The typic in Kant’s critique of practical reason : moral judgment and symbolic representation

Comment pouvons-nous représenter un principe moral universel de manière à le rendre applicable à des cas concrets ? Ce problème revêt une forme aiguë dans la philosophie morale d’Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804), tout particulièrement dans sa théorie du jugement moral, car il soutient que l’on doit appliquer la loi morale « suprasensible » à des actions dans le monde sensible afin de déterminer celles-ci comme moralement bonnes ou mauvaises. Kant aborde ce problème dans un chapitre de la Critique de la raison pratique (1788) intitulé « De la typique de la faculté de juger pratique pure » (KpV 5: 67-71). La première partie de la thèse vise à fournir un commentaire compréhensif et détaillé de ce texte important, mais trop peu étudié. Étant donné que la loi morale, en tant qu’Idée suprasensible de la raison, ne peut pas être appliquée directement à des actions dans l’intuition sensible, Kant a recours à une forme particulière de représentation indirecte et symbolique. Sa solution inédite consiste à fournir la faculté de juger avec un « type [Typus] », ou analogue formel, de la loi morale. Ce type est la loi de la causalité naturelle : en tant que loi, il sert d’étalon formel pour tester l’universalisabilité des maximes ; et, en tant que loi de la nature, il peut aussi s’appliquer à toute action dans l’expérience sensible. Dès lors, le jugement moral s’effectue par le biais d’une expérience de pensée dans laquelle on se demande si l’on peut vouloir que sa maxime devienne une loi universelle d’une nature contrefactuelle dont on ferait soi-même partie. Cette expérience de pensée fonctionne comme une « épreuve [Probe] » de la forme des maximes et, par ce moyen, du statut moral des actions. Kant soutient que tout un chacun, même « l’entendement le plus commun », emploie cette procédure pour l’appréciation morale. De plus, la typique prémunit contre deux menaces à l’éthique rationaliste de Kant, à savoir l’empirisme (c’est-à-dire le conséquentialisme) et le mysticisme. La seconde partie de la thèse se penche sur l’indication de Kant que la typique « ne sert que comme un symbole ». Un bon nombre de commentateurs ont voulu assimiler la typique à la notion d’« hypotypose symbolique » présentée dans le § 59 de la Critique de la faculté de juger (1790). La typique serait un processus de symbolisation esthétique consistant à présenter, de façon indirecte, la représentation abstraite de la loi morale sous la forme d’un symbole concret et intuitif. Dans un premier chapitre, cette interprétation est présentée et soumise à un examen critique qui cherche à montrer qu’elle est erronée et peu judicieuse. Dans le second chapitre, nous poursuivons une voie d’interprétation jusqu’ici ignorée, montrant que la typique a de plus grandes continuités avec la notion d’« anthropomorphisme symbolique », une procédure strictement analogique introduite auparavant dans les Prolégomènes (1783). Nous en concluons, d’une part, que la typique fut un moment décisif dans l’évolution de la théorie kantienne de la représentation symbolique et que, d’autre part, elle marque la réalisation, chez Kant, d’une conception proprement critique de la nature et de la morale comme deux sphères distinctes, dont la médiation s’opère par le biais des concepts de loi et de conformité à la loi (Gesetzmässigkeit). En un mot, la typique s’avère l’instrument par excellence du « rationalisme de la faculté de juger ».

Thin, fine and with sensitivity: a metamethodology of intuitions

Do philosophers use intuitions? Should philosophers use intuitions? Can philosophical methods (where intuitions are concerned) be improved upon? In order to answer these questions we need to have some idea of how we should go about answering them. I defend a way of going about methodology of intuitions: a metamethodology. I claim the following: (i) we should approach methodological questions about intuitions with a thin conception of intuitions in mind; (ii) we should carve intuitions finely; and, (iii) we should carve to a grain to which we are sensitive in our everyday philosophising. The reason is that, unless we do so, we don’t get what we want from philosophical methodology. I argue that what we want is information that will aid us in formulating practical advice concerning how to do philosophy responsibly/well/better.

