Affect and the Problem of Evil

A central aspect of the problem of evil or the argument from evil is the intensity or quantity of suffering. This quantity is conceived of as something objective and fixed. But because our experience is in part constituted and interpreted by our effectual orientation, there is no such objective quantum of suffering. But where there is no objective quantum of suffering, the argument from evil collapses. Here we begin by examining the connection between the philosophical and existential dimensions of the problem of and argument from evil as suffering. Next we consider the role of the affect in the constitution and interpretation of experience generally, together with implications for the argument from suffering. Third, we look at how a key affectual element of the argument from evil might undercut that argument. And finally, we consider a proposal to categorize suffering as a species of moral or spiritual failure, as affectually wrong.

Theodicies, Utilitarianism, and Respect for Persons

Most theodicy responses to the problem of evil have in common the claim that God legitimately allows some evil such that greater good may come. This response is puzzling because the seemingly overwhelming consensus (at least amongst Christian apologists) is that 1) morality is deontological in nature (e.g. our duty of obedience to God’s commands, or acting in accordance with God’s purpose), and 2) relatedly, that humans are made in God’s image (i. e. are rational beings) and thus are worthy of respect. I shall argue that theodicy defenses that claim that God allows some evil such that greater good may come are untenable because they either unnecessarily bifurcate Christian morality in an ad hoc manner, or entail that God cannot have respect for persons.

A Mea Culpa for The Felix Culpa? A Greater Goods Response to the Problems of Evil and Hell

In this paper I want to develop a particular kind of greater-good response to the problems of evil and hell, one which hence can serve as a backup plan should the free will defense not satisfy. Ultimately, this response will appear to belong to several traditions in theodicy. Like all greater-goods views, this one relies on explaining the existence of evil in terms of the greater goods that come out of it. Among these goods are the greater goods of Incarnation and Atonement, their respective goodness consisting in large part in the higher-order divine good of glorifying God through the display of divine virtue.

Religion, Democracy and the Public Sphere

Throughout the development and maturation of the American democratic experience, religiously inspired conduct has contributed significantly to democratically progressive political concerns such as the abolition of slavery and campaigns for civil rights, but also the encouragement and perpetuation pf anti-democratic practices such as the institution of slavery and policies of racial segregation. It may be rarely admitted, but there is no essential conceptual affinity between conduct proper to democratic political association. It may, therefore, be useful in our own political circumstances to try to determine boundaries for conduct that expresses and satisfies compatibly both religious and democratic commitments. Perhaps most Americans do recognize – if not in their own cases, at least in reference to the beliefs and actions of others – that religiously inspired conduct is neither thereby justified morally or legally nor absolved from further critical appraisal. Certainly, the history of American legal practice shows that religious belief or inspiration does not serve as acceptable legal defense for conduct charged as criminal infraction. The U.S. Constitution contains only two references to religion: the non-establishment clause prohibits governmental institutionalization of religious beliefs or liberty rights – is limited in scope and application both by other constitutional rights of individuals and by constitutionally authorized powers of government. As the U.S.S.C. has repeatedly held, individual constitutional features must be understood in a manner that harmonizes all stated and implied constitutional features, not by unbridled abstractions of selected phrases. Under the American legal system, there is no absolute or unlimited right to free exercise of religion: not everything done publicly under religious inspiration is legally permissible; what is otherwise illegal conduct is not legalized by religious inspiration. In important respects, general features of the legal boundaries concerning religiously inspired conduct in public life are reasonably clear; nevertheless, broader issues concerning further moral or ethical constraints upon religiously inspired conduct remain unresolved and rarely addressed explicitly.

Molinism, Open Theism, and Moral Luck

It is sometimes thought that the choice between Molinism and open theism involves a trade-off in values: Molinism asserts that God has providential power but allows God indirectly to manipulate that in virtue of which human beings are to be judged; while open theism grants human beings more power over that in virtue of which they are tp be judged, but at the price of giving up providence. I argue here that this picture is misconstrued---that Molinism gives human agents more power over that in virtue of which they may be judged than does open theism. Since open theism confines the possible avenues for evaluating agents to their behavior in the actual world, open theism is incompatible with any solution to the problem of moral luck which appeals to counterfactual behavior, and so (I argue) is impugned by the problem,. Molinists, by contrast, have a promising solution to that problem.

Schleiermacher's Doctrine of Biblical Authority: An Alternative to Content-Based/Supernaturalist and Function-Based Rationalist Models

Author: Kerry W. Holton Title: SCHLEIERMACHER’S DOCTRINE OF BIBLICAL AUTHORITY: AN ALTERNATIVE TO CONTENT-BASED/SUPERNATURALIST AND FUNCTION- BASED/RATIONALIST MODELS Advisor: Theodore M. Vial, Jr. Degree Date: August 2015 This dissertation examines Friedrich Schleiermacher’s understanding of biblical authority and argues that, as an alternative to strictly supernaturalistic and rationalistic models, his understanding allows the New Testament to speak authoritatively in Christian religion in an age of critical, historical awareness. After classifying Schleiermacher’s position in a typology of the doctrine of biblical authority, this dissertation explores his conception of divine revelation and inspiration vis-à-vis scripture. It demonstrates that although he did not believe there is warrant for the claim of a direct connection between divine revelation and scripture, or that scripture is the foundation of faith, he nonetheless asserted that the New Testament is authoritative. He asserted the normative authority of the New Testament on the basis that it is the first presentation of Christian faith. This dissertation examines Schleiermacher’s “canon within the canon,” as well as his denial that the Old Testament shares the same normative worth and inspiration of the New. Although this dissertation finds difficulty with some of Schleiermacher’s views regarding the Old Testament, it names two significant strengths of what is identified as his evangelical, content-based, and rationalist approach to biblical authority. First, it recognizes and values the co-presence and co-activity of the supernatural and the natural !ii in the production of the New Testament canon. This allows both scripture and the church to share religious authority. Second, it allows Christian faith and the historical-method to coexist, as it does not require people to contradict what they know to be the case about science, history, and philosophy. Thus, this dissertation asserts that Schleiermacher’s understanding of biblical authority is a robust one, since, for him, the authority of scripture does not lie in some property of the texts themselves that historians or unbelievers can take away.

The philosophy of Plotinos.

On cover: Plotinus, his life, times and philosophy.

The reasons of the laws of Moses : from the "More nevochim" of Maimonides /

Translation of selections from Dalalāt al-ḥaʻirīn.

Commentatio de vi quam graeca philosophia in theologiam tum Muhammedanorum tum Iudaeorum exercuerit /

"Sacra Christi Pentacostalia : pie riteque celebranda Academiae Fridericianae Halis Consociatae : civibus indicit prorector cum directore et seantu : inest Commentatio de vi quam graeca philosophia in theologiam tum Muhammedanorum tum Iudaeorum exercuerit."

Elements of the philosophy of the human mind /

Mode of access: Internet.

Elements of the philosophy of the human mind /

Imprint varies: v.2. New York, Eastburn, Kirk, & co., Paul and Thomas, printers.--v.3. Philadelphia, Carey, Lea & Carey, 1827.

Elements of the philosophy of the human mind /

Shoemaker 45800.