Income taxation in a frictional labor market

A new model of wage dispersion is used to examine welfare aspects of income taxation. The model retains the dynamics of wage posting modelswhile exogenizing search e¤ort, therefore allowing more insight into policy issues. The results highlight effects that standard analyses do not take into account. The optimal income tax should depend on an incidenceeffect between workers and firms. This incidence effect arises from firmstrying to lower wages as much as possible. An employment tax proves, incertain cases, to be the best method to encourage labor force participation.

Concentration and self-censorship in commercial media

Within a simple model of non-localized, Hotelling-type competitionamong arbitrary numbers of media outlets we characterize qualityand content of media under different ownership structures. Assumingadvertising-sponsored, profit-maximizing outlets, we show that (i) topicssensitive to advertisers can be underreported (self-censored) by alloutlets in the market, (ii) self-censorship increases with the concentrationof ownership, (iii) adding outlets, while keeping the number ofowners fixed, may even increase self-censorship; the latter result relieson consumers' most preferred outlets being potentially owned by thesame media companies. We argue that externalities resulting fromself-censorship could be empirically large.

A retail benchmarking approach to efficient two-way access pricing

We study a retail benchmarking approach to determine access prices for interconnected networks. Instead of considering fixed access charges as in the existing literature, we study access pricing rules that determine the access price that network i pays to network j as a linear function of the marginal costs and the retail prices set by both networks. In the case of competition in linear prices, we show that there is a unique linear rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium, independently of the underlying demand conditions. In the case of competition in two-part tariffs, we consider a class of access pricing rules, similar to the optimal one under linear prices but based on average retail prices. We show that firms choose the variable price equal to the marginal cost under this class of rules. Therefore, the regulator (or the competition authority) can choose one among the rules to pursue additional objectives such as consumer surplus, network coverage or investment: for instance, we show that both static and dynamic e±ciency can be achieved at the same time.

The pricing of academic journals: A two-sided market perspective

More and more academic journals adopt an open-access policy, by which articlesare accessible free of charge, while publication costs are recovered through authorfees. We study the consequences of this open access policy on a journal s qualitystandard. If the journal s objective was to maximize social welfare, open accesswould be optimal as long as the positive externalities generated by its diffusionexceed the marginal cost of distribution. However, we show that if an open accessjournal has a different objective (such as maximizing readers payoffs, the impactof the journal or its profit), it tends to choose a quality standard below the sociallyefficient level.

First price auctions: Monotonicity and uniqueness

I study monotonicity and uniqueness of the equilibrium strategies in a two-person first price auction with affiliated signals. I show thatwhen the game is symmetric there is a unique Nash equilibrium thatsatisfies a regularity condition requiring that the equilibrium strategies be{\sl piecewise monotone}. Moreover, when the signals are discrete-valued, the equilibrium is unique. The central part of the proof consists of showing that at any regular equilibrium the bidders' strategies must be monotone increasing within the support of winning bids. The monotonicity result derived in this paper provides the missing link for the analysis of uniqueness in two-person first price auctions. Importantly, this result extends to asymmetric auctions.

Reflections on gains and losses: A 2x2x7 experiment

We test whether risk attitudes change when losses instead of gains areinvolved. The study of gain-loss asymmetries has been largely confinedto reflected choices, where all the money amounts of a positiveprospect are multiplied by minus one. We define the decomposition reflection = translation + probability switch, and experimentally findboth a translation effect (risk attraction becomes more frequent whengains are translated into losses) and a probability switch effect (riskattraction becomes more frequent when the probability of the best outcomedecreases). Surprisingly, the switch effect is somewhat stronger than thetranslation effect, negating a conventional reflection effect when onestarts with choices between gains with a low probability of the bestoutcome. We conclude by arguing that, while both the translation effectand the switch effect contradict the expected utility hypothesis, thetranslation effect implies a deeper violation of standard preference theory.

Reputation and honesty in a market for information

Previous works on asymmetric information in asset markets tendto focus on the potential gains in the asset market itself. We focus on the market for information and conduct an experimental study to explore, in a game of finite but uncertain duration, whether reputation can be an effective constraint on deliberate misinformation. At the beginning of each period, an uninformed potential asset buyer can purchase information, at a fixed price and from a fully-informed source, about the value of the asset in that period. The informational insiders cannot purchase the asset and are given short-term incentives to provide false information when the asset value is low. Our model predicts that, in accordance with the Folk Theorem, Pareto-superior outcomes featuring truthful revelation should be sustainable. However, this depends critically on beliefs about rationality and behavior. We find that, overall, sellers are truthful 89% of the time. More significantly, the observed frequency of truthfulness is 81% when the asset value is low. Our result is consistent with both mixed-strategy and trigger strategy interpretations and provides evidence that most subjects correctly anticipate rational behavior. We discuss applications to financial markets, media regulation, and the stability of cartels.