Intuitions in the Face of Diversity

In recent decades, intuitions' role in philosophy has been hotly debated. Many claim intuitions play an important role. Others, some armed with data, challenge the use of intuitions. This thesis reflects on this debate and advances the debate in two main ways. Having a clear understanding of the challenge which intuition-use in philosophy faces is important. Part I focuses on this. Chapters 1-2 introduce the topic of intuitions, motivate the methodological study of intuitions, and present the historical background to recent empirical challenges to intuition-use. Chapters 3-5 concern the contemporary challenge. I present the empirical evidence the challenge uses, present what I argue to be the strongest version of the challenge, and defend that challenge against some objections. How one characterises intuitions is incredibly important in philosophical methodology. If we are to properly evaluate philosophical methods vis-a-vis their use of something called intuitions { if we are to assess the empirical challenge { it is important to be clear exactly what we mean by `intuitions'. Part II focuses on this. Chapter 6 argues there is little consensus among philosophers as to what intuitions are and their role in philosophy. Chapter 7 questions whether philosophers have developed an idiolect in which `intuition' has distinctive meaning | as frequently supposed. Chapter 8 points out a common misunderstanding about intuitions in philosophy; using quantitative tools to challenge the idea that an increased use of `intuition' in philosophy is the result of an increased use of intuition. So, the developing picture is one of confusion, without a clear idea of what sense of `intuition' is important. Fortunately, Chapter 9 sets us back on the right track. It sets out a positive programme for evaluative methodology: methodologists should adopt a permissive conception of intuitions and make fine distinctions between different intuitions, so long as we can track those distinctions while philosophising.

The metaphysics of self in Praśastapāda's differential naturalism

In A Compendium of the Characteristics of Categories (Padārthadharmasaṃgraha) the classical Vaiśeṣika philosopher Praśastapāda (6th c. CE) presents an innovative metaphysics of the self. This article examines the defining metaphysical and axiological features of this conception of self and the dualist categorial schema in which it is located. It shows how this idea of the self, as a reflexive and ethical being, grounds a multinaturalist view of natural order and offers a conception of agency that claims to account for all the reflexive features of human mental and bodily life. Finally, it discusses the ends of self’s reflexivity and of human life as a return to the true self. It argues that at the heart of Praśastapāda’s metaphysics of self is the idea that ethics is metaphysics, and that epistemic practice is ethical practice.

'In Charge of the Truffula Seeds' : On Children's Literature, Rationality and Children's Voices in Philosophy

In this paper I investigate how philosophy can speak for children and how children can have a voice in philosophy and speak for philosophy. I argue that we should understand children as responsible rational individuals who are involved in their own philosophical inquiries and who can be involved in our own philosophical investigations-not because of their rational abilities, but because we acknowledge them as conversational partners, acknowledge their reasons as reasons, and speak for them as well as let them speak for us and our rational community. In order to argue this I turn, first, to Gareth Matthews' philosophy of childhood and suggest a reconstruction of some of his concepts in line with the philosophy of Stanley Cavell. Second, in order to examine more closely our conceptions of rationality and our pictures of children, I consider the children's books, The Lorax and Where is My Sister? and Henrik Ibsen's play, The Wild Duck.

Ethical Care of the Self and the Teacher in the Pedagogical Relationship: Reflections Based on the Latest Foucault

Our conception of education is that it is the responsible action whereby man becomes human, trains and faces the challenges that life and the world present, as man enters a larger, shared cultural tradition and thus joins the world. However such sharing implies that we must not just rely on tradition, but remain open to new ideas. It is essential for schooling to preserve a field where the art of living intersects with the world for which future generations are being prepared. It is in this field of intersection that this essay seeks to discuss Michel Foucault's thought, care of the self and the role played by others in the acquisition of ethical attitudes pertaining to one's conduct in life. Through reconstructing Foucault's ideas, we elaborate on the hypothesis that, before morally shaping students, teaching them values, or aiding in their skill acquisition in the sense prevailing in schooling today, it is important to understand the notion of care of the self (and how the notion implies interaction with others for effective care of the self). Care of the self is vital for thoroughly understanding the relationships between ethics and education in school. We particularly examine how Foucault's ideas and his analysis of the teacher's role in shaping the student's life conduct can help educators rethink pedagogical action in an ethical sense and find within it a certain openness to the formation of attitudes in educators and students

The structuring body : a critical study in the description & explanation of perceptual experience

