Where are all the men? The marginalization of men in social scientific research on infertility

There is a wealth of research exploring the psychological consequences of infertility and assisted reproduction technology: a substantial body of sociological and anthropological work on ‘reproductive disruptions’ of many kinds and a small but growing literature on patient perspectives of the quality of care in assisted reproduction. In all these fields, research studies are far more likely to be focused on the understandings and experiences of women than those of men. This paper discusses reasons for the relative exclusion of men in what has been called the ‘psycho-social’ literature on infertility, comments on research on men from psychological and social perspectives and recent work on the quality of patient care, and makes suggestions for a reframing of the research agenda on men and assisted reproduction. Further research is needed in all areas, including: perceptions of infertility and infertility treatment seeking; experiences of treatment; information and support needs; decisions to end treatment; fatherhood post assisted conception; and the motivation and experiences of sperm donors and men who seek fatherhood through surrogacy or co-parenting. This paper argues for multimethod, interdisciplinary research that includes broader populations of men which can contribute to improved clinical practice and support for users of assisted reproduction treatment

Derivation of scientific software from mathematical specifications

Often the modification and enhancement of large scientific software systems are severely hampered because many components of the system are written in an implementation dependent fashion, they are inadequately documented, and their functionalities are not precisely known. In this paper we consider how mathematics may be employed to alleviate some of these problems. In particular, we illustrate how the formal specification notation VDM-SL is being used to specify precisely abstract data types for use in the development of scientific software.

Scientific standards for human intervention trials evaluating health benefits of foods, and their application to infants, children and adolescents

Associations between the consumption of particular foods and health outcomes may be indicated by observational studies. However, intervention trials that evaluate the health benefits of foods provide the strongest evidence to support dietary recommendations for health. Thus, it is important that these trials are carried out safely, and to high scientific standards. Accepted standards for the reporting of the health benefits of pharmaceutical and other medical interventions have been provided by the Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials (CONSORT) statement. However, there are no generally accepted standards for trials to evaluate the health benefits of foods. Trials with foods differ from medical trials in issues related to safety, ethics, research governance and practical implementation. Furthermore, these important issues can deter the conduct of both medical and nutrition trials in infants, children and adolescents. This paper provides standards for the planning, design, conduct, statistical analysis and interpretation of human intervention trials to evaluate the health benefits of foods that are based on the CONSORT guidelines, and outlines the key issues that need to be addressed in trials in participants in the paediatric age range.

Should scientific realists be platonists?

Enhanced Indispensability Arguments (EIA) claim that Scientific Realists are committed to the existence of mathematical entities due to their reliance on Inference to the Best Explana- tion (IBE). Our central question concerns this purported parity of reasoning: do people who defend the EIA make an appropriate use of the resources of Scientific Realism (in particular, IBE) to achieve platonism? (§2) We argue that just because a variety of different inferential strategies can be employed by Scientific Realists does not mean that ontological conclusions concerning which things we should be Scientific Realists about are arrived at by any inferen- tial route which eschews causes (§3), and nor is there any direct pressure for Scientific Real- ists to change their inferential methods (§4). We suggest that in order to maintain inferential parity with Scientific Realism, proponents of EIA need to give details about how and in what way the presence of mathematical entities directly contribute to explanations (§5).