Important, unimportant a critical anticipation of the assumptions of legal positivism in Alice in Wonderland

Almost a full century separates Lewis’ Alice in Wonderland (1865) and the second, lengthier and more elaborate edition of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law (1960; first edition published in 1934). And yet, it is possible to argue that the former anticipates and critically addresses many of the philosophical assumptions that underlie and are elemental to the argument of the latter. Both texts, with the illuminating differences that arise from their disparate genre, have as one of their key themes norms and their functioning. Wonderland, as Alice soon finds out, is a world beset by rules of all kinds: from the etiquette rituals of the mad tea-party to the changing setting for the cricket game to the procedural insanity of the trial with which the novel ends. Pure Theory of Law, as Kelsen emphatically stresses, has the grundnorm as the cornerstone upon which the whole theoretical edifice rests2. This paper discusses some of the assumptions underlying Kelsen’s argument as an instance of the modern worldview which Lewis satirically scrutinizes. The first section (Sleepy and stupid) discusses Lewis critique of the idea that, to correctly apprehend an object (in the case of Kelsen’s study, law), one has to free it from its alien elements. The second section (Do bats eat cats?) discusses the notion of systemic coherence and its impact on modern ways of thinking about truth, law and society. The third section (Off with their heads!) explores the connections between readings of systems as neutral entities and the perpetuation of political power. The fourth and final section (Important, Unimportant) explains the sense in which a “critical anticipation” is both possible and useful to discuss the philosophical assumptions structuring some positivist arguments. It also discusses the reasons for choosing to focus on Kelsen’s work, rather than on that of Lewis’ contemporary, John Austin, whose The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (published in 1832) remains influential in legal debates today.

3D probability tomography: theoretical developments and applications to high-resolution geophysical prospecting

The theory of the 3D multipole probability tomography method (3D GPT) to image source poles, dipoles, quadrupoles and octopoles, of a geophysical vector or scalar field dataset is developed. A geophysical dataset is assumed to be the response of an aggregation of poles, dipoles, quadrupoles and octopoles. These physical sources are used to reconstruct without a priori assumptions the most probable position and shape of the true geophysical buried sources, by determining the location of their centres and critical points of their boundaries, as corners, wedges and vertices. This theory, then, is adapted to the geoelectrical, gravity and self potential methods. A few synthetic examples using simple geometries and three field examples are discussed in order to demonstrate the notably enhanced resolution power of the new approach. At first, the application to a field example related to a dipole–dipole geoelectrical survey carried out in the archaeological park of Pompei is presented. The survey was finalised to recognize remains of the ancient Roman urban network including roads, squares and buildings, which were buried under the thick pyroclastic cover fallen during the 79 AD Vesuvius eruption. The revealed anomaly structures are ascribed to wellpreserved remnants of some aligned walls of Roman edifices, buried and partially destroyed by the 79 AD Vesuvius pyroclastic fall. Then, a field example related to a gravity survey carried out in the volcanic area of Mount Etna (Sicily, Italy) is presented, aimed at imaging as accurately as possible the differential mass density structure within the first few km of depth inside the volcanic apparatus. An assemblage of vertical prismatic blocks appears to be the most probable gravity model of the Etna apparatus within the first 5 km of depth below sea level. Finally, an experimental SP dataset collected in the Mt. Somma-Vesuvius volcanic district (Naples, Italy) is elaborated in order to define location and shape of the sources of two SP anomalies of opposite sign detected in the northwestern sector of the surveyed area. The modelled sources are interpreted as the polarization state induced by an intense hydrothermal convective flow mechanism within the volcanic apparatus, from the free surface down to about 3 km of depth b.s.l..

