A note on the axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium correspondence
Data(s) |
2015
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Resumo |
A new axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium correspondence for n-person games based on independence of irrelevant strategies is given. Using a flexible general model, it is proved that the Nash equilibrium correspondence is the only solution to satisfy the axioms of non-emptiness, weak one-person rationality, independence of irrelevant strategies and converse independence of irrelevant strategies on the class of subgames of a fixed finite n-person game which admit at least one Nash equilibrium. It is also shown that these axioms are logically independent. |
Formato |
application/pdf |
Identificador |
http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/2186/1/MathPannonica_2015.pdf Forgó, Ferenc (2015) A note on the axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium correspondence. Mathematica Pannonica, 25 (1). pp. 147-155. ISSN 0865-2090 |
Publicador |
Editorial Board of Mathematica Pannonica |
Relação |
http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/2186/ |
Palavras-Chave | #Mathematics, Econometrics |
Tipo |
Article PeerReviewed |