ELECTRICITY GENERATION MODELING AND PHOTOVOLTAIC FORECASTS IN CHINA

With the economic development of China, the demand for electricity generation is rapidly increasing. To explain electricity generation, we use gross GDP, the ratio of urban population to rural population, the average per capita income of urban residents, the electricity price for industry in Beijing, and the policy shift that took place in China. Ordinary least squares (OLS) is used to develop a model for the 1979-2009 period. During the process of designing the model, econometric methods are used to test and develop the model. The final model is used to forecast total electricity generation and assess the possible role of photovoltaic generation. Due to the high demand for resources and serious environmental problems, China is pushing to develop the photovoltaic industry. The system price of PV is falling; therefore, photovoltaics may be competitive in the future.

High secondary aerosol contribution to particulate pollution during haze events in China

Rapid industrialization and urbanization in developing countries has led to an increase in air pollution, along a similar trajectory to that previously experienced by the developed nations. In China, particulate pollution is a serious environmental problem that is influencing air quality, regional and global climates, and human health. In response to the extremely severe and persistent haze pollution experienced by about 800 million people during the first quarter of 2013 (refs 4, 5), the Chinese State Council announced its aim to reduce concentrations of PM2.5 (particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter less than 2.5micrometres) by up to 25 per cent relative to 2012 levels by 2017 (ref. 6). Such efforts however require elucidation of the factors governing the abundance and composition of PM2.5, which remain poorly constrained in China. Here we combine a comprehensive set of novel and state-of-the-art offline analytical approaches and statistical techniques to investigate the chemical nature and sources of particulate matter at urban locations in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Xi'an during January 2013. We find that the severe haze pollution event was driven to a large extent by secondary aerosol formation, which contributed 30-77 per cent and 44-71 per cent (average for all four cities) of PM2.5 and of organic aerosol, respectively. On average, the contribution of secondary organic aerosol (SOA) and secondary inorganic aerosol (SIA) are found to be of similar importance (SOA/SIA ratios range from 0.6 to 1.4). Our results suggest that, in addition to mitigating primary particulate emissions, reducing the emissions of secondary aerosol precursors from, for example, fossil fuel combustion and biomass burning is likely to be important for controlling China's PM2.5 levels and for reducing the environmental, economic and health impacts resulting from particulate pollution.

Source apportionment and dynamic changes of carbonaceous aerosols during the haze bloom-decay process in China based on radiocarbon and organic molecular tracers

Fine carbonaceous aerosols (CAs) is the key factor influencing the currently filthy air in megacities in China, yet few studies simultaneously focus on the origins of different CAs species using specific and powerful source tracers. Here, we present a detailed source apportionment for various CAs fractions, including organic carbon (OC), water-soluble OC (WSOC), water-insoluble OC (WIOC), elemental carbon (EC) and secondary OC (SOC) in the largest cities of North (Beijing, BJ) and South China (Guangzhou, GZ), using the measurements of radiocarbon and anhydrosugars. Results show that non-fossil fuel sources such as biomass burning and biogenic emission make a significant contribution to the total CAs in Chinese megacities: 56±4 in BJ and 46±5% in GZ, respectively. The relative contributions of primary fossil carbon from coal and liquid petroleum combustions, primary non-fossil carbon and secondary organic carbon (SOC) to total carbon are 19, 28 and 54% in BJ, and 40, 15 and 46% in GZ, respectively. Non-fossil fuel sources account for 52 in BJ and 71% in GZ of SOC, respectively. These results suggest that biomass burning has a greater influence on regional particulate air pollution in North China than in South China. We observed an unabridged haze bloom-decay process in South China, which illustrates that both primary and secondary matter from fossil sources played a key role in the blooming phase of the pollution episode, while haze phase is predominantly driven by fossil-derived secondary organic matter and nitrate.

