Two-production-period in a duopoly with nonprofit and for-profit firms

We investigate endogenous roles in a competition between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a homogeneous goods market, by allowing two production periods. We find that the Cournot-type equilibrium and one Stackelberg-type equilibrium where the nonprofit firm becomes the follower exist; however, another tackelberg-type equilibrium where the nonprofit firm becomes the leader does not exist.

Asymmetric taxation in a competition between nonprofit and for-profit firms

This paper considers a Cournot competition between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a homogeneous goods market, with uncertain demand. Given an asymmetric tax schedule, we compute explicitly the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we analize the effects of the tax rate and the degree of altruistic preference on market equilibrium outcomes.

Adaptive Penalty and Barrier function based on Fuzzy Logic

Optimization methods have been used in many areas of knowledge, such as Engineering, Statistics, Chemistry, among others, to solve optimization problems. In many cases it is not possible to use derivative methods, due to the characteristics of the problem to be solved and/or its constraints, for example if the involved functions are non-smooth and/or their derivatives are not know. To solve this type of problems a Java based API has been implemented, which includes only derivative-free optimization methods, and that can be used to solve both constrained and unconstrained problems. For solving constrained problems, the classic Penalty and Barrier functions were included in the API. In this paper a new approach to Penalty and Barrier functions, based on Fuzzy Logic, is proposed. Two penalty functions, that impose a progressive penalization to solutions that violate the constraints, are discussed. The implemented functions impose a low penalization when the violation of the constraints is low and a heavy penalty when the violation is high. Numerical results, obtained using twenty-eight test problems, comparing the proposed Fuzzy Logic based functions to six of the classic Penalty and Barrier functions are presented. Considering the achieved results, it can be concluded that the proposed penalty functions besides being very robust also have a very good performance.

The impact of corporate social responsibility on consumer behavior: The role of profit-seeking and altruistic perceived motives

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Identity dynamics in non-profit organizations: Ideological and methodological identity orientations

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Market selection and market entry recommendations for a non-profit organization's first international venture

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Challenges of converting nonprofit in for-profit-reasons decision making and key success factores of a conversion

Due to external constraints (opposed by the market and legal system) and internal changes nonprofit organizations have been converting to for-profit entities combining commercial revenue and social value creation. To create an understanding of the conversion process considering its challenges, the reasons, the decision-making process and key success factors of a conversion are examined. Therefore, a two-step research procedure is used combining literature research and a multiple case study approach based on expert interviews with known companies. The outcome is a helpful guideline (including a decision matrix) for social entrepreneurs that might face a conversion.

A Descriptive and analytic look at Marx's own explanations of the falling rate of profit (second version)

This paper examines, both descriptively and analytically, Marx's arguments for the falling rate of profit from the Hodgskin section of Theories of Surplus Value, The General Law section of the recently published Volume 33 of the Collected Works and Chapter 3 of Volume III of Capital. The conclusions are as follows: First, Marx realised that his main attempt to give an intrinsic explanation of the falling rate of profit, which occurred in the General Law section, had failed; but he still hoped that he would be able to demonstrate it in the future. Second, the Hodgskin and General Law sections contain a number of subsidiary explanations, mostly related to resource scarcity, some of which are correct. Third, Part III of volume III does not contain a demonstration of the falling rate of profit, but a description of the role of the falling rate of profit in capitalist development. Forth, it also contains suppressed references to resource scarcity. And finally, in Chapter 3 of Volume III, Marx says that it is resource scarcity that causes the fall in the rate of profit described in Part III of the same volume. The key to all these conclusions in the careful analysis of the General Law section.

A descriptive and analytic look at Marxs own explanations for the falling rate of profit

Marxs conclusions about the falling rate of profit have been analysed exhaustively. Usually this has been done by building models which broadly conform to Marxs views and then showing that his conclusions are either correct or, more frequently, that they can not be sustained. By contrast, this paper examines, both descriptively and analytically, Marxs arguments from the Hodgskin section of Theories of Surplus Value, the General Law section of the recently published Volume 33 of the Collected Works and Chapter 3 of Volume III of Capital. It also gives a new interpretation of Part III of this last work. The main conclusions are first, that Marx had an intrinsic explanation of the falling rate of profit but was unable to give it a satisfactory demonstration and second, that he had a number of subsidiary explanations of which the most important was resource scarcity. The paper closes with an assessment of the pedigree of various currents of Marxian thought on this issue.

