Contracts as Rent Seeking Devices: Evidence from German Soccer
| Data(s) |
2015
|
|---|---|
| Formato |
application/pdf |
| Identificador |
http://boris.unibe.ch/82464/1/ecin12098.pdf Feess, Eberhard; Gerfin, Michael; Muehlheusser, Gerd (2015). Contracts as Rent Seeking Devices: Evidence from German Soccer. Economic Inquiry, 53(1), pp. 714-730. Wiley 10.1111/ecin.12098 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12098> doi:10.7892/boris.82464 info:doi:10.1111/ecin.12098 urn:issn:1465-7295 |
| Idioma(s) |
eng |
| Publicador |
Wiley |
| Relação |
http://boris.unibe.ch/82464/ |
| Direitos |
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
| Fonte |
Feess, Eberhard; Gerfin, Michael; Muehlheusser, Gerd (2015). Contracts as Rent Seeking Devices: Evidence from German Soccer. Economic Inquiry, 53(1), pp. 714-730. Wiley 10.1111/ecin.12098 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12098> |
| Palavras-Chave | #330 Economics |
| Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion PeerReviewed |
