The typic in Kant’s critique of practical reason : moral judgment and symbolic representation

Comment pouvons-nous représenter un principe moral universel de manière à le rendre applicable à des cas concrets ? Ce problème revêt une forme aiguë dans la philosophie morale d’Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804), tout particulièrement dans sa théorie du jugement moral, car il soutient que l’on doit appliquer la loi morale « suprasensible » à des actions dans le monde sensible afin de déterminer celles-ci comme moralement bonnes ou mauvaises. Kant aborde ce problème dans un chapitre de la Critique de la raison pratique (1788) intitulé « De la typique de la faculté de juger pratique pure » (KpV 5: 67-71). La première partie de la thèse vise à fournir un commentaire compréhensif et détaillé de ce texte important, mais trop peu étudié. Étant donné que la loi morale, en tant qu’Idée suprasensible de la raison, ne peut pas être appliquée directement à des actions dans l’intuition sensible, Kant a recours à une forme particulière de représentation indirecte et symbolique. Sa solution inédite consiste à fournir la faculté de juger avec un « type [Typus] », ou analogue formel, de la loi morale. Ce type est la loi de la causalité naturelle : en tant que loi, il sert d’étalon formel pour tester l’universalisabilité des maximes ; et, en tant que loi de la nature, il peut aussi s’appliquer à toute action dans l’expérience sensible. Dès lors, le jugement moral s’effectue par le biais d’une expérience de pensée dans laquelle on se demande si l’on peut vouloir que sa maxime devienne une loi universelle d’une nature contrefactuelle dont on ferait soi-même partie. Cette expérience de pensée fonctionne comme une « épreuve [Probe] » de la forme des maximes et, par ce moyen, du statut moral des actions. Kant soutient que tout un chacun, même « l’entendement le plus commun », emploie cette procédure pour l’appréciation morale. De plus, la typique prémunit contre deux menaces à l’éthique rationaliste de Kant, à savoir l’empirisme (c’est-à-dire le conséquentialisme) et le mysticisme. La seconde partie de la thèse se penche sur l’indication de Kant que la typique « ne sert que comme un symbole ». Un bon nombre de commentateurs ont voulu assimiler la typique à la notion d’« hypotypose symbolique » présentée dans le § 59 de la Critique de la faculté de juger (1790). La typique serait un processus de symbolisation esthétique consistant à présenter, de façon indirecte, la représentation abstraite de la loi morale sous la forme d’un symbole concret et intuitif. Dans un premier chapitre, cette interprétation est présentée et soumise à un examen critique qui cherche à montrer qu’elle est erronée et peu judicieuse. Dans le second chapitre, nous poursuivons une voie d’interprétation jusqu’ici ignorée, montrant que la typique a de plus grandes continuités avec la notion d’« anthropomorphisme symbolique », une procédure strictement analogique introduite auparavant dans les Prolégomènes (1783). Nous en concluons, d’une part, que la typique fut un moment décisif dans l’évolution de la théorie kantienne de la représentation symbolique et que, d’autre part, elle marque la réalisation, chez Kant, d’une conception proprement critique de la nature et de la morale comme deux sphères distinctes, dont la médiation s’opère par le biais des concepts de loi et de conformité à la loi (Gesetzmässigkeit). En un mot, la typique s’avère l’instrument par excellence du « rationalisme de la faculté de juger ».

The interest rates and performance of MFIs in the MENA region: is there a moral issue?

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Exclusão étnica, julgamento moral e emoções morais : estudo em adolescentes

