).

State capacity and military conflict

In 1500, Europe was composed of hundreds of statelets and principalities, with weak central authority,no monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, and overlapping jurisdictions. By 1800, only ahandful of powerful, centralized nation states remained. We build a model that explains both the emergenceof capable states and growing divergence between European powers. We argue that the impactof war was crucial for state building, and depended on: i) the financial cost of war, and ii) a country sinitial level of domestic political fragmentation. We emphasize the role of the "Military Revolution",which raised the cost of war. Initially, this caused more cohesive states to invest in state capacity, whilemore divided states rationally dropped out of the competition, causing divergence between Europeanstates. As the cost of war escalated further, all states engaged in a "race to the top" towards greater statebuilding.

A possible territorial or recognition behavior of Leptoglossus zonatus (Dallas) (Heteroptera, Coreidae)

The coreid Leptoglossus zonatus (Dallas, 1852) is commonly found in corn (Zea mays L.) fields in Brazil, and it has been observed flying and landing on objects or persons near these fields. During January, 1995, this behavior was studied in corn plantations. Results indicated that the bugs concentrated on objects (plastic cylinders traps) introduced into their habitat and that their number increased during the first 24 hs. However, as time passed (8 days), this possible territorial or recognition behavior gradually decreased, and tended to disappear.