Olson vs. Coase: Coalitional worth in conflict

We analyze a model of conflict with endogenous choice of effort, wheresubsets of the contenders may force the resolution to be sequential:First the alliance fights it out with the rest and in case they win later they fight it out among themselves. For three-player games, wefind that it will not be in the interest of any two of them to form analliance. We obtain this result under two different scenarios:equidistant preferences with varying relative strengths, and vicinityof preferences with equal distribution of power. We conclude that thecommonly made assumption of super-additive coalitional worth is suspect.

Weak and strong altruism in traitgGroups: Reproductive suicide, personal fitness and expected value

A simple variant of trait group selection, employing predators as themechanism underlying group selection, supports contingent reproductivesuicide as altruism (i.e., behavior lowering personal fitness whileaugmenting that of another) without kin assortment. The contingentsuicidal type may either saturate the population or be polymorphicwith a type avoiding suicide, depending on parameters. In addition tocontingent suicide, this randomly assorting morph may also exhibitcontinuously expressed strong altruism (sensu Wilson 1979) usuallythought restricted to kin selection. The model will not, however,support a sterile worker caste as such, where sterility occurs beforelife history events associated with effective altruism; reproductivesuicide must remain fundamentally contingent (facultative sensu WestEberhard 1987; Myles 1988) under random assortment. The continuouslyexpressed strong altruism supported by the model may be reinterpretedas probability of arbitrarily committing reproductive suicide, withoutbenefit for another; such arbitrary suicide (a "load" on "adaptive"suicide) is viable only under a more restricted parameter spacerelative to the necessarily concomitant adaptive contingent suicide.

Intergenerational justice when future worlds are uncertain

Let there be a positive (exogenous) probability that, at each date, the human species will disappear.We postulate an Ethical Observer (EO) who maximizes intertemporal welfare under thisuncertainty, with expected-utility preferences. Various social welfare criteria entail alternativevon Neumann- Morgenstern utility functions for the EO: utilitarian, Rawlsian, and an extensionof the latter that corrects for the size of population. Our analysis covers, first, a cake-eating economy(without production), where the utilitarian and Rawlsian recommend the same allocation.Second, a productive economy with education and capital, where it turns out that the recommendationsof the two EOs are in general different. But when the utilitarian program diverges, thenwe prove it is optimal for the extended Rawlsian to ignore the uncertainty concerning the possibledisappearance of the human species in the future. We conclude by discussing the implicationsfor intergenerational welfare maximization in the presence of global warming.

Corruption and competition in procurement

We consider a procurement problem in which the procurement agent is supposed to allocate the realization of a project according to a competitive mechanism that values bids in terms of the proposed price and quality. Potential bidders have private information about their production costs. Since the procurement agent is also in charge of verifying delivered quality, in exchange for a bribe, he can allow an arbitrary firm to be awarded the realization of the project and to produce a quality level lower than the announced. We compute the equilibrium level of corruption and we study the impact on corruption of the competitiveness of the environment, and in particular of: i) an increase in the number of potential suppliers of the good or service to be procured, ii) competitive (rather than collusive) behavior of procurement agents, and iii) an increase of competition in the market for procurement agents. We identify the effects that influence the equilibrium level of corruption and show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, corruption may well be increasing in competition.

Decision making in uncertain and changing environments

We consider an agent who has to repeatedly make choices in an uncertainand changing environment, who has full information of the past, who discountsfuture payoffs, but who has no prior. We provide a learning algorithm thatperforms almost as well as the best of a given finite number of experts orbenchmark strategies and does so at any point in time, provided the agentis sufficiently patient. The key is to find the appropriate degree of forgettingdistant past. Standard learning algorithms that treat recent and distant pastequally do not have the sequential epsilon optimality property.

Heterogeneity-promoting optimal procurement

When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design of the object being procured affects the resulting degree of competition. This paper highlights the interaction between theoptimal procurement mechanism and the design choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the sponsor's design choice, instead of homogenizingthe market to generate competition, promotes heterogeneity.

Foreign direct investments and spillovers through workers' mobility

We analyze a model where a multinational firm can use its superiortechnology in a foreign subsidiary only after appropriate trainingof local managers. Technological spillovers from foreign directinvestment arise when such managers are later hired by a localfirm. Benefits for the host economy may also take the form of therent that trained managers receive by the foreign affiliate toprevent them from moving to local competitors. We study conditionsunder which technological spillovers occur. We also show that undercertain circumstances the multinational firm might find it optimalto resort to export instead of foreign direct investment, to avoiddissipation of its intangible assets.

On the complexity of rationalizing behavior

We study the complexity of rationalizing choice behavior. We do so by analyzing two polar cases, and a number of intermediate ones. In our most structured case, that is where choice behavior is defined in universal choice domains and satisfies the "weak axiom of revealed preference," finding the complete preorder rationalizing choice behavior is a simple matter. In the polar case, where no restriction whatsoever is imposed, either on choice behavior or on choice domain, finding the complete preordersthat rationalize behavior turns out to be intractable. We show that the task of finding the rationalizing complete preorders is equivalent to a graph problem. This allows the search for existing algorithms in the graph theory literature, for the rationalization of choice.