LUCAS 13,1-5 MEMÓRIA PERIGOSA DAS VÍTIMAS

O seguinte trabalho desenvolve o tema da violência contra o movimento popular na Galiléia, segundo o texto de Lucas 13,1-5. Esse texto não tem paralelo nas outras duas fontes sinóticas, nem em João, nem em Tomé, nem no grupo Galileu que escreveu a fonte Q; quanto a esses eventos históricos que narra o texto, não há referência nem em Flávio Josefo, nem em outros historiadores da época. Isso quer dizer, que estes versículos são uma fonte própria de Lucas, uma fonte autônoma, chamada por alguns como fonte L (ou fonte S). A abordagem deste texto de Lucas, feita por grande parte de pesquisadores na área bíblica, preocupa-se com os temas de pecado e arrependimento, deixando na margem a situação das vítimas e as ameaças de Jesus para seus ouvintes. Neste sentido, este trecho de Lucas é de grande importância. Estes versículos expressam a realidade sócio -política. Seu conteúdo é um sinal de conflito e de denúncia contra o sistema imperial romano que não passou desapercebido para o redator do texto e nem para o seu auditório. Trata-se, portanto, da memória das vítimas da opressão. Apresentamos a seguir, a pesquisa em três capítulos esboçados brevemente. O primeiro descreve o agir específico dos procuradores ou governadores romanos, nas províncias comandadas por eles; ao mesmo tempo, a reação do povo e os seus protestos. A nossa ênfase recairá sobre o procurador romano Pôncio Pilatos. Nos valeremos das fontes bíblicas, extra-bíblicas e pseudo-epígrafas. No final, destacaremos a relevância e o papel central do texto Lucas 13,1-5. No segundo capítulo, o centro será a exegese de Lucas 13,1-5, relacionando-o com o contexto maior que, em nosso caso, é chamado itinerário de viagem para Jerusalém , e com um contexto imediato que é o capitulo 13 de Lucas. No final, perguntaremos pelo grupo ou grupos que podem estar por trás destes versículos, e a importância da fonte L, como fonte primeira que se insere no Evangelho de Lucas. O texto de Lucas 13,1-5 aparece como texto autônomo, memória das vítimas; ele contrasta com a visão moderada dos relatos da Paixão nos sinóticos, frente a uma realidade de opressão. O terceiro capítulo constitui-se num ensaio de articulação destes dois capítulos com a realidade atual, especificamente com a situação de guerra, violência e morte na Colômbia, junto aos esforços atuais por reconstruir a memória das vítimas do povo colombiano, memória que dá sentido e dignifica a oferenda de suas vidas.(AU)

LUCAS 13,1-5 MEMÓRIA PERIGOSA DAS VÍTIMAS

O seguinte trabalho desenvolve o tema da violência contra o movimento popular na Galiléia, segundo o texto de Lucas 13,1-5. Esse texto não tem paralelo nas outras duas fontes sinóticas, nem em João, nem em Tomé, nem no grupo Galileu que escreveu a fonte Q; quanto a esses eventos históricos que narra o texto, não há referência nem em Flávio Josefo, nem em outros historiadores da época. Isso quer dizer, que estes versículos são uma fonte própria de Lucas, uma fonte autônoma, chamada por alguns como fonte L (ou fonte S). A abordagem deste texto de Lucas, feita por grande parte de pesquisadores na área bíblica, preocupa-se com os temas de pecado e arrependimento, deixando na margem a situação das vítimas e as ameaças de Jesus para seus ouvintes. Neste sentido, este trecho de Lucas é de grande importância. Estes versículos expressam a realidade sócio -política. Seu conteúdo é um sinal de conflito e de denúncia contra o sistema imperial romano que não passou desapercebido para o redator do texto e nem para o seu auditório. Trata-se, portanto, da memória das vítimas da opressão. Apresentamos a seguir, a pesquisa em três capítulos esboçados brevemente. O primeiro descreve o agir específico dos procuradores ou governadores romanos, nas províncias comandadas por eles; ao mesmo tempo, a reação do povo e os seus protestos. A nossa ênfase recairá sobre o procurador romano Pôncio Pilatos. Nos valeremos das fontes bíblicas, extra-bíblicas e pseudo-epígrafas. No final, destacaremos a relevância e o papel central do texto Lucas 13,1-5. No segundo capítulo, o centro será a exegese de Lucas 13,1-5, relacionando-o com o contexto maior que, em nosso caso, é chamado itinerário de viagem para Jerusalém , e com um contexto imediato que é o capitulo 13 de Lucas. No final, perguntaremos pelo grupo ou grupos que podem estar por trás destes versículos, e a importância da fonte L, como fonte primeira que se insere no Evangelho de Lucas. O texto de Lucas 13,1-5 aparece como texto autônomo, memória das vítimas; ele contrasta com a visão moderada dos relatos da Paixão nos sinóticos, frente a uma realidade de opressão. O terceiro capítulo constitui-se num ensaio de articulação destes dois capítulos com a realidade atual, especificamente com a situação de guerra, violência e morte na Colômbia, junto aos esforços atuais por reconstruir a memória das vítimas do povo colombiano, memória que dá sentido e dignifica a oferenda de suas vidas.(AU)