Clusters and Innovation: Beijing's Hi-technology Industry Cluster and Guangzhou's Automobile Industry Cluster

This paper proposes a flowchart approach to the automobile industry cluster policy and the hi-technology industry cluster policy to prioritize policy measures. First, in the automobile industry cluster, suppliers of parts and components to anchor firms such as Honda, Nissan and Toyota of Japanese assembly makers in Guangzhou, China, can innovate partly because the suppliers have become independent of their anchor firms in the Japanese Keiretsu system. Second, concerning the hi-technology industry clustering in Beijing, we show that the existence of universities is a precondition for the industrial cluster policy and that the leadership of the Zhongguancun Science Park Management Committee of Beijing Municipality is crucial to the success of the industrial cluster policy. The flowchart for the hi-technology industry is different from the one for the automobile industry cluster.

The voices and protests of China's labour NGOs and their effort to promote migrant worker rights

Labour NGOs in China are relatively new organizations that emerged in the 1990s and have spread during the 2000s. Migrant workers in China are weak both socially and economically and have been lacking ways of voicing grievances and protesting. Grassroots labour NGOs for migrant workers seem to be an efficient channel for their voices. This paper examines how labour NGOs emerged and how they function in the context of current Chinese society. This paper adopts the case study method to describe three NGOs in Beijing and Shenzhen. The paper shows that these NGOs are using different methods to resolve migrant worker problems. At the same time, they are voicing the migrants' grievances and protesting in their own ways.

China N-S

[drawn by Erwin Raisz].

The US-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change: Can the G2 make a difference? CEPS Commentary, 26 November 2014

This Commentary finds that the US-China joint declaration on climate change, issued following the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Beijing on November 12th, is undoubtedly an important announcement by the two global economic giants responsible for emitting over 30% of the world’s GHG emissions. As such, it needs to be seen as important and relevant – a very positive development towards a new global climate change agreement in Paris. It is a challenge to those that have announced their pledges and are seen as capable of doing more, as well as to those that have not yet announced their intentions. It shows the importance and success of the UN climate change conference in Warsaw last year, when the decision was made that all Parties should announce their commitments by the first quarter of 2015. It also represents a total breakdown of the Kyoto Protocol-style separation in climate change negotiations between countries into Annex 1 and non-Annex 1, with China signalling that it is taking on the leadership role that comes with being a great economic power. In broader terms, it shows that there is scope for cooperation between the two main economic actors, even in the face of competition in other spheres. It is also a challenge to the EU, which was a leader and needs to show that there is a benefit in maintaining its leadership. Finally, agreements are deemed historic only by history. This one is important, and a potential game-changer, on the face of it. But it needs to live up to its promise. There is sufficient uncertainty for us to withhold final judgement and see if its promise materialises through implementation. But, as sober a judgement as we must make on such important matters, this announcement certainly gives us great hope that it is possible to do what needs to be done, and we must wholeheartedly welcome and applaud it.

China vs. Central Asia. The achievements of the past two decades. OSW Study 45/2013

The collapse of the USSR brought about conditions conducive to the dynamic development of relations between Central Asia and China. These relations have evolved from deep mistrust to the continually growing Chinese presence primarily in the region’s economy but also increasingly in its politics. Central Asia is playing a growing role in those areas of the economy which China sees as strategic (in particular in energy and communications). China’s ambitions and capabilities with regard to new areas and its geopolitical competitors are also being tested here. For the time being, it can be said that China has achieved vast success: its offer is appealing for the region, and Beijing has outpaced its Western rivals and has seriously challenged Russia’s position in the region. It remains, however, an open question whether China will be able to maintain and secure its present achievements and trends, which will be a serious challenge given the eternal instability in the region and Russia’s reintegration ambitions.

A partial success of trade cooperation within the ‘16+1’ formula: the case of food exports to China. OSW COMMENTARY #189, 2015-10-29

