Optimal operation of multiproduct batch plants

Multiproduct plants, Dynamic Optimization, Mixed Integer Linear/Non-Linear Programming, Scheduling

Optimal design for dose finding studies on safety and efficacy

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Mathematik, Diss., 2009

Optimal designs for mixed effects poisson regression models

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Mathematik, Diss., 2010

Objectives of social entrepreneurs and federal lending programs, and the optimal allocation of external funds

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Wirtschaftswiss., Diss., 2010

Optimal designs for multivariate linear models

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Mathematik, Diss., 2013

Optimal design in the presence of random or fixed block effects

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Mathematik, Diss., 2014

Optimal experimental design for parameter identification and model selection

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik, Diss., 2014

Bilinear H 2-optimal Model Order-Reduction with applications to thermal parametric systems

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Mathematik, Diss., 2015

Optimal designs for the prediction in hierarchical random coefficient regression models

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Mathematik, Diss., 2015

Optimal control of a Stefan problem with gradient-based methods in FEniCS

Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg, Fakultät für Mathematik, Masterarbeit, 2016

The optimal behaviour of firms facing stochastic costs

This paper aims at assessing the optimal behavior of a firm facing stochastic costs of production. In an imperfectly competitive setting, we evaluate to what extent a firm may decide to locate part of its production in other markets different from which it is actually settled. This decision is taken in a stochastic environment. Portfolio theory is used to derive the optimal solution for the intertemporal profit maximization problem. In such a framework, splitting production between different locations may be optimal when a firm is able to charge different prices in the different local markets.

Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes

In a market where firms with different characteristics decide upon both the level of emissions and their reports, we study the optimal audit policy for an enforcement agency whose objective is to minimize the level of emissions. We show that it is optimal to devote the resources primarily to the easiest-to-monitor firms and to those firms that value pollution the less. Moreover, unless the budget for monitoring is very large, there are always firms that do not comply with the environmental objective and others that do comply; but all of them evade the environmental taxes.

Una estimación del coste marginal en bienestar del sistema impositivo en España

Actual tax systems do not follow the normative recommendations of yhe theory of optimal taxation. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the informational difficulties of knowing or estimating all relevant elasticities and parameters. Secondly, the political complexities that would arise if a new tax implementation would depart too much from current systems that are perceived as somewhat egalitarians. Hence an ex-novo overhaul of the tax system might just be non-viable. In contrast, a small marginal tax reform could be politically more palatable to accept and economically more simple to implement. The goal of this paper is to evaluate, as a step previous to any tax reform, the marginal welfare cost of the current tax system in Spain. We do this by using a computational general equilibrium model calibrated to a point-in-time micro database. The simulations results show that the Spanish tax system gives rise to a considerable marginal excess burden. Its order of magnitude is of about 0.50 money units for each additional money unit collected through taxes.

Optimal technology policy: subsidies versus monitoring

We analyze the optimal technology policy to solve a free-riding problem between the members of a RJV. We assume that when intervening the Government suffers an additional adverse selection problem because it is not able to distinguish the value of the potential innovation. Although subsidies and monitoring may be equivalent policy tools to solve firms' free-riding problem, they imply different social losses if the Government is not able to perfectly distinguish the value of the potential innovation. The supremacy of monitoring tools over subsidies is proved to depend on which type of information the Government is able to obtain about firms' R&D performance.

Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment

In this paper we answer a question posed by Sertel and Özkal-Sanver (2002) on the manipulability of optimal matching rules in matching problems with endowments. We characterize the classes of consumption rules under which optimal matching rules can be manipulated via predonation of endowment.