Reacciones y protestas de agricultores e inmigrantes en El Ejido : Un municipio español inserto en las dinámicas de la globalización

El Ejido es una ciudad del sudeste español que ha pasado de ser una pequeña aldea dedicada a la agricultura de subsistencia, a principios de 1960, a tener en 2015 más de 85.000 habitantes. Este cambio se debe al desarrollo de una economía de invernaderos muy próspera que hoy está totalmente inserta en las dinámicas de la globalización. Tales dinámicas han ocasionado efectos contradictorios y han suscitado reacciones y/o formas de protesta diferentes en los dos principales actores sociales de El Ejido (los agricultores y los inmigrantes), entre los que se observan profundas asimetrías socioeconómicas y relaciones de explotación laboral. Como consecuencia, los inmigrantes y los agricultores viven en dos mundos sociales completamente diferentes y tienen percepciones y actitudes opuestas sobre la realidad, las cuales, a su vez, afectan a sus respectivas posibilidades y modos de reacción y/o de protesta

Acción colectiva rural, reforma agraria y política en El Ecuador, ca. 1920-1965

This thesis studies the rural collective action processes between 1920 and 1965 in Ecuador with a social history and political sociology approach. An approximation is carried out towards the conflicts, mobilizations and protests where indigenous and not indigenous peasants participated. Because of this, they are considered two periods, the first one that last from 1931 to 1947, sealed by the political instability and a constant change of governments; and the second one between 1948 and 1965, in a phase of successive constitutionally governments that ruled between 1948 and 1960. The conflicts and rural mobilizations reached a major visibility since 1958, deeply affecting the public opinion. The importance and magnitude of the rural mobilizations between 1959 and 1963 generated a controversy on their political effects in the agrarian change. Certainly, the rural mobilizations influenced in the outcome that took the political crisis, which concluded in the implantation of a military government in 1963. This government issued an Agrarian Reform Law in 1964, which modified partially the working relations and the land ownership. And, in addition, it defined a new type of military intervention in the policies that combined repression with reforms. The existence of a landowner social segment that backed a reform in the rural highland (sierra) society has been generally identified by Galo Plaza's figure. In his government (1948-1952), transformations were accentuated in the State intervention, mainly orientated towards the economic and political modernization. This was a new moment of coastal agro-exportation development with the leadership of the banana production. There were stimulated measures of promotion of the production and exportation of bananas. So, the road infrastructure was intensively spread and connected the producing zones with the export ports...

Visions of the Spanish Revolution: identities and conflicts in post-welfare societies

This is a case study that analyzes photographic documents of the social protest in Spain between 2011 and 2013. The analysis is qualitative and considers the use of space, the visual expression of the messages and the orientation toward the causes or effects of political, economic and social changes. Visual sociology allows us to appreciate, in the case of the Spanish Revolution, a dynamic of “reflexivity” unrecognizable from other research approaches. Two successive waves of social mobilization in response to two different shocks can be appreciated. The first is given by political corruption, unemployment and the threat to consumer society. The second shock is caused by the savage cuts in the Welfare State. Social mobilization is expressed differently in each phase, and the forms taken by the protests show how the class structure in post industrial society shapes the reactions to the crisis of the Welfare State.

The EU’s Sanctions against Syria: Conflict Management by Other Means. Security Policy Brief No. 38

Since May 2011, the EU has launched one of its most far reaching and sophisticated sanctions operations in support of the protests against the current regime in Syria. The present brief examines the measures wielded by the EU, its expected impact and its implications for the EU’s relations with its global partners. While seriously undermined by the lack of support of Russia, the sanctions are having a noticeable economic impact. Yet, the choice of measures is ill-suited to stop the bloodshed. The sanctions have also served to (re)define partnerships with other powers, both in the Middle-East and globally.