The aims of the dissertation are to find the right description of the structure of perceptual experience and to explore the ways in which the structure of the body might serve to explain it. In the first two parts, I articulate and defend the claim that perceptual experience seems direct and the claim that its objects seem real. I defend these claims as integral parts of a coherent metaphysically neutral conception of perceptual experience. Sense-datum theorists, certain influential perceptual psychologists, and early modern philosophers (most notably Berkeley) all disputed the claim that perceptual experience seems direct. In Part I, I argue that the grounds on which they did so were poor. The aim is then, in Part II, to give a proper appreciation of the distinctive intentionality of perceptual experience whilst remaining metaphysically neutral. I do so by drawing on the early work of Edmund Husserl, providing a characterisation of the perceptual experience of objects as real, qua mind-independent particulars. In Part III, I explore two possible explanations of the structure characterising the intentionality of perceptual experience, both of which accord a distinctive explanatory role to the body. On one account, perceptual experience is structured by an implicit pre-reflective consciousness of oneself as a body engaged in perceptual activity. An alternative account makes no appeal to the metaphysically laden concept of a bodily self. It seeks to explain the structure of perceptual experience by appeal to anticipation of the structural constraints of the body. I develop this alternative by highlighting the conceptual and empirical basis for the idea that a first-order structural affordance relation holds between a bodily agent and certain properties of its body. I then close with a discussion of the shared background assumptions that ought to inform disputes over whether the body itself (in addition to its representation) ought to serve as an explanans in such an account.

Securities: Its Conception and Protection of Interests of its Holders

Theoretical studies of the problems of the securities markets in the Russian Federation incline to one or other of the two traditional approaches. The first consists of comparing the definition of "valuable paper" set forth in the current legislation of the Russian Federation, with the theoretical model of "Wertpapiere" elaborated by German scholars more than 90 years ago. The problem with this approach is, in Mr. Pentsov's opinion, that any new features of the definition of "security" that do not coincide with the theoretical model of "Wertpapiere" (such as valuable papers existing in non-material, electronic form) are claimed to be incorrect and removed from the current legislation of the Russian Federation. The second approach works on the basis of the differentiation between the Common Law concept of "security" and the Civil Law concept of "valuable paper". Mr. Pentsov's research, presented in an article written in English, uses both methodological tools and involves, firstly, a historical study of the origin and development of certain legal phenomena (securities) as they evolved in different countries, and secondly, a comparative, synchronic study of equivalent legal phenomena as they exist in different countries today. Employing the first method, Mr. Pentsov divided the historical development of the conception of "valuable paper" in Russia into five major stages. He found that, despite the existence of a relatively wide circulation of valuable papers, especially in the second half of the 19th century, Russian legislation before 1917 (the first stage) did not have a unified definition of valuable paper. The term was used, in both theoretical studies and legislation, but it covered a broad range of financial instruments such as stocks, bonds, government bonds, promissory notes, bills of exchange, etc. During the second stage, also, the legislation of the USSR did not have a unified definition of "valuable paper". After the end of the "new economic policy" (1922 - 1930) the stock exchanges and the securities markets in the USSR, with a very few exceptions, were abolished. And thus during the third stage (up to 1985), the use of valuable papers in practice was reduced to foreign economic relations (bills of exchange, stocks in enterprises outside the USSR) and to state bonds. Not surprisingly, there was still no unified definition of "valuable paper". After the beginning of Gorbachev's perestroika, a securities market began to re-appear in the USSR. However, the successful development of securities markets in the USSR was retarded by the absence of an appropriate regulatory framework. The first effort to improve the situation was the adoption of the Regulations on Valuable Papers, approved by resolution No. 590 of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, dated June 19, 1990. Section 1 of the Regulation contained the first statutory definition of "valuable paper" in the history of Russia. At the very beginning of the period of transition to a market economy, a number of acts contained different definitions of "valuable paper". This diversity clearly undermined the stability of the Russian securities market and did not achieve the goal of protecting the investor. The lack of unified criteria for the consideration of such non-standard financial instruments as "valuable papers" significantly contributed to the appearance of numerous fraudulent "pyramid" schemes that were outside of the regulatory scheme of Russia legislation. The situation was substantially improved by the adoption of the new Civil Code of the Russian Federation. According to Section 1 of Article 142 of the Civil Code, a valuable paper is a document that confirms, in compliance with an established form and mandatory requisites, certain material rights whose realisation or transfer are possible only in the process of its presentation. Finally, the recent Federal law No. 39 - FZ "On the Valuable Papers Market", dated April 22 1996, has also introduced the term "emission valuable papers". According to Article 2 of this Law, an "emission valuable paper" is any valuable paper, including non-documentary, that simultaneously has the following features: it fixes the composition of material and non-material rights that are subject to confirmation, cession and unconditional realisation in compliance with the form and procedure established by this federal law; it is placed by issues; and it has equal amount and time of realisation of rights within the same issue regardless of when the valuable paper was purchased. Thus the introduction of the conception of "emission valuable paper" became the starting point in the Russian federation's legislation for the differentiation between the legal regimes of "commercial papers" and "investment papers" similar to the Common Law approach. Moving now to the synchronic, comparative method of research, Mr. Pentsov notes that there are currently three major conceptions of "security" and, correspondingly, three approaches to its legal definition: the Common Law concept, the continental law concept, and the concept employed by Japanese Law. Mr. Pentsov proceeds to analyse the differences and similarities of all three, concluding that though the concept of "security" in the Common Law system substantially differs from that of "valuable paper" in the Continental Law system, nevertheless the two concepts are developing in similar directions. He predicts that in the foreseeable future the existing differences between these two concepts will become less and less significant. On the basis of his research, Mr. Pentsov arrived at the conclusion that the concept of "security" (and its equivalents) is not a static one. On the contrary, it is in the process of permanent evolution that reflects the introduction of new financial instruments onto the capital markets. He believes that the scope of the statutory definition of "security" plays an extremely important role in the protection of investors. While passing the Securities Act of 1933, the United States Congress determined that the best way to achieve the goal of protecting investors was to define the term "security" in sufficiently broad and general terms so as to include within the definition the many types of instruments that in the commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of "security' and to cover the countless and various devices used by those who seek to use the money of others on the promise of profits. On the other hand, the very limited scope of the current definition of "emission valuable paper" in the Federal Law of the Russian Federation entitled "On the Valuable Papers Market" does not allow the anti-fraud provisions of this law to be implemented in an efficient way. Consequently, there is no basis for the protection of investors. Mr. Pentsov proposes amendments which he believes would enable the Russian markets to become more efficient and attractive for both foreign and domestic investors.

