Wage bargaining, privatisation, ability to pay and outside options:evidence from Hungary

This article examines the determinants of short-term wage dynamics, using a sample of large Hungarian companies for 1996–99. We test the basic implications of an efficient contract model of bargaining between incumbent employees and managers, which the data do not reject. In particular, there are structural differences between the ownership sectors consistent with our prior knowledge on relative bargaining strength and unionisation measures. Stronger bargaining position of workers leads to higher ability to pay elasticity of wages, and lower outside option elasticity. Our results indicate that while bargaining position of workers in domestic privatised firms may be weaker than in the state sector, the more robust difference relates to state sector workers versus privatised firms with majority foreign ownership.

Wage bargaining, privatisation, ability to pay, and outside options:evidence from Hungary

This paper examines the determinants of short-term wage dynamics, using a sample of large Hungarian companies for the period of 1996-1999. We test the basic implications of an efficient contract model of bargaining between the incumbent employees and the managers, which we are unable to reject. In particular, there are structural differences between the ownership sectors consistent with our prior knowledge on relative bargaining strength and unionisation measures. Stronger bargaining position of workers leads to higher ability to pay elasticity of wages, and lower outside option elasticity. Our results indicate that while bargaining position of workers in domestic privatised firms may be weaker than in the state sector, the more robust difference relate to state sector workers versus the privatised firms with the majority foreign ownership. We examine several extensions. We augment the bargaining specification by controls related to workers' skills and find that the basic findings are robust to that. We take a closer look at the outside options of the workers. We find some interactive effects, where unemployment modify the impact of availability of rents on wages. We interpret our results as an indication that bargaining power of workers may be affected by changes in their outside options. We also experiment with one concise indicator of reservation wage which is closest to the theoretical model specification and combines sectoral wages, unemployment benefits and regional unemployment levels,. We found that measure performing well. Finally, we found that while responsiveness of wages towards ability to pay is higher in the state sector, variation in wage dynamics is lower. This may indicate some wage smoothing in the state sector, consistent with the preferences of employees.

Nash implementable domains for the Borda count

We characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satisfies Maskin monotonicity. The basic concept is the notion of a "cyclic permutation domain" which arises by fixing one particular ordering of alternatives and including all its cyclic permutations. The cyclic permutation domains are exactly the maximal domains on which the Borda count is strategy-proof when combined with every possible tie breaking rule. It turns out that the Borda count is monotonic on a larger class of domains. We show that the maximal domains on which the Borda count satisfies Maskin monotonicity are the "cyclically nested permutation domains" which are obtained from the cyclic permutation domains in an appropriately specified recursive way. ------ *We thank József Mala for posing the question of Nash implementability on restricted domains that led to this research. We are very grateful to two anonymous referees and an associate editor for their helpful comments and suggestions. The second author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA) through the Bolyai János research fellowship.

Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopolies

This article is searching for necessary and sufficient conditions which are to be imposed on the demand curve to guarantee the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a Bertrand-Edgeworth game with capacity constraints.

A vállalati likviditáskezelés szerepe eszközfedezettel rendelkező hitelszerződésekben. Az alkun alapuló megközelítés eredményei (The role of corporate liquidity management under secured debt financing Results of the bargaining approach)

A szerző azt a kérdést vizsgálja, hogy a vállalat működése során a likvid eszközök mekkora arányát tartsa fenn. A kérdést a finanszírozás szemszögéből veti fel, mivel a hitelezés okozta korlátok jelentősen befolyásolják a likvid eszköz tartalékolásának motivációit. A cikk a vállalkozói-hitelezői információs kapcsolat háromféle esetében mutatja be az eszközfedezettel rendelkező hitelek adósságszolgálatát meghatározó tényezőket. Elsőként a teljes információs viszony melletti stratégiákkal meghatározott adósságszolgálatot vizsgálja, majd a második típusú információs kapcsolatban a nem megfigyelhető vállalkozói erőfeszítéseket feltételezve adja meg az adósságszolgálat fizetésének ex ante és ex post egyensúlyát. Harmadikként, a nem igazolható vállalati adatok feltevése mellett teljes és részleges eszközfedezetre is meghatározza az optimális vállalkozói likviditási politikát, és tárgyalja az itt fennálló ellentéteket. Megmutatja, hogy részleges eszközfedezet mellett 1. újratárgyalható a hitelszerződés, és a stratégiai adósságszolgálatot nem lehet elkerülni, 2. a likviditásoptimalizálásnak nincs ex post Pareto-egyensúlyi megoldása, ugyanis a hitelszerződésben részt vevő felek alkuereje határozza meg a vállalat likviditásának szintjét. / === / This paper investigates what the liquid asset ratio for firms should be. Financing constraints significantly influence motivations for liquidity hoarding. The article shows the determinants of secured debt services for three different information cases of a lender-borrower relationship. First, it examines the strategic debt service under full information, and then, assuming non-observable entrepreneurial efforts, it gives the ex ante and ex post equilibria of the strategic debt service. The third case supposes non-verifiable firm information; this provides the optimal corporate liquidity policy and explains the contrary propositions. It shows that under not fully secured collateral, 1. the debt contract is renegotiable; the lender cannot avoid the strategic debt service, 2. there is no ex post optimal Pareto efficient solution to liquidity policy, because the corporate liquidity ratio is determined by the bargaining power of the partners in the debt contract.

