Ministers as strategic political leaders? : Strategic political steering after NPM reforms in Finland

This study explores strategic political steering after the New Public Management (NPM) reforms, with emphasis on the new role assigned to Government ministers in Finland. In the NPM model, politicians concentrate on broad, principal issues, while agencies have discretion within the limits set by politicians. In Finland, strategic steering was introduced with Management by Results (MBR), but the actual tools for strategic political steering have been the Government Programme, the Government Strategy Portfolio (GSP) and Frame Budgeting. This study addresses these tools as means of strategic steering conducted by the Cabinet and individual ministers within their respective ministries. The time frame of the study includes the two Lipponen Cabinets between 1995 and 2003. Interviews with fourteen ministers as well as with fourteen top officials were conducted. In addition, administrative reform documents and documents related to strategic steering tools were analysed. The empirical conclusions of the study can be summarised as follows: There were few signs of strategic political steering in the Lipponen Cabinets. Although the Government Programmes of both Cabinets introduced strategic thinking, the strategic guidelines set forth at the beginning of the Programme were not linked to the GSP or to Frame Budgeting. The GSP could be characterised as the collected strategic agendas of each ministry, while there was neither the will nor the courage among Cabinet members to prioritise the projects and to make selections. The Cabinet used Frame Budgeting mainly in the sense of spending limits, not in making strategic allocation decisions. As for the GSP at the departmental level, projects were suggested by top officials, and ministers only approved the suggested list. Frame Budgeting at the departmental level proved to be the most interesting strategic steering tool from ministers viewpoint: they actively participated in defining which issues would need extra financing. Because the chances for extra financing were minimal, ministers had an effect only on a marginal share of the budget. At the departmental level, the study shows that strategic plans were considered the domain of officials. As for strategies concerning specific substances, there was variation in the interest shown by the ministers. A few ministers emphasised the importance of strategic work and led strategy processes. In most cases, however, officials led the process while ministers offered comments on the drafts of strategy documents. The results of this study together with experiences reported in other countries and local politics show that political decision-makers have difficulty operating at the strategic level. The conclusion is that politicians do not have sufficient incentive to perform the strategic role implied by the NPM type of reforms. Overall, the empirical results of the study indicate the power of politics over management reforms.

The Vexing Case of Igor Shafarevich, a Russian Political Thinker

The Russian mathematician, academician and former dissident Igor Shafarevich (b. 1923) is commonly mentioned in Western scholarly studies on perestroika and post-perestroika-era Russian politics as one of the most notable anti-Semites and extreme nationalists of the country. This notoriety owes to Shafarevich’s old samizdat article Russophobia, which was published in 1988. The scandal surrounding Russophobia came to a head when the president of The National Academy of Sciences in the United States asked Shafarevich, its honorary member, to resign. Nothing like this had ever happened in the academy’s history. The present dissertation discusses Shafarevich’s political activities, his texts and ideas as well as their reception. Particular attention is given to Russophobia, whose detailed examination proves very clearly that its reputation as an anti-Semitic text is groundless. The reasons for Russophobia’s hasty but fierce condemnation were many, but only one was that when the Soviet system began to tumble, it was commonly assumed that a vigorous rise in anti-Semitism and extreme nationalism in the Soviet Union/Russia would be just a matter of time. Many observers were highly sensitised to detecting its signs and symptoms. The dissertation also shows that most of those to write the first criticisms of Russophobia and to liken Shafarevich to the ideologues of Nazi Germany were the same people he had criticised in Russophobia for their deterministic view of history and irrational manner of connecting things for the purpose of fanning the flames of distrust between Russia’s Jews and Russians. In retrospect, it is fairly evident that Shafarevich actually managed to effectively “neutralise” the message of many of those obsessed with the Jews among his Russian contemporaries and contributed to the fact that anti-Jewish sentiments have been a great deal less popular in post-communist Russia than so many had feared and expected. The thesis also thoroughly discusses Shafarevich’s other texts and activities before Russophobia’s appearance and after it. In the 1970s, Shafarevich was one of the best-known dissidents in the Soviet Union. He worked together with academician Andrei Sakharov in a dissidents’ unofficial human rights committee and co-operated closely with Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn before Solzhenitsyn’s exile. Then, during the chaotic years of perestroika, Shafarevich defended the basic rights of ordinary citizens and warned that the hype concerning democracy could become counterproductive if the most palpable result of the reforms was the disappearance of citizens’ basic security and elementary social justice. One of the conclusions of the thesis is that even if the world around Shafarevich has changed considerably, his views have remained essentially the same since the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Image, Political