The emblematic statement of the Nobel Peace Prize. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 13 No. 1, January 2013

From the Introduction. On October 12th the Nobel Committee announced that the annual Nobel Peace Prize would be awarded to the European Union for, “promoting peace, democracy and human rights over six decades”.1 This was a bit of good news for the EU who had produced nothing but bad press with the Euro Crisis, the bailouts of struggling countries like Greece, and protests in the southern member states of Spain, Portugal, and Italy. At such a momentous occasion the EU’s next challenge was to figure out who would be the rightful head of the EU to accept the award. The EU has made their decision by opting to send its top three officials Jose Manuel Barroso the President of the European Commission, Herman Van Rompuy the President of the European Council, and Martin Schulz the President of the European Parliament2 as a sign that the EU is not headed by one person but instead is an supranational economic and political bloc that seeks to unify the European continent. Their symbolic acceptance of the award is in response to what Geir Lundestad, the Secretary of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, called, “an accumulated record.”3 This record has ushered the EU into the international spotlight as a beacon for countries in the EU’s periphery to want to join the bloc.

Ukraine and the EU: turning the Association Agreement into a success story1. EPC Policy Brief, 23 April 2014

It is paradoxical and symbolic that it has taken Ukraine two waves of mass protests to conclude a new agreement with the EU. As a result, the political and geopolitical implications of the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine are very high. This means that it cannot be regarded merely as one of many trade agreements signed by the EU with its numerous trading partners. More attention needs to be paid to the role and impact of the Association Agreement on Ukraine. This requires screening, prioritising and sequencing of the approximation process at the national, sectoral and regional levels. Implementing the Agreement in a cost-effective way will allow Ukraine to derive benefits in the short-to-medium term, at the very time when Russia is sparing no efforts to inflict harm on the Ukrainian economy to punish the country for its European orientation.

Ukraine – Trying to build a future beyond the past. EPC Commentary, 2 June 2014

On 25 May Ukrainian businessman Petro Poroshenko became Ukraine’s fifth President, winning in the first round with some 54% of the vote, far ahead of Yulia Tymoshenko. While Poroshenko has been involved in Ukrainian politics for several years, including a short stint in the government of disposed President Viktor Yanukovych, his support and involvement in the EuroMaiden anti-government protests, along with the decision of Vitali Klitschko to drop out of the presidential race and support Poroshenko’s candidacy, were key to his success.

Transnistria – Where to? EPC Policy Brief, 13 March 2014

At the Vilnius summit of the Eastern Partnership in November 2013, Moldova initialled its Association Agreement with the EU, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) agreement, and is expected to sign the documents before the end of August 2014. Meanwhile, Russia has increased its presence and pressure in the region, as a consequence of which Armenia declined the AA and DCFTA with the EU and Ukraine, after months of protests and political paralysis, now has part of its territory occupied by Russia. Moldova is no exception to Russian pressure. As the country gets closer to upgrading relations with the EU, Russia has increased its activities in Moldova, including in the autonomous region of Gagauzia and in the breakaway region of Transnistria. Even though the “5+2” negotiations for the settlement of the Transnistria conflict continue, the number of incidents in and around this region have increased. The window of opportunity created by the involvement of Germany in the settlement of the conflict and the restart of the “5+2” negotiations in late 2011 seems to have closed. Given the recent events in the region and in Moldova/Transnistria, including the potential impact of DCFTA and visa liberalisation, Chisinau finds it increasingly difficult to manage the juggling act between its EU commitment and dialogue with Tiraspol. This Policy Brief presents the background, state of play and prospects of the Transnistria conflict while also focusing on the potential impact of Moldova’s Association Agreement with the EU on the settlement of the conflict.