Os pressupostos defendidos na declaração de Salamanca sobre a Educação Inclusiva não são fáceis de concretizar pois as pessoas, por causa de diferenças de sexo, etnia, aparência, etc, têm frequentemente condutas diferenciais. Um dos critérios sociais que mais provoca exclusão social são as diferenças étnicas, um fenómeno mais estudado pela psicologia social. Porém, a atitude de exclusão social pode estar relacionada com a competência moral dos indivíduos, uma relação que foi analisada neste estudo. Para isso recorremos ao suporte da psicologia moral que valoriza o papel das emoções na compreensão das condutas sociais, bem exemplificada nos estudos do vitimizador feliz (e.g., Arsenio & Kramer, 1992; Lourenço, 1998). Nas perspectivas mais recentes da psicologia moral tem sido atribuída grande ênfase à necessidade de analisar cognições e emoções nas condutas morais (e.g., Malti & Latzko, 2010; Turiel & Killen, 2010). Apoiados no estudo de Malti, Killen & Gasser (2012) sobre a exclusão social analisámos os julgamentos e as emoções morais de adolescentes em três contextos, etnia africana, etnia cigana e género, numa amostra de 45 adolescentes, com idades entre os 13 e os 19 anos, através da aplicação de uma versão traduzida da Survey Instrument for Measuring Judgments about Emotions about Exclusion (Malti, Killen & Gasser, 2009). Os jovens avaliaram a exclusão étnica como mais incorreta que a exclusão por género mas não foram encontradas diferenças nos juízos e emoções expressas pelos portugueses e estrangeiros. As emoções de culpa, tristeza, vergonha, atribuídas ao excludente confirmam a avaliação negativa da atitude de exclusão. Porém, a emoção normal que revela indiferença expressa que alguns jovens avaliaram positivamente a exclusão. A intensidade emocional intermédia das emoções atribuídas mostra inconsistência com o juízo moral. Relativamente ao excluído existe consenso pois as emoções de tristeza e raiva foram as mais atribuídas. As justificações dos juízos e emoções atribuídos são de tipo diverso, ou seja, argumentos morais de justiça e igualdade, argumentos de inclusão por empatia e argumentos convencionais relativos à coesão intragrupal. A atitude de exclusão não é estritamente moral pois também é vista em função de benefícios para o funcionamento do grupo. A relação complexa entre juízos, emoções e justificações requisita mais investigação de modo a percebermos melhor os processos psicológicos que induzem a conduta social.

The philosophy of W. Ross Ashby and its relationship to 'The Matrix'

Ashby was a keen observer of the world around him, as per his technological and psychiatrical developments. Over the years, he drew numerous philosophical conclusions on the nature of human intelligence and the operation of the brain, on artificial intelligence and the thinking ability of computers and even on science in general. In this paper, the quite profound philosophy espoused by Ashby is considered as a whole, in particular in terms of its relationship with the world as it stands now and even in terms of scientific predictions of where things might lead. A meaningful comparison is made between Ashby's comments and the science fiction concept of 'The Matrix' and serious consideration is given as to how much Ashby's ideas lay open the possibility of the matrix becoming a real world eventuality.

Moral uncertainty and permissibility: evaluating option sets

In this essay, we explore an issue of moral uncertainty: what we are permitted to do when we are unsure about which moral principles are correct. We develop a novel approach to this issue that incorporates important insights from previous work on moral uncertainty, while avoiding some of the difficulties that beset existing alternative approaches. Our approach is based on evaluating and choosing between option sets rather than particular conduct options. We show how our approach is particularly well-suited to address this issue of moral uncertainty with respect to agents that have credence in moral theories that are not fully consequentialist.

The bubbles or the boiling pot? An ecosystemic approach to culture, environment and quality of life

For the diagnosis and prognosis of the problems of quality of life, a multidisciplinary ecosystemic approach encompasses four dimensions of being-in-the-world, as donors and recipients: intimate, interactive, social and biophysical. Social, cultural and environmental vulnerabilities are understood and dealt with, in different circumstances of space and time, as the conjugated effect of all dimensions of being-in-the-world, as they induce the events (deficits and assets), cope with consequences (desired or undesired) and contribute for change. Instead of fragmented and reduced representations of reality, diagnosis and prognosis of cultural, educational, environmental and health problems considers the connections (assets) and ruptures (deficits) between the different dimensions, providing a planning model to develop and evaluate research, teaching programmes, public policies and field projects. The methodology is participatory, experiential and reflexive; heuristic-hermeneutic processes unveil cultural and epistemic paradigms that orient subject-object relationships; giving people the opportunity to reflect on their own realities, engage in new experiences and find new ways to live better in a better world. The proposal is a creative model for thought and practice, providing many opportunities for discussion, debate and development of holistic projects integrating different scientific domains (social sciences, psychology, education, philosophy, etc.).

