A note on the coincidence between Stackelberg and Nash equilibria in a differential game between government and firms

[cat] A Navas i Marín Solano es va demostrar la coincidència entre els equilibris de Nash i de Stackelberg per a una versi´o modificada del joc diferencial proposat por Lancaster (1973). Amb l’objectiu d’obtenir una solució interior, es van imposar restriccions importants sobre el valors dels paràmetres del model. En aquest treball estenem aquest resultat, en el límit en que la taxa de descompte és igual a zero, eliminant les restriccions i considerant totes les solucions possibles.

The maximun and the addition of assigment games

[cat] En el context dels mercats a dues bandes, considerem, en primer lloc, que els jugadors poden escollir on dur a terme les seves transaccions. Mostrem que el joc corresponent a aquesta situació, que es representa pel màxim d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, pot ser un joc no equilibrat. Aleshores proporcionem condicions per a l’equilibri del joc i, per aquest cas, analitzem algunes propietats del core del joc. En segon lloc, considerem que els jugadors poden fer transaccions en diversos mercats simultàniament i, llavors, sumar els guanys obtinguts. El joc corresponent, representat per la suma d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, és equilibrat. A més a més, sota certes condicions, la suma dels cores dels dos jocs d’assignació coincideix amb el core del joc suma.

Petróleo y gas en África: viejas realidades, nuevos escenarios

[cat] En els últims temps es parla molt del nou paper dels hidrocarburs d'Àfrica, fins i tot s'al·ludeix a un oil rush o a un african oil scramble , que inevitablement desembocarà en una confrontació bipolar entre la Xina i els Estats Units, pel control de les reserves de petroli del subsòl del continent africà. Així, el propòsit d'aquest text és, en primer lloc, realitzar una anàlisi descriptiva que ajudi a valorar la hipòtesi d'aquest african oil scramble. A continuación, amb les dades obtingudes, es discutirà sobre la possibilitat de que aquest fenomen desemboqui en un escenari de confrontació xinoamericana. Aquesta especulació ens durà a concloure que hi ha suficients indicis per a argumentar que el joc petrolífer africà podria desenvolupar-se en un escenari marcat per la multilateralitat.

Coalitionally monotonic set-solutions for cooperative TU games

A static comparative study on set-solutions for cooperative TU games is carried out. The analysis focuses on studying the compatibility between two classical and reasonable properties introduced by Young (1985) in the context of single valued solutions, namely core-selection and coalitional monotonicity. As the main result, it is showed that coalitional monotonicity is not only incompatible with the core-selection property but also with the bargaining-selection property. This new impossibility result reinforces the tradeoff between these kinds of interesting and intuitive economic properties. Positive results about compatibility between desirable economic properties are given replacing the core selection requirement by the core-extension property.

The assignment game: core bounds for mixed-pair coalitions

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the coreof the game. These games will be called buyer¿seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed¿pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyerseller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer¿seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed¿pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a ¿45o¿lattice¿ by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered

The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game

The set of undominated imputations and the core: an axiomatic approach

This paper provides an axiomatic framework to compare the D-core (the set of undominatedimputations) and the core of a cooperative game with transferable utility. Theorem1 states that the D-core is the only solution satisfying projection consistency, reasonableness (from above), (*)-antimonotonicity, and modularity. Theorem 2 characterizes the core replacing (*)-antimonotonicity by antimonotonicity. Moreover, these axioms alsocharacterize the core on the domain of convex games, totally balanced games, balancedgames, and superadditive games

All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyer-seller exact representative

Sequential decisions in allocation problems

[eng] In the context of cooperative TU-games, and given an order of players, we consider the problem of distributing the worth of the grand coalition as a sequentia decision problem. In each step of process, upper and lower bounds for the payoff of the players are required related to successive reduced games. Sequentially compatible payoffs are defined as those allocation vectors that meet these recursive bounds. The core of the game is reinterpreted as a set of sequentally compatible payoffs when the Davis-Maschler reduced game is considered (Th.1). Independently of the reduction, the core turns out to be the intersections of the family of the sets of sequentially compatible payoffs corresponding to the different possible orderings (Th.2), so it is in some sense order-independent. Finally, we analyze advantagenous properties for the first player

Woody Allen i l'esperit de la tragèdia grega: de Crimes and Misdemeanors a Match Point

Nombrosos són ja els estudis que s'han centrat en l'anomenat "cinema seriós" de Woody Allen i, entre ells, paga la pena de mencionar el que Pau Gilabert Barberà, autor d'aquest article, va escriure (2006) sobre el que, en opinió seva, és el llegat sofístic subjacent en el guió de Crimes and Misdemeanors. En aquesta ocasió, el seu objectiu és analitzar la trajectòria fluctuant del director americà en relació a la tragèdia grega, des de la convicció que, només així, és possible revelar la seva empatia amb l'esperit tràgic dels grecs i comprendre la seva necessitat de presentar aquell gènere literari com un paradigma des del qual entendre les grandeses i misèries del món contemporani.

