De la mano de Keynes: "A tract on monetary reform"

En Tract on Monetary Reform, John Maynard Keynes propuso utilizar la base monetaria y el coeficiente de reserva bancaria como variables instrumentales d¿una política monetaria que había sido considerada hasta entonces innecesaria. En este trabajo se intenta desvelar las primeras contribuciones de Keynes al progreso del análisis económico

Monetary integration and the cost of borrowing

With the beginning of the European Monetary Union (EMU), euro-area sovereign securities¿ adjusted spreads over Germany (corrected from the foreign exchange risk) experienced an increase that caused a lower than expected decline in borrowing costs. The objective of this paper is to study what explains that rising. In particular, if it took place a change in the price assigned by markets to domestic (credit risk and/or market liquidity) or to international risk factors. The empirical evidence supports the idea that a change in the market value of liquidity occurred with the EMU. International and default risk play a smaller role

The Impact of Monetary Union on EU-15 Sovereign Debt Yield Spreads

With European Monetary Union (EMU), there was an increase in the adjusted spreads (corrected from the foreign exchange risk) of euro participating countries' sovereign securities over Germany and a decrease in those of non-euro countries. The objective of this paper is to study the reasons for this result, and in particular, whether the change in the price assigned by markets was due to domestic factors such as credit risk and/or market liquidity, or to international risk factors. The empirical evidence suggests that market size scale economies have increased since EMU for all European markets, so the effect of the various risk factors, even though it differs between euro and non-euro countries, is always dependent on the size of the market.

Incentives and promotion in wage hierarchies

Most of the large firms organization schemes consist in hierarchical structures of tiers with different wage levels. Traditionally the existence of this kind of organizations has been associated to the separation of productive and managerial or supervision tasks and to differences in the skills of the workers. However, many firms now employ workers with similar skills, and then the hierarchical structure can be related to an incentive scheme to ensure that workers supply effort. The model we present investigates how firm owners should determine the optimal wage distribution in order to maximize profits.

Local Public-Services Provision under Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Design and Contracting Parties Incentives

When deciding to resort to a PPP contract for the provision of a local public service, local governments have to consider the demand risk allocation between the contracting parties. In this article, I investigate the effects of demand risk allocation on the accountability of procuring authorities regarding consumers changing demand, as well as on the cost-reducing effort incentives of the private public-service provider. I show that contracts in which the private provider bears demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs. This is due to the fact that consumers are empowered when the private provider bears demand risk, that is, they have the possibility to oust the private provider in case of non-satisfaction with the service provision, which provides procuring authorities with more credibility in side-trading and then more incentives to be responsive. As a consequence, I show that there is a lower matching with consumers' preferences over time when demand risk is on the public authority rather than on the private provider, and this is corroborated in the light of two famous case studies. However, contracts in which the private provider does not bear demand risk motivate more the private provider from investing in cost-reducing efforts. I highlight then a tradeoff in the allocation of demand risk between productive and allocative efficiency. The striking policy implication of this article for local governments would be that the current trend towards a greater resort to contracts where private providers bear little or no demand risk may not be optimal. Local governments should impose demand risk on private providers within PPP contracts when they expect that consumers' preferences over the service provision will change over time.

Uncertainty, electoral incentives and political myopia

We study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build aframework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectlyobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies withfuture returns in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reelection probability.Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may, undersome conditions, increase social welfare. We use the model to study how political rewardscan be set so as to maximise social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limitto governments. The predictions of our theory are consistent with a number of stylised factsand with a new empirical observation documented in this paper: aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility, is associated to better fiscal discipline in a panel of 20 OECDcountries.

The effects of monetary policy on stock market bubbles: Some evidence

We estimate the response of stock prices to exogenous monetary policy shocks usinga vector-autoregressive model with time-varying parameters. Our evidence points toprotracted episodes in which, after a a short-run decline, stock prices increase persistently in response to an exogenous tightening of monetary policy. That responseis clearly at odds with the "conventional" view on the effects of monetary policy onbubbles, as well as with the predictions of bubbleless models. We also argue that it isunlikely that such evidence be accounted for by an endogenous response of the equitypremium to the monetary policy shocks.

Chronic disease management: a qualitative study investigating the barriers, facilitators and incentives perceived by Swiss healthcare stakeholders.

BACKGROUND: Chronic disease management has been implemented for some time in several countries to tackle the increasing burden of chronic diseases. While Switzerland faces the same challenge, such initiatives have only emerged recently in this country. The aim of this study is to assess their feasibility, in terms of barriers, facilitators and incentives to participation. METHODS: To meet our aim, we used qualitative methods involving the collection of opinions of various healthcare stakeholders, by means of 5 focus groups and 33 individual interviews. All the data were recorded and transcribed verbatim. Thematic analysis was then performed and five levels were determined to categorize the data: political, financial, organisational/ structural, professionals and patients. RESULTS: Our results show that, at each level, stakeholders share common opinions towards the feasibility of chronic disease management in Switzerland. They mainly mention barriers linked to the federalist political organization as well as to financing such programs. They also envision difficulties to motivate both patients and healthcare professionals to participate. Nevertheless, their favourable attitudes towards chronic disease management as well as the fact that they are convinced that Switzerland possesses all the resources (financial, structural and human) to develop such programs constitute important facilitators. The implementation of quality and financial incentives could also foster the participation of the actors. CONCLUSIONS: Even if healthcare stakeholders do not have the same role and interest regarding chronic diseases, they express similar opinions on the development of chronic disease management in Switzerland. Their overall positive attitude shows that it could be further implemented if political, financial and organisational barriers are overcome and if incentives are found to face the scepticism and non-motivation of some stakeholders.

