National Aquaculture Development Plan / prepared by the Joint Subcommittee on Aquaculture of the Federal Coordinating Council on Science, Engineering and Technology.

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Science, technology, and American diplomacy : an extended study of the interactions of science and technology with United States foreign policy / Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives.

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Science, technology, and American diplomacy : an extended study of the interactions of science and technology with United States foreign policy / Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives.

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Science, technology, and American diplomacy : an extended study of the interactions of science and technology with United States foreign policy / Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives.

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Labour market frictions, social policies, and barriers to technology adoption

Barriers to technological changes have recently been shown to be a key element in explaining differences in output per worker across countries. This study examines the role that labour market features and institutions have in explaining barriers to technology adoption. I build a model that includes labour market frictions, capital market imperfections and heterogeneity in workers' skills. I found that the unemployment rate together with the welfare losses that workers experiment after displacement are key factors in explaining the existence of barriers to technology adoption. Moreover, I found that none of these factors alone is sufficient to build these barriers. The theory also suggests that welfare policies like the unemployment insurance system may enhance these kinds of barriers while policies like a severance payment system financed by an income tax seem to be more effective in eliminating them.

Optimal technology policy: subsidies versus monitoring

We analyze the optimal technology policy to solve a free-riding problem between the members of a RJV. We assume that when intervening the Government suffers an additional adverse selection problem because it is not able to distinguish the value of the potential innovation. Although subsidies and monitoring may be equivalent policy tools to solve firms' free-riding problem, they imply different social losses if the Government is not able to perfectly distinguish the value of the potential innovation. The supremacy of monitoring tools over subsidies is proved to depend on which type of information the Government is able to obtain about firms' R&D performance.