‘Due libertie and proportiond equalitie’: Milton, democracy, and the republican tradition

John Milton’s political thought has been interpreted in strikingly divergent ways. This article argues that he should be seen as a classical republican, and locates key aspects of his political thought within an ancient Greek discourse critical of democracy or extreme democracy. Milton was clearly familiar with the ancient texts expounding this critique, and he himself deployed both the arguments and the characteristic discourse of the anti-democratic thinkers across the span of his writing. This vision of politics emphasized the rightly-ordered soul of the masculine republican citizen, in contrast to the unruly passions seen both in tyrants and in the democratic rabble.

Extreme bounds of democracy

What determines the emergence and survival of democracy? The authors apply extreme bounds analysis to test the robustness of fifty-nine factors proposed in the literature, evaluating over three million regressions with data from 165 countries from 1976 to 2002. The most robust determinants of the transition to democracy are gross domestic product (GDP) growth (a negative effect), past transitions (a positive effect), and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development membership (a positive effect). There is some evidence that fuel exporters and Muslim countries are less likely to see democracy emerge, although the latter finding is driven entirely by oil-producing Muslim countries. Regarding the survival of democracy, the most robust determinants are GDP per capita (a positive effect) and past transitions (a negative effect). There is some evidence that having a former military leader as the chief executive has a negative effect, while having other democracies as neighbors has a reinforcing effect.

Greek politics: economic crisis or crisis of democracy?

Greece’s economic instability has become the Western world’s longest-running monetary crisis. Will Germany allow the EU to keep propping up Greece’s unstable financial system? Will the country leave the eurozone? Will such a departure, if it occurs, unravel the idea of “Europe”? All valid questions. But behind them stands another equally profound social and political crisis that has made Greece the weak man of Europe.

Democratic Deficit in the EU : Towards Parliamentary Democracy?!

Nowadays, the western societies are based on parliamentary democracy. Therefore, weak legislative power of the European Parliament is alleged for the democratic deficit in the EU. How it can be possible that the parliamentary democracy which is practiced on the national level can be achieved beyond the nation-states without diminishing the democracy at the nation-states? If not, how legitimacy can be obtained so that the continued existence and expansion of the EU should be justified? Since expectations for democratization of the EU are still unmet, finding answers to the actual questions is a great appeal. The thesis will explore the fundamental debates and arguments contributing to the democracy in the EU through the parliaments. I will try to reflect to the different ways of thinking and the prospects of establishing parliamentary democracy beyond the nation states.

Why did democracy become the preferred political regime only in the twentieth century?

A Democracia Tornou-Se a Forma Preferida de Governo Apenas no Século Vinte. a Busca por Motivos Racionais para Entendermos a Razão não é Suficiente. o Autor Procura por um Fato Histórico Novo que Tenha Levado a Essa Mudança de Preferência, Baseado Sucessivamente na Revolução Capitalista e na Perda Gradual do Medo da Expropriação Pela Burguesia. a Revolução Capitalista que Mudou o Modo de Apropriação do Excedente, da Violência para o Mercado, é a Primeira Condição Necessária. Representa Também a Transição do Estado Absoluto para o Estado Liberal. a Segunda Condição é o Desaparecimento do Medo da Expropriação, Permitindo a Transição do Regime Liberal para o Regime Liberal-Democrático. Depois de Estabelecer Estas Duas Condições, ou Estes Dois Fatos Históricos Novos, o Regime Democrático Tornou-Se Rational Choice para Todas as Classes. para os Capitalistas, Democracia é Agora a Forma de Governo que Melhor Assegura o Direito À Propriedade e Aos Contratos. para os Trabalhadores, é a Forma de Governo que Melhor Assegura o Aumento de Salários com Lucros

Political institutions as substitute for democracy: a political economy analysis of economic growth

This manuscript empirically assesses the effects of political institutions on economic growth. It analyzes how political institutions affect economic growth in different stages of democratization and economic development by means of dynamic panel estimation with interaction terms. The new empirical results obtained show that political institutions work as a substitute for democracy promoting economic growth. In other words, political institutions are important for increasing economic growth, mainly when democracy is not consolidated. Moreover, political institutions are extremely relevant to economic outcomes in periods of transition to democracy and in poor countries with high ethnical fractionalization.

Distributive politics in Latin América: the impact of democracy, eletions and globalization on the welfare state

A tese busca examinar dois desenvolvimentos de grandes conseqüências na América Latina nas últimas três décadas do século XX. Ela procura testar as teorias sobre políticas distributivas examinando os efeitos da democracia e da globalização no estado de bem-estar na América Latina utilizando dados de séries temporais para 15 países entre 1973 e 2000.

Democracy and capitalist revolution

Democracy became the preferred and consolidated form of government only in the twentieth century. It is not sufficient to explain this change solely by reference to rational motives, nor by detecting processes and leadership. A historical approach is required. The new historical fact that led to the change of preference from aristocratic rule to democracy is the capitalist revolution, which changed the manner of appropriating the economic surplus from violence to the market. This is the first necessary condition for democracy. The disappearance of the fear of expropriation, the rise of middle classes and the pressures of the poor or of the workers are the second, third and fourth new historical facts that opened the way for the transition from the liberal to the liberal-democratic regime. After these four conditions were fulfilled, the elites ceased to fear that they would be expropriated if universal suffrage was granted. Eventually, after the transition, the democratic regime became the rational choice for all classes. The theory presented here does not predict transitions, since countries often turn democratic without fully realized historical conditions, but it predicts democratic consolidation, since no country that has completed its capitalist revolution falls back into authoritarianism.

Democracy and growth in pre-industrial countries

This paper distinguishes three types of countries (rich, middle-income, and pre-industrial) and focus on the latter, which, in contrast to the other two, didn’t complete their industrial and capitalist revolutions. Can pre-industrial countries be governed well and embody the principles of consolidated democracies? Today these countries are under pressure from the imperial West to eschew institutions and developmental strategies that, in the past, allowed rich and middle-income countries to industrialize. At the same time, they are pressured by these same Western parties (and by its own people) to be democratic, even though their societies are not mature enough to fulfill that. In fact, no country completed its industrial and capitalist revolution within the framework of even a minimal democracy, suggesting that such demands are unfair. Added to this, pre-industrial countries are extremely difficult to govern because they usually don’t have a strong nation and capable states. This double pressure to renounce development strategies that have worked for the West while being required to become a democracy represents a major obstacle to their development.

Scientific knowledge and digital democracy in Brazil: how to assess public health policy debate with applied Scientometrics

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Mathematics education and democracy

In this paper, we investigate the relationship between mathematics education and the notions of education for all/democracy. In order to proceed with our analysis, we present Marx's concept of commodity and Jean Baudrillard's concept of sign value as a theoretical reference in the discussion of how knowledge has become a universal need in today's society and ideology. After, we engage in showing mathematics education's historical and epistemological grip to this ideology. We claim that mathematics education appears in the time period that English becomes an international language and the notion of international seems to be a key constructor in the constitution of that ideology. Here, we draw from Derrida's famous saying that there is nothing beyond the text. We conclude that a critique to modern society and education has been developed from an idealistic concept of democracy. © FIZ Karlsruhe 2009.