The Philosophy of Dissonant Children : Stanley Cavell's Wittgensteinian Philosophical Therapies as an Educational Conversation

Education is often understood as a process whereby children come to conform to the norms teachers believe should govern our practices. This picture problematically presumes that educators know in advance what it means for children to go on the way that is expected of them. In this essay Viktor Johansson suggests a revision of education, through the philosophy of Stanley Cavell, that can account for both the attunement in our practices and the possible dissonance that follows when the teacher and child do not go on together. There is an anxiety generated by the threat of disharmony in our educational undertakings that may drive teachers toward philosophy in educational contexts. Here Johansson offers a philosophical treatment of this intellectual anxiety that teachers may experience when they, upon meeting dissonant children, search for epistemic justifications of their practices—a treatment whereby dissonant children can support teachers in dissolving their intellectual frustrations.

Desenvolvimento moral e preconceito: um estudo sobre os juízos de crianças do ensino fundamental de uma escola inclusiva

Pós-graduação em Educação - FFC

Moralidade e violência nas escolas na visão dos professores

Pós-graduação em Psicologia - FCLAS

A revisão das antinomias na psicologia: do racionalismo cientificista ao estruturalismo

In this essay, we sustain the idea that structuralist thinking is part of spontaneous criticism against the reductionisms that surround psychology. We depart from the radical split-up between the scientific viewpoint and that of metaphysics, expressed in the end-19th century scientific psychology projects. Next, we highlight the importance of the structuralist perspective in the review of the antinomic relations between the subjective and objective, operated at the heart of psychology throughout the 20th century. We show that the rejection of unilineal causality in favor of network causality curbed the advancement of unilateral or reductionist theories in psychology. Moreover, we consider the idea of structure as a point of convergence between psychology and philosophy. More than its explanatory nature, the notion of structure reveals an epistemological register capable of re-approximating psychology to the relativization of the ideal of scientific neutrality. The importance of structuralist thinking in psychology makes us consider the history of psychological knowledge as a type of research that belongs to cultural history.

The Neuroscience of Visual Hallucinations

Each year, some two million people in the United Kingdom experience visual hallucinations. Infrequent, fleeting visual hallucinations, often around sleep, are a usual feature of life. In contrast, consistent, frequent, persistent hallucinations during waking are strongly associated with clinical disorders; in particular delirium, eye disease, psychosis, and dementia. Research interest in these disorders has driven a rapid expansion in investigatory techniques, new evidence, and explanatory models. In parallel, a move to generative models of normal visual function has resolved the theoretical tension between veridical and hallucinatory perceptions. From initial fragmented areas of investigation, the field has become increasingly coherent over the last decade. Controversies and gaps remain, but for the first time the shapes of possible unifying models are becoming clear, along with the techniques for testing these. This book provides a comprehensive survey of the neuroscience of visual hallucinations and the clinical techniques for testing these. It brings together the very latest evidence from cognitive neuropsychology, neuroimaging, neuropathology, and neuropharmacology, placing this within current models of visual perception. Leading researchers from a range of clinical and basic science areas describe visual hallucinations in their historical and scientific context, combining introductory information with up-to-date discoveries. They discuss results from the main investigatory techniques applied in a range of clinical disorders. The final section outlines future research directions investigating the potential for new understandings of veridical and hallucinatory perceptions, and for treatments of problematic hallucinations. Fully comprehensive, this is an essential reference for clinicians in the fields of the psychology and psychiatry of hallucinations, as well as for researchers in departments, research institutes and libraries. It has strong foundations in neuroscience, cognitive science, optometry, psychiatry, psychology, clinical medicine, and philosophy. With its lucid explanation and many illustrations, it is a clear resource for educators and advanced undergraduate and graduate students.

Affect and the Problem of Evil

A central aspect of the problem of evil or the argument from evil is the intensity or quantity of suffering. This quantity is conceived of as something objective and fixed. But because our experience is in part constituted and interpreted by our effectual orientation, there is no such objective quantum of suffering. But where there is no objective quantum of suffering, the argument from evil collapses. Here we begin by examining the connection between the philosophical and existential dimensions of the problem of and argument from evil as suffering. Next we consider the role of the affect in the constitution and interpretation of experience generally, together with implications for the argument from suffering. Third, we look at how a key affectual element of the argument from evil might undercut that argument. And finally, we consider a proposal to categorize suffering as a species of moral or spiritual failure, as affectually wrong.