En torno a los efectos de la edad en el aprendizaje escolar de una lengua extrangera

The purpose of this article is to treat a currently much debated issue, the effects of age on second language learning. To do so, we contrast data collected by our research team from over one thousand seven hundred young and adult learners with four popular beliefs or generalizations, which, while deeply rooted in this society, are not always corroborated by our data.Two of these generalizations about Second Language Acquisition (languages spoken in the social context) seem to be widely accepted: a) older children, adolescents and adults are quicker and more efficient at the first stages of learning than are younger learners; b) in a natural context children with an early start are more liable to attain higher levels of proficiency. However, in the context of Foreign Language Acquisition, the context in which we collect the data, this second generalization is difficult to verify due to the low number of instructional hours (a maximum of some 800 hours) and the lower levels of language exposure time provided. The design of our research project has allowed us to study differences observed with respect to the age of onset (ranging from 2 to 18+), but in this article we focus on students who began English instruction at the age of 8 (LOGSE Educational System) and those who began at the age of 11 (EGB). We have collected data from both groups after a period of 200 (Time 1) and 416 instructional hours (Time 2), and we are currently collecting data after a period of 726 instructional hours (Time 3). We have designed and administered a variety of tests: tests on English production and reception, both oral and written, and within both academic and communicative oriented approaches, on the learners' L1 (Spanish and Catalan), as well as a questionnaire eliciting personal and sociolinguistic information. The questions we address and the relevant empirical evidence are as follows: 1. "For young children, learning languages is a game. They enjoy it more than adults."Our data demonstrate that the situation is not quite so. Firstly, both at the levels of Primary and Secondary education (ranging from 70.5% in 11-year-olds to 89% in 14-year-olds) students have a positive attitude towards learning English. Secondly, there is a difference between the two groups with respect to the factors they cite as responsible for their motivation to learn English: the younger students cite intrinsic factors, such as the games they play, the methodology used and the teacher, whereas the older students cite extrinsic factors, such as the role of their knowledge of English in the achievement of their future professional goals. 2 ."Young children have more resources to learn languages." Here our data suggest just the opposite. The ability to employ learning strategies (actions or steps used) increases with age. Older learners' strategies are more varied and cognitively more complex. In contrast, younger learners depend more on their interlocutor and external resources and therefore have a lower level of autonomy in their learning. 3. "Young children don't talk much but understand a lot"This third generalization does seem to be confirmed, at least to a certain extent, by our data in relation to the analysis of differences due to the age factor and productive use of the target language. As seen above, the comparably slower progress of the younger learners is confirmed. Our analysis of interpersonal receptive abilities demonstrates as well the advantage of the older learners. Nevertheless, with respect to passive receptive activities (for example, simple recognition of words or sentences) no great differences are observed. Statistical analyses suggest that in this test, in contrast to the others analyzed, the dominance of the subjects' L1s (reflecting a cognitive capacity that grows with age) has no significant influence on the learning process. 4. "The sooner they begin, the better their results will be in written language"This is not either completely confirmed in our research. First of all, we perceive that certain compensatory strategies disappear only with age, but not with the number of instructional hours. Secondly, given an identical number of instructional hours, the older subjects obtain better results. With respect to our analysis of data from subjects of the same age (12 years old) but with a different number of instructional hours (200 and 416 respectively, as they began at the ages of 11 and 8), we observe that those who began earlier excel only in the area of lexical fluency. In conclusion, the superior rate of older learners appears to be due to their higher level of cognitive development, a factor which allows them to benefit more from formal or explicit instruction in the school context. Younger learners, however, do not benefit from the quantity and quality of linguistic exposure typical of a natural acquisition context in which they would be allowed to make use of implicit learning abilities. It seems clear, then, that the initiative in this country to begin foreign language instruction earlier will have positive effects only if it occurs in combination with either higher levels of exposure time to the foreign language, or, alternatively, with its use as the language of instruction in other areas of the curriculum.

Geografia de l'ombra i de la llum. Hannah Arendt.

L'article repassa el joc d'ombres i de llum (del visible i l'invisible) que projecta la categoria de natalitat en l'esfera de la política i de l'acció. Categoria que, en front de la de moralitat, emprada pels filòsofs, permet una reconsideració de la mai resolta tensió entre el pensament i l'acció.

Regular population monotonic allocation schemes and the core

A subclass of games with population monotonic allocation schemes is studied, namelygames with regular population monotonic allocation schemes (rpmas). We focus on theproperties of these games and we prove the coincidence between the core and both theDavis-Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set

The set of undominated imputations and the core: an axiomatic approach

This paper provides an axiomatic framework to compare the D-core (the set of undominatedimputations) and the core of a cooperative game with transferable utility. Theorem1 states that the D-core is the only solution satisfying projection consistency, reasonableness (from above), (*)-antimonotonicity, and modularity. Theorem 2 characterizes the core replacing (*)-antimonotonicity by antimonotonicity. Moreover, these axioms alsocharacterize the core on the domain of convex games, totally balanced games, balancedgames, and superadditive games

The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game