A admissibilidade e a conveniência da exclusão do controlador em S.A.

O estudo refere-se à verificação da admissibilidade e da conveniência da exclusão facultativa de acionista controlador em sociedade anônima. O tema não é propriamente novo no Brasil. Intenciona-se, no entanto, construir a hipótese a partir de fundamento legal diferente. A Lei 6.404/76 (LSA) apenas destina a exclusão para casos de acionista remisso (artigo 107, II), permanecendo silente com relação ao inadimplemento de deveres de colaboração e lealdade (em conjunto, deveres de cooperação). Nesse contexto, a doutrina e a jurisprudência brasileiras tendem a admitir a hipótese de exclusão em tais casos por aplicação do artigo 1.030 do Código Civil, destinado a regular a matéria no âmbito das sociedades simples. Para tanto, aproximam a companhia fechada das sociedades de pessoas a fim de justificar, dada a alegada omissão da lei especial a esse respeito, o tratamento por analogia. A partir do estudo sistemático da LSA, que compreende, entre outros, o entendimento do princípio da circulação de ações e da extensão dos deveres de boa-fé entre os sócios, pretende-se admitir a hipótese com base na própria lógica acionária, em razão da eventual relevância do relacionamento societário para a consecução do fim social. Em tais companhias, o adimplemento dos deveres de cooperação torna-se tão imprescindível quanto o adimplemento do dever de conferimento para o alcance do escopo comum. Em decorrência desse raciocínio, a exclusão torna-se admissível na ocorrência de inadimplemento de qualquer dever social que inviabilize, real ou potencialmente, o preenchimento do fim social. A identificação de eventual affectio societatis entre os acionistas, portanto, passa a ser irrelevante. Admitir a hipótese no que se refere a acionista controlador se revela ainda importante instrumento de limitação do exercício ilegítimo do poder de controle e não se confunde com a sanção de perdas e danos prevista na LSA por abuso de poder de controle. Por fim, será analisada a conveniência da exclusão do controlador, em razão de sua relevância pessoal para a consecução da atividade, a participação societária por ele detida e da possibilidade de dissolver-se parcialmente a sociedade, com a saída do acionista minoritário descontente.

Influencia anglosajona en la prueba del Arbitraje Internacional: Discovery

El objeto de este estudio es conocer las semejanzas que existen entre los sistemas jurídicos del common law y civil law. Nos centraremos en el mecanismo probatorio del discovery, un mecanismo propio del Derecho americano y expondremos si tiene cabida en Estados pertenecientes al civil law, en concreto en España. En segundo lugar, se hará una exposición sobre la regulación de este incidente, tanto en Derecho americano como en Derecho británico al igual de la influencia que ha tenido las nuevas tecnologías. Asimismo, veremos qué ocurre cuando la información que se requiere está en poder de un tercero ajeno a la controversia ¿Es posible requerirle? ¿Y si se encuentra en el extranjero? Finalmente, expondremos cómo funciona el discovery en un arbitraje internacional mediante el Schedule of Document Production, también denominado Redfern Schedule.

Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client)