Representation via Probabilities: Models of Probabilistic Modeling

How do probabilistic models represent their targets and how do they allow us to learn about them? The answer to this question depends on a number of details, in particular on the meaning of the probabilities involved. To classify the options, a minimalist conception of representation (Su\'arez 2004) is adopted: Modelers devise substitutes (``sources'') of their targets and investigate them to infer something about the target. Probabilistic models allow us to infer probabilities about the target from probabilities about the source. This leads to a framework in which we can systematically distinguish between different models of probabilistic modeling. I develop a fully Bayesian view of probabilistic modeling, but I argue that, as an alternative, Bayesian degrees of belief about the target may be derived from ontic probabilities about the source. Remarkably, some accounts of ontic probabilities can avoid problems if they are supposed to apply to sources only.

The Social Imaginary of Culture/Civilization in the Arabic Literary Tradition

Charles Taylor’s contribution to social imaginaries offers an interpretive framework for better understanding modernity as secularity. One of its main aspects is conceiving of human society in linear, homogenous time (secular time). Looking into the Arabic intellectual tradition, I will argue in my paper that Taylor’s framework can help us understand major social and intellectual transformations. The Ottoman and Arabic modernization process during the 19th century has often been understood by focusing on certain core concepts. One of these is tamaddun, usually translated as “civilization.” I will be mostly talking about the works of two “pioneers” of Arab modernity (which is traditionally referred to as an-nahḍa, the so-called Arab Renaissance): the Syrian Fransīs Marrāsh and the Egyptian Rifāʿa aṭ-Ṭahṭāwī. First I will focus on Marrāsh’s didactic novel “The Forest of Truth” (1865), as it offers a complex view of tamaddun, which has sometimes been construed as merely a social and political reform program. The category of "social imaginary,” however, is useful in grasping the wider semantic scope of this concept, which is reading it as a signifier for human history conceived of in secular time, as Taylor defines it. This conceptualization of human history functioning within the immanent frame can also be observed in the introduction to “The Extraction of Pure Gold in the Description of Paris” (1834), a systematic account of a travel experience in France that was written by the other “pioneer,” aṭ-Ṭahṭāwī. Finally, in translating tamaddun as “the modern social imaginary of civilization/culture,” the talk aims to consider this imaginary as a major factor in the emergence of the “secular age.” Furthermore, it suggests the importance of studying (quasi-) literary texts, such as historiographical, geographical, and self-narratives in the Arabic literary tradition, in order to further elaborate continuities and ruptures in social imaginaries.

