971 resultados para Military History
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"Bibliography of modern works from 1870": p. 555-569.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Illustrated by Darley and others.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Extract from the edition of 1834 ([8] p.) inserted before p. [7]
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Mode of access: Internet.
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"[Fac-simile] Proceedings of a board of general officers, held by order of His Excellency Gen. Washington ... respecting Major John Andrè ... September 29, 1780. Philadelphia: Printed by Francis Bailey ... M.DCC.LXXX": p. 127-147.
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Continued by Register of graduates and former cadets of the United States Military Academy.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Medical personnel serving with the Defence Forces have contributed to the evolution of trauma treatment and the advancement of prehospital care within the military environment. This paper investigates the stories of an Australian Medical Officer, Sir Neville Howse, and two stretcher bearers, Private John Simpson (Kirkpatrick) and Private Martin O’Meara, In particular it describes the gruelling conditions under which they performed their roles, and reflects on the legacy that they have left behind in Australian society. While it is widely acknowledged that conflicts such as World War One should never have happened, as civilian and defence force paramedics, we should never forget the service and sacrifice of defence force medical personnel and their contribution to the body of knowledge on the treatment of trauma. These men and women bravely provided emergency care in the most harrowing conditions possible. However, men like Martin O’Meara may not have been given the same status in society today as Sir Neville Howse or Simpson and his donkey, due to the public’s lack of awareness and acceptance of war neurosis and conditions such as post traumatic stress disorder, reactive psychosis and somatoform disorders which were suffered by many soldiers during their wartime service and on their return home after fighting in war.
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Background There is no legal requirement for Iranian military truck drivers to undergo regular visual checkups as compared to commercial truck drivers. Objectives This study aimed to evaluate the impact of drivers’ visual checkups by comparing the visual function of Iranian military and commercial truck drivers. Patients and Methods In this comparative cross-sectional study, two hundred military and 200 commercial truck drivers were recruited and their Visual Acuity (VA), Visual Field (VF), color vision and Contrast Sensitivity (CS) were assessed and compared using the Snellen chart, confrontation screening method, D15 test and Pelli-Robson letter chart, respectively. A questionnaire regarding driving exposure and history of motor-vehicle crashes (MVCs) was also filled by drivers. Results were analyzed using an independent samples t-test, one-way ANOVA (assessing difference in number of MVCs across different age groups), chi-square test and Pearson correlation at statistical significance level of P < 0.05. Results Mean age was 41.6 ± 9.2 for the military truck drivers and 43.4 ± 10.9 for commercial truck drivers (P > 0.05). No significant difference between military and commercial drivers was found in terms of driving experience, number of MVCs, binocular VA, frequency of color vision defects and CS scores. In contrast, the last ocular examination was significantly earlier in military drivers than commercial drivers (P < 0.001). In addition, 4% of military drivers did not meet the national standards to drive as opposed to 2% of commercial drivers. There was a significant but weak correlation between binocular VA and age (r = 0.175, P < 0.001). However, CS showed a significantly moderate correlation with age (r = -0.488, P < 0.001). Conclusions The absence of legal requirement for regular eye examination in military drivers caused the incompetent drivers to be missed in contrast to commercial drivers. The need for scientific revision of VA standard for Iranian drivers is also discussed. The CS measurement in visual checkups of older drivers deserves to be investigated more thoroughly.
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This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.
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In the opening pages of Selling Sex we are introduced to 'Joy', a statue of a young female sex worker which stood in East Sydney for eighteen months during 1995- 1997. Following complaints by local residents, the statue was removed from public view and returned to its owner. Evidently, Joy was considered a reminder of the community's 'bad old days', when it was better known for prostitution than restaurants. In a nation in which almost every sizable community has proudly erected monuments to military men, the removal of Joy reveals much about labour and gender relations in Australia. For Frances, the removal of Joy is symbolic, our historical treatment of sex workers having parallels with our treatment of the convicts. This work sets out to give these women (male prostitutes do not figure in this history) a voice and break with the stereotypes of 'abandoned whores' or 'sad victims'. It also sets out to place the sex industry in the broader national and international context in which it has historically operated...