The set of undominated imputations and the core: an axiomatic approach

This paper provides an axiomatic framework to compare the D-core (the set of undominatedimputations) and the core of a cooperative game with transferable utility. Theorem1 states that the D-core is the only solution satisfying projection consistency, reasonableness (from above), (*)-antimonotonicity, and modularity. Theorem 2 characterizes the core replacing (*)-antimonotonicity by antimonotonicity. Moreover, these axioms alsocharacterize the core on the domain of convex games, totally balanced games, balancedgames, and superadditive games

All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyer-seller exact representative

Sequential decisions in allocation problems

[eng] In the context of cooperative TU-games, and given an order of players, we consider the problem of distributing the worth of the grand coalition as a sequentia decision problem. In each step of process, upper and lower bounds for the payoff of the players are required related to successive reduced games. Sequentially compatible payoffs are defined as those allocation vectors that meet these recursive bounds. The core of the game is reinterpreted as a set of sequentally compatible payoffs when the Davis-Maschler reduced game is considered (Th.1). Independently of the reduction, the core turns out to be the intersections of the family of the sets of sequentially compatible payoffs corresponding to the different possible orderings (Th.2), so it is in some sense order-independent. Finally, we analyze advantagenous properties for the first player

En torno a los efectos de la edad en el aprendizaje escolar de una lengua extrangera

The purpose of this article is to treat a currently much debated issue, the effects of age on second language learning. To do so, we contrast data collected by our research team from over one thousand seven hundred young and adult learners with four popular beliefs or generalizations, which, while deeply rooted in this society, are not always corroborated by our data.Two of these generalizations about Second Language Acquisition (languages spoken in the social context) seem to be widely accepted: a) older children, adolescents and adults are quicker and more efficient at the first stages of learning than are younger learners; b) in a natural context children with an early start are more liable to attain higher levels of proficiency. However, in the context of Foreign Language Acquisition, the context in which we collect the data, this second generalization is difficult to verify due to the low number of instructional hours (a maximum of some 800 hours) and the lower levels of language exposure time provided. The design of our research project has allowed us to study differences observed with respect to the age of onset (ranging from 2 to 18+), but in this article we focus on students who began English instruction at the age of 8 (LOGSE Educational System) and those who began at the age of 11 (EGB). We have collected data from both groups after a period of 200 (Time 1) and 416 instructional hours (Time 2), and we are currently collecting data after a period of 726 instructional hours (Time 3). We have designed and administered a variety of tests: tests on English production and reception, both oral and written, and within both academic and communicative oriented approaches, on the learners' L1 (Spanish and Catalan), as well as a questionnaire eliciting personal and sociolinguistic information. The questions we address and the relevant empirical evidence are as follows: 1. "For young children, learning languages is a game. They enjoy it more than adults."Our data demonstrate that the situation is not quite so. Firstly, both at the levels of Primary and Secondary education (ranging from 70.5% in 11-year-olds to 89% in 14-year-olds) students have a positive attitude towards learning English. Secondly, there is a difference between the two groups with respect to the factors they cite as responsible for their motivation to learn English: the younger students cite intrinsic factors, such as the games they play, the methodology used and the teacher, whereas the older students cite extrinsic factors, such as the role of their knowledge of English in the achievement of their future professional goals. 2 ."Young children have more resources to learn languages." Here our data suggest just the opposite. The ability to employ learning strategies (actions or steps used) increases with age. Older learners' strategies are more varied and cognitively more complex. In contrast, younger learners depend more on their interlocutor and external resources and therefore have a lower level of autonomy in their learning. 3. "Young children don't talk much but understand a lot"This third generalization does seem to be confirmed, at least to a certain extent, by our data in relation to the analysis of differences due to the age factor and productive use of the target language. As seen above, the comparably slower progress of the younger learners is confirmed. Our analysis of interpersonal receptive abilities demonstrates as well the advantage of the older learners. Nevertheless, with respect to passive receptive activities (for example, simple recognition of words or sentences) no great differences are observed. Statistical analyses suggest that in this test, in contrast to the others analyzed, the dominance of the subjects' L1s (reflecting a cognitive capacity that grows with age) has no significant influence on the learning process. 4. "The sooner they begin, the better their results will be in written language"This is not either completely confirmed in our research. First of all, we perceive that certain compensatory strategies disappear only with age, but not with the number of instructional hours. Secondly, given an identical number of instructional hours, the older subjects obtain better results. With respect to our analysis of data from subjects of the same age (12 years old) but with a different number of instructional hours (200 and 416 respectively, as they began at the ages of 11 and 8), we observe that those who began earlier excel only in the area of lexical fluency. In conclusion, the superior rate of older learners appears to be due to their higher level of cognitive development, a factor which allows them to benefit more from formal or explicit instruction in the school context. Younger learners, however, do not benefit from the quantity and quality of linguistic exposure typical of a natural acquisition context in which they would be allowed to make use of implicit learning abilities. It seems clear, then, that the initiative in this country to begin foreign language instruction earlier will have positive effects only if it occurs in combination with either higher levels of exposure time to the foreign language, or, alternatively, with its use as the language of instruction in other areas of the curriculum.