Invariance under type morphisms: the bayesian Nash equilibrium

Ely and Peski (2006) and Friedenberg and Meier (2010) provide examples when changing the type space behind a game, taking a "bigger" type space, induces changes of Bayesian Nash Equilibria, in other words, the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is not invariant under type morphisms. In this paper we introduce the notion of strong type morphism. Strong type morphisms are stronger than ordinary and conditional type morphisms (Ely and Peski, 2006), and we show that Bayesian Nash Equilibria are not invariant under strong type morphisms either. We present our results in a very simple, finite setting, and conclude that there is no chance to get reasonable assumptions for Bayesian Nash Equilibria to be invariant under any kind of reasonable type morphisms.

A note on the axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium correspondence

A new axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium correspondence for n-person games based on independence of irrelevant strategies is given. Using a flexible general model, it is proved that the Nash equilibrium correspondence is the only solution to satisfy the axioms of non-emptiness, weak one-person rationality, independence of irrelevant strategies and converse independence of irrelevant strategies on the class of subgames of a fixed finite n-person game which admit at least one Nash equilibrium. It is also shown that these axioms are logically independent.

Collective bargaining and faculty unionization: An administrative perspective

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to gain insight into the perspectives of experienced higher education administrators regarding faculty unionization, the collective bargaining process, and the interpersonal relationships between higher education faculty members and administrators. ^ The primary method of data collection was semi-structured face to face interviews with nine administrators from two community colleges and two universities in the south Florida area. All of the study participants worked with unionized faculty members and had direct experience participating in bargaining negotiations. ^ Upon the completion of each interview, the researcher listened to the taped audio recording of the interview several times and then transcribed all of the information from the audiotape into a Word file. Data collection and analysis for each participant were performed concurrently. Using a modified concept mapping approach, the research questions were written on large yellow sticky notes and placed in the middle of a wall in the researcher’s home with nine descriptive categorical themes written on smaller sticky notes placed around the study questions. The highlighted quotes and key phrases were cut from each transcript and placed under each of the descriptive categories. Over the course of a few months repeatedly reviewing the research questions that guided this study, the theory of symbolic interactionism, and relevant literature the categorical descriptive themes were refined and condensed into five descriptive themes. ^ Study findings indicated that the administrators: (a) must have a clear understanding of what it is that the faculty does to be an effective representative at the bargaining table, (b) experienced role ambiguity and role strain related to a lack of understanding as to their role at the bargaining table and a lack of organizational support, (c) were not offered any type of training in preparation for bargaining, (d) perceived a definite “us versus them” mentality between faculty and administration, and (e) saw faculty collective bargaining at public institutions of higher education in Florida as ineffectual. ^

Antecedents of Concession Bargaining in the Great Recession: Evidence from Ireland

Concession or ‘give back’ bargaining involves firms seeking changes in pay and conditions of employment from trade unions in return for pledges of enhanced job security and sometimes other forms of reciprocation. Several distinct modes of concession bargaining are distinguishable in the literature, and three modes of concession bargaining have been identified in Ireland during the Great Recession: integrative, distributive and minimal engagement. Deploying qualitatively informed quantitative data on the conduct of collective bargaining during the Great Recession, this article examines a series of antecedent influences on the choices firms make in conducting concession bargaining with unions.

Transcript of proceedings : collective bargaining /

At head of cover title: This is a rough draft.

Unit 3: Collective Bargaining

Versión en inglés de la lección 3ª y materiales complementarios (diapositivas Pwp y cuestionario) correspondientes a la asignatura Derecho del Trabajo I (grupo ARA) del Grado en Derecho.

Entrevista a Mary Nash

ResumenLa entrevista responde preguntas acerca de la investigación histórica con enfoque de género.Abstract DR. Nahs respond to question regarding historical research focusing on gender.

Does hepatocellular carcinoma in non-alcoholic steatohepatitis exist in cirrhotic and non-cirrhotic patients?

Non-alcoholic steatohepatitis (NASH) has been associated with hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC) often arising in histologically advanced disease when steatohepatitis is not active (cryptogenic cirrhosis). Our objective was to characterize patients with HCC and active, histologically defined steatohepatitis. Among 394 patients with HCC detected by ultrasound imaging over 8 years and staged by the Barcelona Clinic Liver Cancer (BCLC) criteria, we identified 7 cases (1.7%) with HCC occurring in the setting of active biopsy-proven NASH. All were negative for other liver diseases such as hepatitis C, hepatitis B, autoimmune hepatitis, Wilson disease, and hemochromatosis. The patients (4 males and 3 females, age 63 ± 13 years) were either overweight (4) or obese (3); 57% were diabetic and 28.5% had dyslipidemia. Cirrhosis was present in 6 of 7 patients, but 1 patient had well-differentiated HCC in the setting of NASH without cirrhosis (fibrosis stage 1) based on repeated liver biopsies, the absence of portal hypertension by clinical and radiographic evaluations and by direct surgical inspection. Among the cirrhotic patients, 71.4% were clinically staged as Child A and 14.2% as Child B. Tumor size ranged from 1.0 to 5.2 cm and 5 of 7 patients were classified as early stage; 46% of all nodules were hyper-echoic and 57% were <3 cm. HCC was well differentiated in 1/6 and moderately differentiated in 5/6. Alpha-fetoprotein was <100 ng/mL in all patients. HCC in patients with active steatohepatitis is often multifocal, may precede clinically advanced disease and occurs without diagnostic levels of alpha-fetoprotein. Importantly, HCC may occur in NASH in the absence of cirrhosis. More aggressive screening of NASH patients may be warranted.