Governance of Massive Multiauthor Collaboration – Linux, Wikipedia, and Other Networks: Governed by Bilateral Contracts, Partnerships, or Something in Between?

Open collaborative projects are moving to the foreground of knowledge production. Some online user communities develop into longterm projects that generate a highly valuable and at the same time freely accessible output. Traditional copyright law that is organized around the idea of a single creative entity is not well equipped to accommodate the needs of these forms of collaboration. In order to enable a peculiar network-type of interaction participants instead draw on public licensing models that determine the freedoms to use individual contributions. With the help of these access rules the operational logic of the project can be implemented successfully. However, as the case of the Wikipedia GFDL-CC license transition demonstrates, the adaptation of access rules in networks to new circumstances raises collective action problems and suffers from pitfalls caused by the fact that public licensing is grounded in individual copyright. Legal governance of open collaboration projects is a largely unexplored field. The article argues that the license steward of a public license assumes the position of a fiduciary of the knowledge commons generated under the license regime. Ultimately, the governance of decentralized networks translates into a composite of organizational and contractual elements. It is concluded that the production of global knowledge commons relies on rules of transnational private law.

Mechanische Ersatzmodelle zum Nachweis der Realisierbarkeit minimaler Restbeschleunigungen während der Freifallphase im Einstein-Elevator

Der Einstein-Elevator entspricht einer deutlichen Abwandlung eines klassischen Fallturms. In Falltürmen werden wissenschaftliche Experimente unter Schwerelosigkeit durchgeführt. In großen Vakuumkammern werden dazu die Experimente, ohne das Einleiten externer Kräfte, fallengelassen. Die klassische Fallturmtechnik hat den Nachteil einer geringen Wiederholrate durch einen hohen Zeitaufwand bei der Herstellung des Vakuums. Der Einstein-Elevator schafft durch sein weltweit einzigartiges Führungs- und Antriebskonzept den Zeitaufwand für die Versuchsdurchführung drastisch zu verkürzen und die Qualität der Schwerelosigkeit zu verbessern. Um die benötigte Qualität in der Versuchsumgebung zu erzielen, wurde das Konzept mithilfe einer Mehrkörpersimulation hinsichtlich der im Experiment in der Freifallphase zu erwartenden minimalen Restbeschleunigungen untersucht.

In Case of Emergency: Implementing Disaster Clauses in Publisher Contracts

Joanne Romano, Licensing and Serials Librarian for The Texas Medical Center Library, presented “In Case of Emergency--Implementing Disaster Clauses in Publisher Contracts” to the National Network of Libraries of Medicine/Southeastern/Atlantic Region’s Emergency Response and Preparedness Advisory Committee, (NN/LM-SE/A ERAC) on November 17, 2010, in St. Petersburg, FLA at the Marriott Vinoy Renaissance Resort. Included were slides of the devastation after the 8.8 magnitude earthquake in the Maule region of Chile, how The TMC Library assisted, lessons learned, and advice for how to include disaster clauses in publisher licenses. The NN/LM-SE/A ERAC group invited Ms. Romano to present at their bi-meeting after learning of her library’s key role from other NLM officers. As a result, Ms. Romano was then invited as a guest speaker on for NN/LM-SE/A region’s annual webinar, “Beyond the Sea”, which also included speakers from John Wiley & Sons, Inc., the publisher who worked with The TMC Library in providing emergency access to researchers at the University de Talca, Talca, Chile.

Essays on behavioral aspects of the design and disclosure of compensation contracts

This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology- based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted. Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance. Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort. Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1.

Inseparable, incapable, or invisible: Why public organizations award no-bid contracts

No-bid contracting is a highly prevalent practice in public procurement of technology services. Alt-hough no-bid contracting is a substantial problem since it reduces competition and welfare, the litera-ture lacks theoretical explanations and empirical tests for why public organizations award no-bid con-tracts. In this paper, we propose three theoretical explanations for no-bid contracting, drawing on transaction cost economics, organizational learning, and institutional theory. We also present how we test these explanations using a comprehensive sample of public procurement transactions. We expect to contribute theoretical explanations for no-bid contracting and practical implications for policy-makers.