Political communication scholars, journalists, and political actors alike, argue that the political process, and deliberative democracy (democracy founded on informed discussion inclusive of citizens), have lost their rational authenticity in that image and media spectacle have become more central to public opinion formation and electoral outcomes than policy. This entry examines the validity of that perception, and the extent to which “image” has emerged as a more significant factor in the political process. And if image is so important in political culture, what the impacts might be on the functioning of democratic processes.

The prankster’s passion: Using theatrical terms to unpack players motivations in popular social performance

Amongst social players, the prank, as a social performance form, holds a lot of potential to impact on personal, relational and social status within a group or between one group and another group. More than simply showing off, a prank in the strictest definition of the term, is a social performance in which one player, a prankster, deploys mischief, trickery or deceit, to cause a moment of anxiety, fear or anger about a happening for another spectator-become-collaborating-player, a prankee – to enhance social bonds, entertain, or comment on a social, cultural or political phenomenon. During a prank, the prankster’s ability to be creative, clever or culturally astute, and the prankee’s ability to be duped, be a good sport, play along, or even play/pay the prankster back, both become fodder for other spectators and society to scrutinize. In Australia, pranking traditions are popular with many social groups, from the community-building pranks of footballers, bucks parties and ‘drop bear’ tales told to tourists, to the more controversial pranks of radio shock jocks, activists and artists. In this paper, I consider whether theatrical terms – theoretical terms from the stage such as actor, acting, objective, arc, performance, audience and emotion, such as those offered by Joseph Roach – are useful in understanding the passion some social players show for pranksterism. Are theatrical terms such as Roach’s as useful as analysts of social self-performance such as Erving Goffman suggest they are? Do they assist in understanding the personal actions, reactions and emotions of prankster and prankee? Do they assist in understanding the power relations between prankster and prankee? Do they assist in understanding the relation between the prank – be it an everyday prank amongst families, friends and coworkers, an entertainment program prank of the sort seen on Prank Patrol, Punked or Scare Tactics, or an activist pranks perpetrated by a guerrilla artist, ‘jammers’ or ‘hackers’ intent on turning dominant social systems back on themselves – the social players, and the public sphere in which the prank takes place? I reflect on how reading pranks as performances, by players, for highly participatory audiences, helps understand why they are so prevalent, and so recurrent across times, cultures and contexts, and also so controversial when not performed well enough – or when performed too well – prompting outrage from the prankster, prankee or society as passionate as any debate about a performance by players in a theatre.

Communication and Political Crisis: Media, Politics and Governance in a Globalized Public Sphere

Communication and Political Crisis explores the role of the global media in a period of intensifying geopolitical conflict. Through case studies drawn from domestic and international political crises such as the conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine, leading media scholar Brian McNair argues that the digitized, globalized public sphere now confronted by all political actors has produced new opportunities for social progress and democratic reform, as well as new channels for state propaganda and terrorist spectaculars such as those performed by the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. In this major work, McNair argues that the role of digital communication will be crucial in determining the outcome of pressing global issues such as the future of feminism and gay rights, freedom of speech and media, and democracy itself.