Iceland’s contested European Policy: The Footprint of the Past - A Small and Insular Society. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper 01/2013

Introduction. Iceland’s domestic politics and foreign affairs are undergoing drastic changes. After an economic crash, violent protests on the streets of Reykjavik for the first time in Iceland’s history contributed to the defeat of the government. The party system has been altered. A turn has been taken towards Europe after the United States left the island, first by closing its military base in 2006 and then by its clear stance not to assist the country in its economic difficulties. The former close relations with the superpower are unlikely ever to be restored. The EU membership application is placing severe constraints on political parties which are split on the issue and has put in jeopardy the unity of the first left majority in the Icelandic parliament, the Althingi. Society is in a state of flux after an unprecedented economic downscaling and the collapse of almost its entire financial sector – which had boomed rapidly beginning in the mid-1990s. The credibility of politicians, the parliament and the media is in ruins. Iceland’s smallness and its location on the geographical map – one could also say the geopolitical map – has had a profound influence on its domestic and foreign affairs. Iceland is closely associated with the other Nordic states and has adopted many of their domestic characteristics, with important exceptions. On the other hand, the country has come under American influence – geographically, it straddles the Mid-Atlantic rift – and has limited its participation in the European project. Its geographical location in the middle of the North Atlantic has led to a notion that the country’s culture is unique and should be protected by all available means. Politicians continue to play the ‘nationalistic uniqueness’ card with considerable success even though the country has been swept by globalization. Rapid modernization (which only really began in the Second World War with British and American occupations) and sudden engagement with the outside world (which only extended to the general public in the last quarter of the twentieth century) are still slowly but steadily making their mark on the country’s foreign policy. The country’s political discourse and foreign policy still bear the hallmark of the past, i.e. of a small and insular society This paper will address the political developments in Iceland since the 2008 economic crash and place it in a historical context. The aim is to understand Iceland’s present foreign policy and, in particular, the highly contested decision by its government in 2009 to apply for membership of the European Union. The paper is divided into five sections in addition to this introduction and the concluding remarks. First, it starts by explaining the importance in Iceland of a political discourse based on the concept of independence which dates back to the historical narrative of the settlement period. This section will also examine Iceland’s close relations with the other Nordic states – despite important differences between it and the others. Second, the paper will analyse the importance of the party system, i.e. the dominance of the centre-right in Icelandic politics, and the changed nature of the system. Third, it examines how Iceland further distinguishes itself from the other Nordic states in many important features. Fourthly, the paper analyses the country’s three main foreign policy priorities in the post-war period, i.e. extensions of the Exclusive Economic Zone, firm defence arrangements with the US and membership of NATO, and the drive for better market access for marine products – including a partial engagement in the European project. Fifthly, the paper examines how the country’s smallness, in terms of its central administrative capacity, has affected its domestic and foreign policy-making. The concluding section summarizes the main findings concerning the political and historical obstacles that the Social Democratic Alliance faces in its hard-fought battle to change the country’s European Policy.

Patriarch Kirill's game over Ukraine. OSW Commentary No. 144, 14.08.2014

The protests on Kyiv’s Maidan which commenced in November 2013, followed by the conflict in Ukraine’s eastern regions, have redefined the political and social relations between Russia and Ukraine, and have added complexity to the dependences between the Orthodox Churches operating in the two countries. The Kremlin’s policy has put the Russian Orthodox Church–Moscow Patriarchate (ROC) in an awkward position. The ROC is Russia’s largest religious organisation, which also exercises symbolic sovereignty over Ukraine’s most numerous Orthodox community, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Moscow Patriarchate (UOC–MP), which since 13 August has had a new leader, Metropolitan Onufry. The head of the ROC, the Patriarch of Moscow and All-Russia, Kirill, has been facing a dilemma as to how he should respond to the Russian government’s aggressive policy towards Ukraine. His firm support of the Kremlin’s moves in Ukraine, may lose the Russian Church its social influence in this country. This might also catalyse a process within which Ukraine’s largest Orthodox Church would gradually become independent of Moscow. On the other hand, if he condemns the Kremlin’s policy, this would adversely affect the co-operation between ‘the altar and the throne’ which has been rapidly developing over the past few years in Russia, and which has offered multiple benefits to the Russian Church. As a result, Patriarch Kirill has distanced the ROC from the recent developments in Ukraine and has adopted a neutral stance. However, Kirill’s choice has aggravated the negative perception of the ROC among the Orthodox community in Ukraine. Given its close relations with the Kremlin, the ROC is increasingly viewed there as an instrument of political struggle and an exponent of the Russian government’s interests. The ROC’s stance has cast the UOC–MP, which has links with the Russian Church, in an unfavourable light, and has fostered its efforts to become more independent from the Moscow Patriarchate. Regardless of how the situation evolves, the recent developments in Ukraine have made it clear that the interests of the Russian Church and the Kremlin, which have coincided for years, now come into conflict, mainly due to the disagreement over the methods used. Despite this, the Russian Church is not withdrawing from the cooperation of ‘the altar and the throne’, and submits itself to the Kremlin’s decisions.