Na 1 Nachlass Max Horkheimer, 657 - "The Philosophy of Western Society", "Bericht über die Aktivitäten des Instituts für Sozialforschung für Robert M. MacIver", "Über die Tätigkeit des Instituts für Sozialforschung", "Stipendiaten des Instituts für Sozialforschung: Forschungsberichte", "Research Projects of the International Institut of Social Research" (p. IX 56-IX 59.2)

Über das Forschungsprogramm: The Philosophy of Western Society. Teilstück des allgemeinen Forschungsprogramms, veröffentlicht unter dem Untertitel: "The Philosophy of Social Science", in: "International Institute of Social Research. A Report of Its History, Aims and Activites, 1933-1938", New York (1938?), S. 19, Typoskript mit eigenhändiger Korrektur, 2 Blatt; Bericht über die Aktivitäten des Instituts für Sozialforschung für Robert M. MacIver, 1938-39: 1. Bericht vom 7.12.1939; a) Typoskript, englisch, 9 Blatt; b) Typoskript, als Brief von Pollock an Robert M. MacIver, Typoskript 10 Blatt; c) Entwurf Typoskript, englisch, 15 Blatt; d) Entwurf Typoskript, deutsch, 17 Blatt; MacIver, Robert M.: 1 Brief mit Unterschrift an Friedrich Pollock, New York, 27.04.1938, 1 Blatt; "Some data on the Institut`s Staff and Activities", 11.03.1938, zwei Typoskripte, je 2 Blatt; Über die Tätigkeiten des Instituts für Sozialforschung. Verschiedene Berichte. 1939; Aufstellung der Forschungsgebiete verschiedener Mitarbeiter des Instituts. Ohne Datum, Typoskript, 9 Blatt; Aufstellung der Forschungsgebiete verschiedener Mitarbeiter des Institutes, aus einem Bericht. Typoskript, 7 Blatt; Bericht an den Präsidenten des Columbia University. Typoskript, 2 Blatt; "Contribution of Dr. Franz Neumann to the Round Table Discussion, Chicago, Social Science Reaserach Building" Dezember 1939; a) Typoskript mit Handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 3 Blatt; b) Typoskript, 3 Blatt; "Statment on the objectives of the International Institut of Social Research". Typoskript, 2 Blatt; Stipendiaten des Instituts für Sozialforschung: Forschungsberichte, Ende 1939; Adorno, Theodor W.: a) Typoskript, englisch, mit eigenhändigen Korrekturen, 4 Blatt; b) Typoskript, deutsch, 3 Blatt; Beck, Maximilian: "Geschichte des Begriffs der Vernunft von Platon bis Husserl (Outline)". Typoskript, englisch und deutsch, mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 7 Blatt; Flechtheim, Ossip K.: Typoskript mit handschriftlichen Ergänzungen, 1 Blatt; Fried, Hans Ernest: Typoskript, 1 Blatt, 16.11.1939; Grossmann, Henryk: "Capitalism in the 13th Century"; a) Typoskript, englisch, mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 6 Blatt; b) Typoskript, englisch, 6 Blatt; c) Typoskript, deutsch, 4 Blatt; Grossmann, Henryk: "The Classical Theory and Marxism"; a) Typoskript, englisch, mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 2 Blatt; b) Typoskript, deutsch, mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 2 Blatt; Kirchheimer, Otto: Manuskript, 1 Blatt; Lauterbach, Albert: a) Typoskript, englisch, mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 2 Blatt; b) Typoskript, deutsch, mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 1 Blatt; Marcuse, Herbert: Typoskript mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 2 Blatt; Neumann, Franz L.: Typoskript, 2 Blatt; Wittfogel, Karl August: Typsokript, 2 Blatt; Zilsel, Edgar: Typoskript, 4 Blatt; Research Projects of the International Institute of Social Research. nicht vor 1939; Beschreibung der Forschungsprojekte: Pollock, Friedrich: "Economic and Social Cosequences of a Prepardness Economy". Neumann, Franz L.: "The Rule of Law". Fromm, Erich: "The German Worker in the Weiman Republic". Kirchheimer,Otto: "Criminal Law and Social Structure". Marcuse, Herbert: " A Text and Source Book for the History of Philosophy". Fromm, Erich: "Character Structure of Modern Man". Neumann, Franz L.: "The Theory and Practice of European Labor Law". Wittfogel, Karl August; Wittfogel-Lang, Olga: "The Chinese Family"; Dasselbe wie in "Beschreibung der Forschungsprojekte", ausgenommen Pollock, Friedrich: "Economic and Social Cosquences of a Prepardness Economy" und Fromm, Erich: "The German Worker in the Weimar Republic", zusätzlich Kirchner, Otto; Weil, Felix: "Changes in Social Stratification, National Income, and Living Standards of Germany since 1933"; 1 Ordner, Typoskript mit eigenhändigen Korrekturen, 49 Blatt;