Three usually unexpressed, and too often unnoticed, conceptual dichotomies underlie our perception and understanding of lawyers’ ethics. First, the existence of a special body of professional ethics and professional regulation presupposes some special need or risk. Criminal and civil law are apparently insufficient. Ordinary day-to-day morality and ordinary ethics, likewise, are not considered to be enough. What is the risk entailed by the notion of a profession that is special; who needs protection, and from what? Two quite different possible answers to this question provide the first of the three dichotomies examined in this article: one can understand the risk as primarily to a vulnerable client from a powerful professional; or, to the contrary, from a powerful client-lawyer combination toward vulnerable others. Second, what is the foundational orientation of lawyers? Are lawyers serving primarily their particular clients, and those clients’ preferences, choices and autonomy? Or is the primary allegiance of lawyers to some community or collective goal or interest distinct from the particular goals or interests of the client? The third dichotomy concerns not the substance of the risk, or the primary orientation, but the appropriate means of responding to that risk or that fundamental obligation. Should professional ethics be implemented primarily through rules? Or, should we rely on character and the discretion of lawyers to make a thought out, all things considered, decision? Each of these three presents a fundamental difference in how we perceive and address issues of lawyers’ ethics. Each affects our understanding and analysis on multiple levels, from (1) determining the appropriate or requisite conduct in a particular situation, to (2) framing a specific rule or approach for a particular category of situations, to (3) more general or abstract theory or policy. A person’s inclinations in regard to the dichotomies affects the conclusions that person will reach on each of those levels of analysis, yet those inclinations and assumptions are frequently unexamined and unarticulated. One’s position on each of the dichotomies tends to structure the approach and outcome without the issues and choice having been explicitly addressed or possibly even noticed. This article is an effort to ameliorate that problem. Part I addresses the question of what is the risk in the work of lawyers, or the function of lawyers, for which professional ethics is the answer. The concluding section focuses on the particular problem of the corporation as client. Part II then asks the related and possibly consequent question of what is the foundational orientation or allegiance of the lawyer? Is it to the individual client? Or is it to some larger community interest? Again, the concluding section focuses on the corporation. Part III turns to the means or method for addressing the obligations and possible problems of the professional ethics of lawyers. Should lawyers’ ethics guide and confine the conduct of lawyers primarily through rules? Or should it function primarily through reliance on the knowledge, judgment and character of lawyers? If the latter were the guide, ethical decisions would be made on a situation by situation basis under the discretion of each lawyer. Toward the end of each discussion possibilities for bridging the dichotomy are considered (and with such bridges each dichotomy may come to look more like a spectrum or continuum.). At several points after its introduction in Parts I and II, the special problem of the corporation as client is revisited and possible solutions suggested. Illustrating the usefulness of keeping the dichotomies in view, Part IV applies them to several exemplary situations of ethical difficulty in actual lawyer practice. For readers finding it difficult to envision the consequences of these distinctions, turning ahead to Part IV may be useful in making the discussion more concrete. Some commonalities across the dichotomies and connections among them are then developed in the concluding section, Part V.

Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client)

Three usually unexpressed, and too often unnoticed, conceptual dichotomies underlie our perception and understanding of lawyers’ ethics. First, the existence of a special body of professional ethics and professional regulation presupposes some special need or risk. Criminal and civil law are apparently insufficient. Ordinary day-to-day morality and ordinary ethics, likewise, are not considered to be enough. What is the risk entailed by the notion of a profession that is special; who needs protection, and from what? Two quite different possible answers to this question provide the first of the three dichotomies examined in this article: one can understand the risk as primarily to a vulnerable client from a powerful professional; or, to the contrary, from a powerful client-lawyer combination toward vulnerable others. Second, what is the foundational orientation of lawyers? Are lawyers serving primarily their particular clients, and those clients’ preferences, choices and autonomy? Or is the primary allegiance of lawyers to some community or collective goal or interest distinct from the particular goals or interests of the client? The third dichotomy concerns not the substance of therisk, or the primary orientation, but the appropriate means of responding to that risk or that fundamental obligation. Should professional ethics be implemented primarily through rules? Or, should we rely on character and the discretion of lawyers to make a thought out, all things considered, decision? Each of these three presents a fundamental difference in how we perceive and address issues of lawyers’ ethics. Each affects our understanding and analysis on multiple levels, from (1) determining the appropriate or requisite conduct in aparticular situation, to (2) framing a specific rule or approach for a particular category of situations, to (3) more general or abstract theory or policy. A person’s inclinations in regard to the dichotomies affects the conclusions that person will reach on each of those levels of analysis, yet those inclinations and assumptions are frequently unexamined and unarticulated. One’s position on each of the dichotomies tends to structure the approach and outcome without the issues and choice having been explicitly addressed or possibly even noticed. This article is an effort to ameliorate that problem. Part I addresses the question of what is the risk in the work of lawyers, or the function of lawyers, for which professional ethics is the answer. The concluding section focuses on the particular problem of the corporation as client. Part II then asks the related and possibly consequent question of what is the foundational orientation or allegiance of the lawyer? Is it to the individual client? Or is it to some larger community interest? Again, the concluding section focuses on thecorporation. Part III turns to the means or method for addressing the obligations and possible problems of the professional ethics of lawyers. Should lawyers’ ethics guide and confine the conduct of lawyers primarily through rules? Or should it function primarily through reliance on the knowledge, judgment and character of lawyers? If the latter were the guide, ethical decisions would be made on a situation by situation basis under the discretion of each lawyer. Toward the end of each discussion possibilities for bridging the dichotomy are considered (and with such bridges each dichotomy may come to look more like a spectrum or continuum.). At several points after its introduction in Parts I and II, the special problem of the corporation as client is revisited and possible solutions suggested. Illustrating the usefulness of keeping the dichotomies in view, Part IV applies them to several exemplary situations of ethical difficulty in actual lawyer practice. For readers finding it difficult to envision the consequences of these distinctions, turning ahead to Part IV may be useful in making the discussion more concrete. Some commonalities across the dichotomies and connections among them are then developed in the concluding section, Part V.