Germany on Russia. Yes to links, no to rapprochement. OSW Point of View Number 39, March 2014

The German media have been correctly describing the atmosphere between the Chancellor's Office and the Kremlin as the chilliest in years. Various factors have laid bare the fact that the strategic partnership between Germany and Russia is at best currently undergoing a 'technical pause’: the underwhelming outcomes of the German-Russian intergovernmental consultations in the autumn of 2012 and of Chancellor Merkel's meeting with President Putin during the Hanover fair in the spring of 2013, as well as the way in which the EU dealt with the Cyprus debt issue and, finally, the support that Germany has extended to the anti-presidential protests in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the priorities of Germany's foreign and economic policy have changed considerably, not only as a result of the eurozone crisis, but also, even more importantly, because the attention of German business and politics has been shifting to the so-called neue Gestaltungsmächte, or new regional powers. German politicians increasingly believe that Russia should not be offered new methods or mechanisms of co-operation. Firstly, because the existing ones have not been fully utilised, and secondly, because Germany at this stage seems to have no idea of what the long-term strategy of co-operation with Putin's Russia should be.

The internet in Russia: the cradle of civil society. OSW Commentary No. 72, 2012-03-21

In the last decade, along with economic and technological growth, Russia has seen a dynamic development of the internet. Today the net is an everyday tool of work, information and entertainment for 40% of Russians – the most educated, active and affluent part of the society. The spread of the internet (known in Russia as the Runet) has, in turn, brought about significant political and social consequences. With the political and social sphere in Russia strictly controlled by the government, most of this activity has moved to cyberspace. The internet has become an alternative to the state-controlled media, a site for the free exchange of views and a home to numerous social initiatives. In this way, it has become a school of citizenship for Russians, and a kind of ‘test tube’ that has spawned social and political activity. This activity went beyond cyberspace in the election period in 2011/2012, and turned into massive street protests. The potential of the internet has also been used by the Russian government, both to shape public opinion (via loyal online media) and to monitor civil initiatives, especially opposition ones. The state has many instruments of technical control and supervision of the internet and its users’ activity. This control was used in the election period 2011/2012, when selected sites were blocked and pressure exerted on independent websites. These actions were a warning sign from the government, aimed at discouraging internet users from any opposition activity. However, it does not seem feasible that any restriction of such activity can be effective. The scale of this activity is now enormous, and attempts to censor the net and resorting to repression against internet users on a wider scale would only fuel resentment towards the government.

Public feeling in Ukraine ahead of the parliamentary election. OSW Commentary No. 89, 2012-07-12

After two and a half years under President Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Regions, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians are dissatisfied with the state the country’s economy is currently in and the direction it has been developing in. There has also been a significant drop in stability and social security with the general public increasingly feeling that the government has little interest in their problems. Only 16% of Ukrainians believe that the current government has performed better than their predecessors, although overall confidence in both the ruling party and the opposition remains low. Nonetheless, falling support for the president and the Cabinet does not seem to have translated into greater popularity for the country’s opposition parties; these currently enjoy the confidence of only a quarter of the electorate. The clear lack of credibility for politicians on either side of the political spectrum, coupled with an almost universal preoccupation with the bare necessities of life, has shifted the political processes in Ukraine further down the agenda for the majority of Ukrainians. Ukraine’s poor economic performance, which over the last two years has been addressed through a series of highly unpopular economic reforms, has resulted in a growing mood of discontent and increased civil activity, with the Ukrainian people reporting a greater willingness than ever to join protests on social issues. Most of them, however, have shown much less interest in political rallies. This is likely to stem from low levels of trust in the opposition and the general belief that opposition politicians are not a viable alternative to the current government. One may therefore assume that there will be little public scrutiny of the parliamentary election scheduled for 28 October, and that the likelihood of mass demonstrations during it is low. However, in the event of large-scale vote rigging and a dismissive response from the government, spontaneous unsanctioned rallies cannot be ruled out. What is more likely, however, is a series of protests after the elections, when the already difficult economic situation is further exacerbated by a predicted rise in the price of gas for Ukrainian households and a possible move to devalue the Ukrainian hryvnia.