Cultural Trauma and Life Stories

The purpose of this work is to use the concepts of human time and cultural trauma in a biographical study of the turning points in the recent history of Estonia. This research is primarily based on 148 in-depth biographical interviews conducted in Estonia and Sweden in 1995-2005, supplemented by excerpts from 5 collections and 10 individually published autobiographies. The main body of the thesis consists of six published and of two forthcoming separate refereed articles, summarised in the theoretical introduction, and Appendix of the full texts of three particular life stories. The topic of the first article is the generational composition and the collective action frames of anti-Soviet social mobilisation in Estonia in 1940-1990. The second article details the differentiation of the rites of passage and the calendar traditions as a strategy to adapt to the rapidly changed political realities, comparatively in Soviet Estonia and among the boat-refugees in Sweden. The third article investigates the life stories of the double-minded strategic generation of the Estonian-inclined Communists, who attempted to work within the Soviet system while professing to uphold the ideals of pre-war Estonia. The fourth article is concentrated on the problems of double mental standards as a coping strategy in a contradictory social reality. The fifth article implements the theory of cultural trauma for the social practice of singing nationalism in Estonia. The sixth article bridges the ideas of Russian theoreticians concerning cultural dialogue and the Western paradigm of cultural trauma, with examples from Estonian Russian life stories. The seventh article takes a biographical look at the logic of the unraveling of cultural trauma through four Soviet decades. The eighth article explores the re-shaping of citizen activities as a strategy of coping with the loss of the independent nation state, comparatively in Soviet Estonia and among Swedish Estonians. Cultural trauma is interpreted as the re-ordering of the society s value-normative constellation due to sharp, violent, usually political events. The first one under consideration was caused by the occupations of the Republic of Estonia by the Soviet army in 1940-45. After half a century of suppression the memories of these events resurfaced as different stories describing the long-term, often inter-generational strategies of coping with the value collapse. The second cultural trauma is revealed together with the collapse of the Soviet power and ideology in Estonia in 1991. According to empirical data, the following three trauma discourses have been reconstructed: - the forced adaptation to Soviet order of the homeland Estonians; - the difficulty of preserving Estonian identity in exile (Sweden); - the identity crisis of the Russian population of Estonia. Comparative analyses of these discourses have shown that opposing experiences and worldviews cause conflicting interpretations of the past. Different social and ethnic groups consider coping with cultural trauma as a matter of self-defence and create appropriate usable pasts to identify with. Keywords: human time, cultural trauma, frame analysis, discourse, life stories

Kansallisen konsensuskulttuurin jäljillä : Globalisaatioajan Suomi Helsingin Sanomissa

The dissertation analyzes Finnish consensual culture in public discussion and journalism in Helsingin Sanomat (HS). The consensual Finnish political culture has evolved and persisted over a long period of time and it has been affected by historical circumstances as well as the dynamics of political and journalistic structures and actors. A historical chronology is drawn in the study regarding the nature and development of consensus culture in 20th century Finland. This political culture is traced by looking at public discussion on globalization at the turn of the millennium. Globalization as a concept has been contested and various societal actors have given different meanings to it. This research looks at how the globalization discussion in HS during the years 1992-2004 constructs consensus. Helsingin Sanomat (and its predecessor Päivälehti) has been an important actor in Finnish journalism and the public sphere almost since its founding 120 years ago. The history of the paper is tightly connected to Finland s general political history and history of the public sphere. Moreover, the paper s connections to the societal elite have always been close. The central question in this research was to see how the globalization discussion in HS evolved in relation to consensus as well as legitimate controversies. As a result it is stated that the globalization question has clearly divided the Finnish societal actors. The most powerful societal elites (government, most civil servants, corporate sector) had a profile of being pro globalization. They communicated their globalization strategy as a national, unified way of thinking. Other elites which have been losing their influence (the president, labor union, part of members of parliament), as well as civil society actors tried to bring forward conflicting views in relation to globalization. The paper did give some room to these elements, but on the other hand it also tried to keep up the consensual discussion culture especially in the editorial section. In line with its traditions Helsingin Sanomat strived to create national unity. At the same time it did not give adequate attention to the changes brought about by globalization to the positions and roles of various elites and civil society actors. In this discussion HS seemed more like a medium of the state than as a critical and independent actor. Journalism has an important role in upholding and also reviving the Finnish political culture and public discussion. From this point of view it is problematic if the area of so called legitimate controversy in broad societal questions like globalization becomes very limited. As the Finnish elites are small and there is no considerable competition between them, journalism should actively bring up controversial issues. This task becomes complicated, however, if the elite circles are closed up and no initiatives come from their ranks. Political decision making as well as democracy can suffer, if issues are not brought to the public agenda.