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Theoretical analysis and numerical verification of the consistency of viscous smoothed-particle-hydrodynamics formulations in simulating free-surface flows

The theoretical formulation of the smoothed particle hydrodynamics (SPH) method deserves great care because of some inconsistencies occurring when considering free-surface inviscid flows. Actually, in SPH formulations one usually assumes that (i) surface integral terms on the boundary of the interpolation kernel support are neglected, (ii) free-surface conditions are implicitly verified. These assumptions are studied in detail in the present work for free-surface Newtonian viscous flow. The consistency of classical viscous weakly compressible SPH formulations is investigated. In particular, the principle of virtual work is used to study the verification of the free-surface boundary conditions in a weak sense. The latter can be related to the global energy dissipation induced by the viscous term formulations and their consistency. Numerical verification of this theoretical analysis is provided on three free-surface test cases including a standing wave, with the three viscous term formulations investigated.

Blood flow and oxygen delivery to human brain during functional activity: Theoretical modeling and experimental data

Coupling of cerebral blood flow (CBF) and cerebral metabolic rate for oxygen (CMRO2) in physiologically activated brain states remains the subject of debates. Recently it was suggested that CBF is tightly coupled to oxidative metabolism in a nonlinear fashion. As part of this hypothesis, mathematical models of oxygen delivery to the brain have been described in which disproportionately large increases in CBF are necessary to sustain even small increases in CMRO2 during activation. We have explored the coupling of CBF and oxygen delivery by using two complementary methods. First, a more complex mathematical model was tested that differs from those recently described in that no assumptions were made regarding tissue oxygen level. Second, [15O] water CBF positron emission tomography (PET) studies in nine healthy subjects were conducted during states of visual activation and hypoxia to examine the relationship of CBF and oxygen delivery. In contrast to previous reports, our model showed adequate tissue levels of oxygen could be maintained without the need for increased CBF or oxygen delivery. Similarly, the PET studies demonstrated that the regional increase in CBF during visual activation was not affected by hypoxia. These findings strongly indicate that the increase in CBF associated with physiological activation is regulated by factors other than local requirements in oxygen.

Actor-network theory as a theoretical lens and research strategy for investigating firm internationalisation

Totally generalisable theories of firm internationalisation in the post-industrial era of international business, where national barriers are becoming less significant and technology becoming more influential, appear to be illusory. Stepwise or evolutionary models that predict gradual internationalisation are under challenge from empirical evidence of rapid internationalisation such as the phenomenon of the “born global” firm. Similarly, equilibrium models such as the eclectic paradigm have been criticised for being static and unable to account for process and path dependency. In this paper, the information and knowledge assumptions implied in theories of firm internationalisation are outlined and discussed. From this discussion, we suggest that actor-network theory, with its balance between description and explanation, may be a useful theoretical and empirical tool for investigating the complex and heterogeneous process of firm internationalisation whilst creating opportunities for further theory building.

Horizontal fiscal equity: a theoretical contribution with an application to the portuguese municipalities.

Doutoramento em Economia.

On Ordinal VC-Dimension and Some Notions of Complexity

We generalize the classical notion of Vapnik–Chernovenkis (VC) dimension to ordinal VC-dimension, in the context of logical learning paradigms. Logical learning paradigms encompass the numerical learning paradigms commonly studied in Inductive Inference. A logical learning paradigm is defined as a set W of structures over some vocabulary, and a set D of first-order formulas that represent data. The sets of models of ϕ in W, where ϕ varies over D, generate a natural topology W over W. We show that if D is closed under boolean operators, then the notion of ordinal VC-dimension offers a perfect characterization for the problem of predicting the truth of the members of D in a member of W, with an ordinal bound on the number of mistakes. This shows that the notion of VC-dimension has a natural interpretation in Inductive Inference, when cast into a logical setting. We also study the relationships between predictive complexity, selective complexity—a variation on predictive complexity—and mind change complexity. The assumptions that D is closed under boolean operators and that W is compact often play a crucial role to establish connections between these concepts. We then consider a computable setting with effective versions of the complexity measures, and show that the equivalence between ordinal VC-dimension and predictive complexity fails. More precisely, we prove that the effective ordinal VC-dimension of a paradigm can be defined when all other effective notions of complexity are undefined. On a better note, when W is compact, all effective notions of complexity are defined, though they are not related as in the noncomputable version of the framework.