Capital Accumulation in the Presence of Informal Credit Contracts: Does the Incentive Mechanism Work Better than Credit Rationing Under Asymmetric Information?

Credit markets with asymmetric information often prefer credit rationing as a profit maximizing device. This paper asks whether the presence of informal credit markets reduces the cost of credit rationing, that is, whether it can alleviate the impact of asymmetric information based on the available information. We used a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogenous agents to assess this. Using Indian credit market data our study shows that the presence of informal credit market can reduce the cost of credit rationing by separating high risk firms from the low risk firms in the informal market. But even after this improvement, the steady state capital accumulation is still much lower as compared to incentive based market clearing rates. Through self revelation of each firm's type, based on the incentive mechanism, banks can diversify their risk by achieving a separating equilibrium in the loan market. The incentive mechanism helps banks to increase capital accumulation in the long run by charging lower rates and lending relatively higher amount to the less risky firms. Another important finding of this study is that self-revelation leads to very significant welfare improvement, as measured by consumptiuon equivalence.

Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency

This paper considers the contacting approach to central banking in the context of a simple common agency model. The recent literature on optimal contracts suggests that the political principal of the central bank can design the appropriate incentive schemes that remedy for time-inconsistency problems in monetary policy. The effectiveness of such contracts, however, requires a central banker that attaches a positive weight to the incentive scheme. As a result, delegating monetary policy under such circumstances gives rise to the possibility that the central banker may respond to incentive schemes offered by other potential principals. We introduce common agency considerations in the design of optimal central banker contracts. We introduce two principals - society (government) and an interest group, whose objectives conflict with society's and we examine under what circumstances the government-offered or the interest-group-offered contract dominates. Our results largely depend on the type of bias that the interest group contract incorporates. In particular, when the interest group contract incorporates an inflationary bias the outcome depends on the principals' relative concern of the incentive schemes' costs. When the interest group contract incorporates an expansionary bias, however, it always dominates the government contract. A corollary of our results is that central banker contracts aiming to remove the expansionary bias of policymakers should be written explicitly in terms of the perceived bias.

Can a Newly Proposed Mechanism for Allocating Contracts in U.S. Electricity Wholesale Markets Lead to Lower Prices? A Game Theoretic Analysis

This study of the wholesale electricity market compares the cost-minimizing performance of the auction mechanism currently in place in U.S. markets with the performance of a proposed replacement. The current mechanism chooses an allocation of contracts that minimizes a fictional cost calculated using pay-as-offer pricing. Then suppliers are paid the market clearing price. The proposed mechanism uses the market clearing price in the allocation phase as well as in the payment phase. In concentrated markets, the proposed mechanism outperforms the current mechanism even when strategic behavior by suppliers is taken into account. The advantage of the proposed mechanism increases with increased price competition.

Evaluation of elevator shafts as a pathway for fungal spores and particles to enter a hospital housing immuno-compromised patients