A descriptive and analytic look at Marxs own explanations for the falling rate of profit (Long Version)

Marxs conclusions about the falling rate of profit have been analysed exhaustively. Usually this has been done by building models which broadly conform to Marxs views and then showing that his conclusions are either correct or, more frequently, that they can not be sustained. By contrast, this paper examines, both descriptively and analytically, Marxs arguments from the Hodgskin section of Theories of Surplus Value, the General Law section of the recently published Volume 33 of the Collected Works and Chapter 3 of Volume III of Capital. It also gives a new interpretation of Part III of this last work. The main conclusions are first, that Marx had an intrinsic explanation of the falling rate of profit but was unable to give it a satisfactory demonstration and second, that he had a number of subsidiary explanations of which the most important was resource scarcity. The paper closes with an assessment of the pedigree of various currents of Marxian thought on this issue.

Land, technical progress and the falling rate of profit

The paper sets out a one sector growth model with a neoclassical production function in land and a capital-labour aggregate. Capital accumulates through capitalist saving, the labour supply is infinitely elastic at a subsistence wage and all factors may experience factor augmenting technical progress. The main result is that, if the elasticity of substitution between land and the capital-labour aggregate is less than one and if the rate of caital augmenting technical progress is strictly positive, then the rate of profit will fall to zero. The surprise is that this result holds regardless of the rate of land augmenting technical progress; that is, no amount of technical advance in agriculture can stop the fall in the rate of profit. The paper also discusses the relation of this result to the classical and Marxist literature and sets out the path of the relative price of land.

Competition for FDI and profit shifting: On the effects of subsidies and tax breaks

We investigate competition for FDI within a region when a foreign multinational rm can profitably exploit differences in statutory corporate tax rates by shifting taxable pro ts to lower-tax jurisdictions. In such framework we show that targeted tax competition may lead to higher welfare for the region as a whole than lump-sum subsidies when the difference in statutory corporate tax rates and/or their average is high enough. Tax competition is also preferable from an efficiency point of view (overall surplus) by changing the firm's investment decision when pro t shifting motivations induce the rm to locate in the (before tax) least pro table country.

A direct approach to the discounted penalty function

This paper provides a new and accessible approach to establishing certain results concerning the discounted penalty function. The direct approach consists of two steps. In the first step, closed-form expressions are obtained in the special case in which the claim amount distribution is a combination of exponential distributions. A rational function is useful in this context. For the second step, one observes that the family of combinations of exponential distributions is dense. Hence, it suffices to reformulate the results of the first step to obtain general results. The surplus process has downward and upward jumps, modeled by two independent compound Poisson processes. If the distribution of the upward jumps is exponential, a series of new results can be obtained with ease. Subsequently, certain results of Gerber and Shiu [H. U. Gerber and E. S. W. Shiu, North American Actuarial Journal 2(1): 48–78 (1998)] can be reproduced. The two-step approach is also applied when an independent Wiener process is added to the surplus process. Certain results are related to Zhang et al. [Z. Zhang, H. Yang, and S. Li, Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics 233: 1773–1 784 (2010)], which uses different methods.

Is there a wage penalty for horizontal and vertical mismatch?

This paper studies how the horizontal and vertical mismatches in the labor market affect wage. We do so by taking into account that by choosing a job, wage and mismatches are simultaneously determined. The Seemingly Unrelated Equations model also allows us to control for any omitted variable that could cause biased estimators. We use REFLEX data for Spain. Results reveal that in most cases being horizontally matched has a wage premium and being over-educated does not affect wage. Results suggest that the modeling strategy successfully accounts for some omitted variable that affects simultaneously the probability of being horizontally matched and the wage. This could explain the existence of a wage penalty for over-educated workers when the omitted variable issue is not dealt with.