When in 2012 China approached the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) with a proposal of cooperation in the ‘16+1’ formula, it declared it was willing to meet the needs of CEE countries. Beijing had been aware of the political importance of the problem of trade deficit (which has been ongoing for years) and launched cooperation with the governments of 16 CEE countries to boost imports from these states. The years 2011–2014 brought an improvement in the balance of trade between China and: Hungary, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia. The remaining ten CEE countries recorded an increase in their trade deficits. Changes in CEE countries’ balance of trade with China resulted only slightly from political actions. Instead, they were due to the macroeconomic situation and to a deterioration of the debt crisis in the EU which, for example, caused a decline in the import of Chinese goods in some of these countries. Multilateral trade cooperation was successfully developed in the entire region only in the agricultural and food production sector – the area of greatest interest to China. The pace of bilateral cooperation with specific countries varied, with the fastest being Poland, Latvia, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria. Actions by governments of CEE countries resulted in Chinese market opening up to hundreds of local companies which, in turn, translated into an increase in the volume of foodstuffs sold by ‘the 16’ to China from US$ 137 million in 2011 to US$ 400 million in 2014. The success achieved in the agricultural and food production sector has demonstrated the effectiveness of trade cooperation in the ‘16+1’ formula. It is, however, insufficient to generate a significant improvement of the trade balance. At present, the sector’s share in the total volume of goods sold to China by CEE states is a mere 3.7%, and any reduction of the trade deficit would require long-term and more comprehensive solutions still to be implemented by the governments of individual CEE states.

China on Russia’s intervention in Syria. OSW Commentary Number 193|19.01.2016

China has reacted positively to Russia’s military intervention in Syria. The Chinese government perceives it as an element of the global fight against terrorism, and has emphasised the fact that Russia was acting in response to a request by the Syrian government. At the same time, Beijing has argued that the Syrian conflict cannot be resolved by military means and that a political compromise is necessary.

Japan and China: Bitter Rivals and Close Partners. Asia Policy Brief 2013/03, June 2013

Japan and China trade a lot between each other. Unfortunately, however, they also argue a lot with each other. Since Tokyo’s purchase of three uninhabited Japanese-controlled islets in the East China Sea from their private owner in September 2012, the main subject of dispute has been that of sovereignty over maritime territories. While bilateral trade amounted to an impressive $333 billion in 2012 (slightly less than in 2011, when bilateral trade reached $345 billion), a bilateral territorial dispute over control and sovereignty of what Tokyo calls Senkaku and Beijing calls the Diaoyu Islands will most probably continue to remain at the very top of the agenda of Sino-Japanese relations in the months ahead.

An essential partner in the background. Europe in China's policy during the rule of Xi Jinping. OSW STUDIES 56 2016

Chinese elites do not treat Europe as an equal partner and are convinced that China holds the upper hand over Europe. They see a growing asymmetry in bilateral relations. China’s sense of its own potential is boosted by internal divisions within the European Union. At the same time, Europe is China’s key economic partner and an ‘economic pillar’ supporting China’s growth on the international stage. Beijing strives to maintain Europe’s open attitude towards the Chinese economy, in particular its exports, technology transfer to China, location of investments and diversification of China’s currency reserves. Cooperation with Europe and support from Europe are necessary to enable China to improve its position in the international economic and financial system, mainly in order to legitimise China’s actions in the area of multilateralism and global governance. Similarly, Beijing attaches great importance to maintaining Europe’s non-involvement in two issues: China’s core interests and Chinese-American relations.

Weishenme Zhongguo zai diyi ci shijie dazhan zhong juyou zhongyao zuoyong 为什么中国在第一次世界大战中具有重要作用 (Why China Played an Important Role in the First World War)

Aufbauend auf dem analytischen Tool des Totalen Krieges (vgl. den Artikel des Autors zu Controversy Total War in 1914-1918-Online) werden im vorliegenden Beitrag die Anstrengungen Chinas im Ersten Weltkrieg zu denjenigen anderer nicht europäischer Länder wie Australien, Südafrika oder Indien in Bezug gesetzt. Dabei wird das Ziel verfolgt, den globalen Charakter eines Konfliktes deutlich zu machen, der zurecht als erster Weltkrieg bezeichnet wird und in welchem China sicherlich eine weit bedeutsamere Rolle spielte, als es gemeinhin in der Historiographie dargestellt wird. Ursprünglich wurde der Beitrag als Antwort auf die Frage konzipiert, warum nicht nur China für eine Globalgeschichte des Ersten Weltkrieges von Bedeutung war. Im Verlauf der Übersetzung wurde der Titel dahingehend angepasst, dass stärker die Bedeutung von Chinas Rolle im Ersten Weltkrieg betont wurde.