Pankkien vakavaraisuussäännöstön uudistus

Tutkielman tavoitteena on kuvata pankkien vakavaraisuusuudistuksen eri osa-alueita. Tarkempi analyysi rajautuu uudistuksen tuomiin muutoksiin luotto- ja operatiivisen riskin pääomavaateissa. Tutkielman empiirisen osuuden tavoitteena on perehtyä vakavaraisuussäännöstön uudistusten vaikutuksiin Nordeassa. Tutkimusmetodologiaksi on valittu normatiivinen tutkimusote. Lisäksi tutkielma sisältää deskriptiivisiä ja positivistisia osia. Lähdeaineisto koostuu Baselin pankkivalvontakomitean ja Suomen Pankin julkaisemista tutkimuksista ja dokumenteista sekä alan julkaisuissa ilmestyneistä artikkeleista. Pankkien vakavaraisuussäännöstöuudistuksen tavoitteena on lisätä rahoitusmarkkinoiden vakautta. Sääntelyn kautta pyritään turvaamaan pankkien varojen riittävyys suhteessa niiden riskien ottoon. Vakavaraisuussäännöstön uudistus muodostuu kolmesta pilarista: (1) minimipääomavaatimuksista, (2) pankkivalvonnan vahvistamisesta ja (3) markkinakurin hyödyntämisestä luottolaitosten toiminnan julkistamisvaatimuksia lisäämällä. Pankkivalvonnan harmonisoinnista vallitsee kansainvälinen yhteisymmärrys, mutta ennen kuin Basel II voi astua voimaan on useita ongelmia ratkaisematta. Baselin vakavaraisuuskehikko ei ole ainut lähitulevaisuudessa pankkitoimialaa koetteleva uudistus. Kansainväliset tilinpäätösstandardit; International Accounting Standards ja erityisesti IAS 39 sekä International Financial Reporting Standards, lyhyemmin IFRS tulevat muuttamaan merkittävästi pankkien tilinpäätöskäyttäytymistä. Epäselvää on vielä kuitenkin tukevatko uudistukset toisiaan ja missä määrin pankkien tulosvolatiliteetin odotetaan kasvavan. Tutkielmassa pohditaan vakavaraisuussäännöstön uudistuksen hyötyjä kansainvälisen kilpailuneutraliteetin osalta, sillä Yhdysvalloissa uudistus koskee vain suurimpia pankkeja. Tutkielmassa paneudutaan lisäksi uudistuksen mahdolliseen talouden syklejä voimistavaan vaikutukseen ja tarkastellaan parannusehdotuksia prosyklisyyden hillitsemiseksi. Yksi vakavaraisuusuudistuksen tärkeimmistä tehtävistä on luoda pankeille kannustin kehittää omia riskienhallinta malleja. Kannustin ongelma on pyritty ratkaisemaan vapaampien sisäisten mallien menetelmien avulla. Ongelmaa ei ole pystytty kuitenkaan ratkaisemaan aivan täysin, sillä luottoriskien osalta pankkien lainaportfolioiden rakenne määrittää sen, hyötyvätkö pankit siirtymisestä sisäisten mallien menetelmän käyttöön. Tutkielma sisältää myös Nordean arvion vakavaraisuusuudistuksen vaikutuksista pankkitoimialaan.

Ownership, Incentives and Hospitals

This article analyzes hospital privatization by comparing costs and quality between different ownership forms. We put the attention on the distinction between public hospitals and private hospitals with public funding. Using information about Spanish hospitals, we have found that private hospitals provide services at a lower cost at expenses of lower quality. We observe that property rights theory is fulfilled at least for the Spanish hospital market. The way that Heath Authorities finance publicly funded hospitals may be responsible for the differences in incentives between public and private centers. We argue that the trade-off between costs and quality could be minimized by designing financing contracts with fixed and variable components.

Testing the FTPL across government tiers

Control on regional government budgets is important in a monetary union as lower tiers of government have fewer incentives to consolidate debt. According to the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level; unsustainable non-Ricardian fiscal policies eventually force monetary policy to adjust. Hence, uncoordinated and non-regulated regional fiscal policies would therefore threaten price stability for the monetary union as a whole. However, the union central bank is not without defense. A federal government that internalises the spillover effect of non-Ricardian fiscal policies on the price level can offset non-Ricardian regional fiscal policies. A federal government, which taxes and transfers resources between regions, may compensate for unsustainable regional fiscal policies so as to keep fiscal policy Ricardian on aggregate. Following Canzoneri et al. (2001), we test the validity of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level for both federal and regional governments in Germany. We find evidence of a spillover effect of unsustainable policies on the price level for other Länder. However, the German federal government offsets this effect on the price level by running Ricardian policies. These results have implications for the regulation of fiscal policies in the EMU.

EU-15 sovereign governments’ cost of borrowing after seven years of monetary union

Yield spreads over 10-year German government securities of the EU-15 countries converged dramatically in the seven years after the beginning of Monetary Integration. In this paper, we investigate the relative influence of systemic and idiosyncratic risk factors on their behaviour. Our conclusions suggest that in EMU-countries the relative importance of domestic risk factors (both credit and liquidity risk factors) is higher than that of international factors, which appear to play a secondary but significant role in non-EMU countries.