God: Savior, Butcher, Or Oblivious Artist? The Theodicy Of Alfred North Whitehead

This paper is a critical examination of Alfred North Whitehead's attempt to solve the traditional problem of evil. Whitehead's conception of evil is crucial to his process cosmology because it is integral to his process cosmology because it is integral to his notion of creation in which evil is understood in relationship to the larger dynamic of God’s creative activity. While Whitehead’s process theodicy is interesting, he fails to successfully escape between the horns of the traditional dilemma. Whitehead is often criticized for treating evil as merely apparent. While some process philosophers, notably Maurice Barineau, have defended Whitehead from this charge, it can be shown that this is an implication of Whitehead’s approach. Moreover, Whitehead’s theodicy fails to address radical moral evil in its concrete dimension in respect to real human suffering. As a result, Whitehead’s theodicy is not relevant to Christian theology. My paper is divided into two parts. I will first briefly discuss the traditional problem of evil and some of the traditional problem of evil and some of the traditional solutions proposed to resolve it. The reminder of the paper will demonstrate why Whitehead’s theodicy addresses the traditional problem of evil only at the expense of theological irrelevancy.

Schleiermacher's Doctrine of Biblical Authority: An Alternative to Content-Based/Supernaturalist and Function-Based Rationalist Models

Author: Kerry W. Holton Title: SCHLEIERMACHER’S DOCTRINE OF BIBLICAL AUTHORITY: AN ALTERNATIVE TO CONTENT-BASED/SUPERNATURALIST AND FUNCTION- BASED/RATIONALIST MODELS Advisor: Theodore M. Vial, Jr. Degree Date: August 2015 This dissertation examines Friedrich Schleiermacher’s understanding of biblical authority and argues that, as an alternative to strictly supernaturalistic and rationalistic models, his understanding allows the New Testament to speak authoritatively in Christian religion in an age of critical, historical awareness. After classifying Schleiermacher’s position in a typology of the doctrine of biblical authority, this dissertation explores his conception of divine revelation and inspiration vis-à-vis scripture. It demonstrates that although he did not believe there is warrant for the claim of a direct connection between divine revelation and scripture, or that scripture is the foundation of faith, he nonetheless asserted that the New Testament is authoritative. He asserted the normative authority of the New Testament on the basis that it is the first presentation of Christian faith. This dissertation examines Schleiermacher’s “canon within the canon,” as well as his denial that the Old Testament shares the same normative worth and inspiration of the New. Although this dissertation finds difficulty with some of Schleiermacher’s views regarding the Old Testament, it names two significant strengths of what is identified as his evangelical, content-based, and rationalist approach to biblical authority. First, it recognizes and values the co-presence and co-activity of the supernatural and the natural !ii in the production of the New Testament canon. This allows both scripture and the church to share religious authority. Second, it allows Christian faith and the historical-method to coexist, as it does not require people to contradict what they know to be the case about science, history, and philosophy. Thus, this dissertation asserts that Schleiermacher’s understanding of biblical authority is a robust one, since, for him, the authority of scripture does not lie in some property of the texts themselves that historians or unbelievers can take away.

A synopsis of naturall philosophy according to the method of the ancients, but improved & augmented with the notions of later philosophers : manuscript, 1677-1679

Possibly autograph, dated at end of volume: Finitu[m] mart: 14, 1678/9. Imperfect copy with title page missing; supplied from a MS copy, dated 29 March 1680, now in the Bodleian Library.