Naturalizing Immigration Imprisonment

Only recently has imprisonment become a central feature of both t across every level of government and involving civil and criminal law enforcement tools. Examining the population as a whole provides crucial insights as to how we arrived at this state of mass immigration imprisonment. While political motivations — parallel to those that fueled the rapid expansion of criminal mass incarceration — may have started the trend, this Article demonstrates that key legal and policy choices explain how imprisonment has become an entrenched feature of immigration law enforcement. In fact, legislators and immigration officials have locked themselves into this choice, as there are now literally billions of dollars, tens of thousands of prison beds, and innumerable third parties invested in maintaining and expanding the use of immigration imprisonment. Using the literature on path dependence and legal legitimacy, this Article explains the phenomenon of immigration imprisonment as a single category that spans all levels of government. Rather than continue further along this path, the Article concludes by suggesting that policymakers should seek a future reflective of immigration law enforcement’s past when imprisonment was the exception rather than the norm.

Rehber-i talibin-i Mecelle

Mehmet Ali Bey'in eseridir.

Mecelle şerhi Teşrih

eser-i Abdüssettar an aza-yi cemiyet ül-Mejelle.

al- Majallah: wa-hiya taḥtawī ʻalá al-qawānīn al-sharʻīyah wa-al-aḥkām al-ʹadlīyah al-muṭābiqah lil-kutub al-fiqhīyah

ḥarrarathā lajnah muʼallafah min al-ʹulamāʼ al-muḥaqqiqīn wa-al-fuqahāʼ al-mudaqqiqīn wa-baʻda an waqaʻat ladá al-Bāb al-ʻĀlī mawqiʻ al-istiḥsān taʻallaqat al-irādah al-sanīyah bi-an takūna dustūr lil-ʻamal bihā.

Recusa à sistematicidade axiomática na tradição romano-germânica e a jurisdição como meio do pluralismo jurídico na República Federal Brasileira

Tese de doutoramento, Direito (Ciências Jurídico-Políticas), Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Direito, 2016

Garantia patrimonial e prejudicialidade : um estudo sobre a resolução em benefício da massa

A resolução em benefício da massa constitui um dos mecanismos mais relevantes do Direito da Insolvvência, tendo por finalidade destruir os efeitos provocados por actos praticados ou omitidos pelo devedor durante um específico período anterior à declaração de insolvência em prejuízo da massa insolvente e dos interesses dos credores. Este trabalho tem como objectivo analisar o conceito de actos prejudiciais de acordo com os princípios basilares de Direito Civil e do Direito da Insolvência, nomeadamente dos princípios da prevalência do interesse dos credores e da par conditio creditorum, bem como os efeitos e o procedimento. Todos os actos que causem uma diminuição do património do devedor ou que lesem a par conditio creditorum podem ser integrados no conceito de actos prejudiciais. A existência de prejuízo pode ser presumida iuris et de iure em determinados casos ou deve ser provada pelo administrador da insolvência. É, igualmente, relevante a má fé do terceiro, que pode ser presumida iuris tantum e é excluída na resolução incondicional. Constituindo um instrumento de protecção dos interesses dos credores na insolvência do devedor, a resolução em benefício da massa ergue-se a direito da colectividade dos credores e torna inoponíveis em relação a estes os actos praticados pelo devedor e por um terceiro. A lei prevê excepções à oponibilidade a terceiros. A resolução em benefício da massa ou outras acções de idêntica natureza previstas na lei civil devem ser exercidas de forma exclusiva pelo administrador da insolvência na pendência do processo de insolvência, ainda que o CIRE permita o exercício pelos credores da impugnação pauliana. No entanto, os efeitos da referida acção devem aproveitar a todos os credores.

De hoy para mañana,

Mode of access: Internet.

Lehrbuch der pandekten,

Mode of access: Internet.

Das Obligationenrecht als Theil des heutigen Römischen Rechts /

Mode of access: Internet.

Iuris civilis septimus tomus continens absolutissimum indicem et summam omnium, quae continentur tam in textu, quam in glossa totius iuris civilis maxima distinctione contextum ... /

Contiene: [7.1]: [A-I] ; 7.2: [L-Z]

Pandekten,

Mode of access: Internet.