Background. It is estimated that hospitals spend between 28 and 33 billion dollars per year as a result of hospital-acquired infections. (Scott, 2009) The costs continue to rise despite the guidance and controls provided by hospital infection control staff to reduce patient exposures to fungal spores and other infectious agents. With all processes and controls in place, the vented elevator shaft represents an unprotected opening from the top of the building to the lower floors. The hypothesis for this prospective study is that there is a positive correlation between the number of Penicillium/Aspergillus-like spores, Cladosporium, ascospores, basidiospores in spores/m3 as individual spore categories found in the hoistway vent of an elevator shaft and the levels of the same spores, sampled near-simultaneously in the outdoor intake of the elevator shaft. Specific aims of this study include determining if external Penicillium/Aspergillus-like spores are entering the healthcare facility via the elevator shaft and hoistway vents. Additional aims include determining levels of Penicillium/Aspergillus-like spores outdoors, in the elevator shafts, and indoors in areas possibly affected by elevator shaft air; and, finally, to evaluate whether any effect is observed due to the installation of a hoistway vent damper, installed serendipitously during this study. ^ Methods. Between April 2010 and September 2010, a total of 3,521 air samples were collected, including 363 spore trap samples analyzed microscopically for seven spore types, and polymerase chain reaction analyses on 254 air samples. 2178 particle count measurements, 363 temperature readings and 363 relative humidity readings were also obtained from 7 different locations potentially related to the path of air travel inside and near a centrally-located and representative elevator shaft. ^ Results. Mean Penicillium/Aspergillus-like spore values were higher outside the building (530 spores/m3 of air) than inside the hoistway (22.8 spores/m3) during the six month study. Mean values inside the hospital were lower than outside throughout the study, ranging from 15 to 73 spores/m3 of air. Mean Penicillium/Aspergillus-like spore counts inside the hoistway decreased from 40.1 spores/m3 of air to 9 spores/m3 of air following the installation of a back draft damper between the outside air and the elevator shaft. Comparison of samples collected outside the building and inside the hoistway vent prior to installing the damper indicated a strong positive correlation (Spearman's Rho=0.8008, p=0.0001). The similar comparison following the damper installation indicated a moderate non-significant inverse correlation (Spearman's rho = −0.2795, p=0.1347). ^ Conclusion. Elevator shafts are one pathway for mold spores to enter a healthcare facility. A significant correlation was detected between spores and particle counts inside the hoistway and outside prior to changes in the ventilation system. The insertion of the back draft damper appeared to lower the spore counts inside the hoistway and inside the building. The mold spore counts in air outside the study building were higher in the period following the damper installation while the levels inside the hoistway and hospital decreased. Cladosporium and Penicillium/Aspergillus -like spores provided a method for evaluating indoor air quality as a natural tracer from outside the building to inside the building. Ascospores and basidiospores were not a valuable tracer due to low levels of detection during this study. ^ Installation of a back draft damper provides additional protection for the indoor environment of a hospital or healthcare facility, including in particular patients who may be immunocompromised. Current design standards and references do not require the installation of a back draft damper, but evaluation of adding language to relevant building codes should be considered. The data indicate a reduction in levels of Penicillium/Aspergillus -like spores, particle counts and a reduction in relative humidity inside of the elevator shaft after damper installation.^

A Case Study of an Agency's Three Family Preservation Contracts

This article presents a case study of a nonprofit child welfare agency that delivered family preservation services under three different purchase-of-service (POS) contracts. The research specifically focuses on how certain POS contract provisions and reimbursement rates influence the delivery of family preservation services. The three contacts examined differed on criteria, such as reimbursement mechanism, service volume, definition of clientele, and reimbursement rate. The study found that as reimbursement rates decline and as administrative costs increase, the service provider struggled with cash flow, staffing, fundraising, and service provision, among other things. It is concluded that contract-related resources, policies, and procedures impact provider agencies in multiple, significant ways that are critical to the provision of services and the accomplishment of positive client outcomes.

Incentives Embedded in Institutions: The Case of Share Contracts in Ghanaian Cocoa Production

Providing price incentives to farmers is usually considered essential for agricultural development. Although such incentives are important, regarding price as the sole explanatory factor is far from satisfactory in understanding the complex realities of agricultural production in Africa. By analyzing the share contracts widely practiced in Ghana, this article argues that local institutions such as land tenure systems and agrarian contracts provide strong incentives and disincentives for agricultural production. Based on data derived from fieldwork in the 1990s, the study analyzes two types of share contracts and the incentive structures embedded in them. The analysis reveals that farmers' investment behavior needs to be understood in terms of both short-term incentive to increase yield and long-term incentive to strengthen land rights. The study concludes that the role of price incentives in agricultural production needs to be reconsidered by placing it in wider incentive structures embedded in local institutions.