Geografia de l'ombra i de la llum. Hannah Arendt.

L'article repassa el joc d'ombres i de llum (del visible i l'invisible) que projecta la categoria de natalitat en l'esfera de la política i de l'acció. Categoria que, en front de la de moralitat, emprada pels filòsofs, permet una reconsideració de la mai resolta tensió entre el pensament i l'acció.

Regular population monotonic allocation schemes and the core

A subclass of games with population monotonic allocation schemes is studied, namelygames with regular population monotonic allocation schemes (rpmas). We focus on theproperties of these games and we prove the coincidence between the core and both theDavis-Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set

The set of undominated imputations and the core: an axiomatic approach

This paper provides an axiomatic framework to compare the D-core (the set of undominatedimputations) and the core of a cooperative game with transferable utility. Theorem1 states that the D-core is the only solution satisfying projection consistency, reasonableness (from above), (*)-antimonotonicity, and modularity. Theorem 2 characterizes the core replacing (*)-antimonotonicity by antimonotonicity. Moreover, these axioms alsocharacterize the core on the domain of convex games, totally balanced games, balancedgames, and superadditive games

The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game

All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyer-seller exact representative

Sequential decisions in allocation problems

[eng] In the context of cooperative TU-games, and given an order of players, we consider the problem of distributing the worth of the grand coalition as a sequentia decision problem. In each step of process, upper and lower bounds for the payoff of the players are required related to successive reduced games. Sequentially compatible payoffs are defined as those allocation vectors that meet these recursive bounds. The core of the game is reinterpreted as a set of sequentally compatible payoffs when the Davis-Maschler reduced game is considered (Th.1). Independently of the reduction, the core turns out to be the intersections of the family of the sets of sequentially compatible payoffs corresponding to the different possible orderings (Th.2), so it is in some sense order-independent. Finally, we analyze advantagenous properties for the first player

Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games

We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition

On the monotonic core

The monotonic core of a cooperative game with transferable utility (T.U.-game) is the set formed by all its Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes. In this paper we show that this set always coincides with the core of a certain game associated to the initial game.

On the dimension of the core of the assignment game

The set of optimal matchings in the assignment matrix allows to define a reflexive and symmetric binary relation on each side of the market, the equal-partner binary relation. The number of equivalence classes of the transitive closure of the equal-partner binary relation determines the dimension of the core of the assignment game. This result provides an easy procedure to determine the dimension of the core directly from the entries of the assignment matrix and shows that the dimension of the core is not as much determined by the number of optimal matchings as by their relative position in the assignment matrix.

Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the nucleolus and the core-center

En aquest treball mostrem que, a diferència del cas bilateral, per als mercats multilaterals d'assignació coneguts amb el nom de Böhm-Bawerk assignment games, el nucleolus i el core-center, i. e. el centre de masses del core, no coincideixen en general. Per demostrar-ho provem que donant un m-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game les dues solucions anteriors poden obtenir-se respectivament del nucleolus i el core-center d'un joc convex definit en el conjunt format pels m sectors. Encara més, provem que per calcular el nucleolus d'aquest últim joc només les coalicions formades per un jugador o m-1 jugadors són importants. Aquests resultats simplifiquen el càlcul del nucleolus d'un multi-sided ¿¿ohm-Bawerk assignment market amb un número molt elevat d'agents.

Coalitionally monotonic set-solutions for cooperative TU games

A static comparative study on set-solutions for cooperative TU games is carried out. The analysis focuses on studying the compatibility between two classical and reasonable properties introduced by Young (1985) in the context of single valued solutions, namely core-selection and coalitional monotonicity. As the main result, it is showed that coalitional monotonicity is not only incompatible with the core-selection property but also with the bargaining-selection property. This new impossibility result reinforces the tradeoff between these kinds of interesting and intuitive economic properties. Positive results about compatibility between desirable economic properties are given replacing the core selection requirement by the core-extension property.