933 resultados para Letting of contracts.
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Electricity markets are systems for effecting the purchase and sale of electricity using supply and demand to set energy prices. Two major market models are often distinguished: pools and bilateral contracts. Pool prices tend to change quickly and variations are usually highly unpredictable. In this way, market participants often enter into bilateral contracts to hedge against pool price volatility. This article addresses the challenge of optimizing the portfolio of clients managed by trader agents. Typically, traders buy energy in day-ahead markets and sell it to a set of target clients, by negotiating bilateral contracts involving three-rate tariffs. Traders sell energy by considering the prices of a reference week and five different types of clients. They analyze several tariffs and determine the best share of customers, i.e., the share that maximizes profit. © 2014 IEEE.
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Business History, Vol 50 No 2, p147-162
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We characterize the optimal job design in a multitasking environment when the firms rely on implicit incentive contracts (i.e., bonus payments). Two natural forms of job design are compared: (i) individual accountability, where each agent is assigned to a particular job and assumes full responsibility for its outcome; and (ii) team accountability, where a group of agents share responsibility for a job and are jointly accountable for its outcome. The key trade-off is that team accountability mitigates the multitasking problem but may weaken the implicit contracts. The optimal job design follows a cut-off rule: firms with high reputation concerns opt for team accountability, whereas firms with low reputation concerns opt for individual accountability. Team accountability is more likely the more acute the multitasking problem is. However, the cut-off rule need not hold if the firm combines implicit incentives with explicit pay-per-performance contracts.
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The objective of this paper is to identify the role of memory in repeated contracts with moral hazard in financial intermediation. We use the database we have built containing the contracts signed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development EBRD between 1991 and 2003. Our framework is a standard setting of repeated moral hazard. After having controlled for the adverse selection component, we are able to prove that client reputation is the discrimination device according to which the bank fixes the amount of credit for the established clients. Our results unambiguously isolate the effect of memory in the bank's lending decisions.
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The objective of this paper is to identify the role of memory as a screening device in repeated contracts with asymmetric information in financial intermediation. We use an original dataset from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. We propose a simple empirical method to capture the role of memory using the client's reputation. Our results unambiguously isolate the dominant effect of memory on the bank's lending decisions over market factors in the case of established clients.
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We consider a market where firms hire workers to run their projects and such projects differ in profitability. At any period, each firm needs two workers to successfully run its project: a junior agent, with no specific skills, and a senior worker, whose effort is not verifiable. Senior workers differ in ability and their competence is revealed after they have worked as juniors in the market. We study the length of the contractual relationships between firms and workers in an environment where the matching between firms and workers is the result of market interaction. We show that, despite in a one-firm-one-worker set-up long-term contracts are the optimal choice for firms, market forces often induce firms to use short-term contracts. Unless the market only consists of firms with very profitable projects, firms operating highly profitable projects offer short-term contracts to ensure the service of high-ability workers and those with less lucrative projects also use short-term contracts to save on the junior workers' wage. Intermediate firms may (or may not) hire workers through long-term contracts.
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While one of the main objectives of adolescence is to achieve autonomy, for the specific population of adolescents with a chronic illness (CI), the struggle for autonomy is accentuated by the limits implied by their illness. However, little is known concerning the way their parents manage and cope with their children's autonomy acquisition. Our aim was to identify the needs and preoccupations of parents of adolescents with CI in coping with their children's autonomy acquisition and to determine whether mothers and fathers coped differently. Using a qualitative approach, 30 parents of adolescents with CI participated in five focus groups. Recruitment took place in five specialized pediatric clinics from our university hospital. Thematic analysis was conducted. Transcript analyses suggested four major categories of preoccupations, those regarding autonomy acquisition, giving or taking on autonomy, shared management of treatment and child's future. Some aspects implied differences between mothers' and fathers' viewpoints and ways of experiencing this period of life. Letting go can be hard for the father, mother, adolescent or all three. Helping one or the other can in turn improve family functioning as a whole. Reported findings may help health professionals better assist parents in managing their child's acquisition of autonomy.
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State Agency Audit Report
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Other Audit Reports - Special Report
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Other Audit Reports
