Clarification of the Meaning of "Beneficial Owner" in the OECD Model Tax Convention: Comment on the April 2011 Discussion Draft

In April 2011, the OECD released an important discussion draft that is intended to clarify the meaning of the term "beneficial ownership" under articles 10, 11 and 12 of the OECD Model (2010). This article discusses these proposals and demonstrates that some refinement is necessary.

« Formulaire de touttes sortes d'expéditions ; requêtes au Parlement... ; mariages », testaments, donations, « transactions, arbitrages et autres actes de Palais ».

Nombreux actes ou extraicts d'actes de Louis XIII, principalement de l'année 1637 (f. 97, 103, etc., 135 et suiv., et 310 et suiv.) ; — Actes de Henri III, 1589 (f. 99), — et de Henri IV, 1592 (f. 99 v) ; — Quelques pièces imprimées, parmi lesquelles on remarque des actes d'officialité (f. 90 bis et suiv.). Table à la fin du volume. — Ce manuscrit provient des Galland.

Property Tax Assessment - Niagara Township No. 179

A tax assessment of property no. 179 for Mr. Theodore Field or Mr. George Field. The total reads 546 and is dated October 25, 1886. Handwritten is "paid" with signature of J.Y.E. Cairns (collector).

List entitled “Total amount of ½ September paid” includes tax and supplies prices

List entitled “Total amount of ½ September paid” includes tax and supplies prices, n.d.

Tax Mimicking and Sub-National Entities : Evidence at the Municipal Level for Montreal, 2000 ?

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Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: with Applicatioon to the United States, 1973 and 1983

A full understanding of public affairs requires the ability to distinguish between the policies that voters would like the government to adopt, and the influence that different voters or group of voters actually exert in the democratic process. We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model of a competitive political economy in which the economic interests of groups of voters and their effective influence on equilibrium policy outcomes can be explicitly distinguished and computed. The model incorporates an amended version of the GEMTAP tax model, and is calibrated to data for the United States for 1973 and 1983. Emphasis is placed on how the aggregation of GEMTAP households into groups within which economic and political behaviour is assumed homogeneous affects the numerical representation of interests and influence for representative members of each group. Experiments with the model suggest that the changes in both interests and influence are important parts of the story behind the evolution of U.S. tax policy in the decade after 1973.