Not in their genes: phenotypic flexibility, behavioural traditions and cultural evolution in wild bonnet macaques

Phenotypic flexibility, or the within-genotype, context-dependent, variation in behaviour expressed by single reproductively mature individuals during their lifetimes, often impart a selective advantage to organisms and profoundly influence their survival and reproduction. Another phenomenon apparently not under direct genetic control is behavioural inheritance whereby higher animals are able to acquire information from the behaviour of others by social learning, and, through their own modified behaviour, transmit such information between individuals and across generations. Behavioural information transfer of this nature thus represents another form of inheritance that operates in many animals in tandem with the more basic genetic system. This paper examines the impact that phenotypic flexibility, behavioural inheritance and socially transmitted cultural traditions may have in shaping the structure and dynamics of a primate society--that of the bonnet macaque (Macaca radiata), a primate species endemic to peninsular India. Three principal issues are considered: the role of phenotypic flexibility in shaping social behaviour, the occurrence of individual behavioural traits leading to the establishment of social traditions, and the appearance of cultural evolution amidst such social traditions. Although more prolonged observations are required, these initial findings suggest that phenotypic plasticity, behavioural inheritance and cultural traditions may be much more widespread among primates than have previously been assumed but may have escaped attention due to a preoccupation with genetic inheritance in zoological thinking.

Oligarchs, political regime changes, and firm valuation

This paper examines the impact of a regime shift on the valuation of politically powerful oligarch firms. Focusing on the Yeltsin-Putin regime shift in Russia, we find that the valuations of outside shareholders claims are significantly higher under the Putin regime than under the Yeltsin regime after controlling for industry and time effects. The findings suggest that the increasing cost of extracting private benefits outweigh the reduction in the value of political connections following the political regime change. The results are also consistent with changes in the risk of state expropriation. Our results show that effects driven by the political regime change complement the traditional view stating that increased ownership concentration improved the performance of Russian oligarch firms.

Political Risk in Credit Evaluation: Empirical Studies and Survey Results

Financing trade between economic agents located in different countries is affected by many types of risks, resulting from incomplete information about the debtor, the problems of enforcing international contracts, or the prevalence of political and financial crises. Trade is important for economic development and the availability of trade finance is essential, especially for developing countries. Relatively few studies treat the topic of political risk, particularly in the context of international lending. This thesis explores new ground to identify links between political risk and international debt defaults. The core hypothesis of the study is that the default probability of debt increases with increasing political risk in the country of the borrower. The thesis consists of three essays that support the hypothesis from different angles of the credit evaluation process. The first essay takes the point of view of an international lender assessing the credit risk of a public borrower. The second investigates creditworthiness assessment of companies. The obtained results are substantiated in the third essay that deals with an extensive political risk survey among finance professionals in developing countries. The financial instruments of core interest are export credit guaranteed debt initiated between the Export Credit Agency of Finland and buyers in 145 countries between 1975 and 2006. Default events of the foreign credit counterparts are conditioned on country-specific macroeconomic variables, corporate-specific accounting information as well as political risk indicators from various international sources. Essay 1 examines debt issued to government controlled institutions and conditions public default events on traditional macroeconomic fundamentals, in addition to selected political and institutional risk factors. Confirming previous research, the study finds country indebtedness and the GDP growth rate to be significant indicators of public default. Further, it is shown that public defaults respond to various political risk factors. However, the impact of the risk varies between countries at different stages of economic development. Essay 2 proceeds by investigating political risk factors as conveivable drivers of corporate default and uses traditional accounting variables together with new political risk indicators in the credit evaluation of private debtors. The study finds links between corporate default and leverage, as well as between corporate default and the general investment climate and measeures of conflict in the debtor country. Essay 3 concludes the thesis by offering survey evidence on the impact of political risk on debt default, as perceived and experienced by 103 finance professionals in 38 developing countries. Taken together, the results of the thesis suggest that various forms of political risk are associated with international debt defaults and continue to pose great concerns for both international creditors and borrowers in developing countries. The study provides new insights on the importance of variable selection in country risk analysis, and shows how political risk is actually perceived and experienced in the riskier, often lower income countries of the global economy.