Book of Selichot by Jacques Judah Lyons written in Surinam

Digital image

An Optimal Mechanism for Sponsored Search Auctions on the Web and Comparison With Other Mechanisms

In this paper, we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a mechanism design problem. Using this framework, we describe two well-known mechanisms for sponsored search auction-Generalized Second Price (GSP) and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG). We then derive a new mechanism for sponsored search auction which we call optimal (OPT) mechanism. The OPT mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue, while achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advertisers. We then undertake a detailed comparative study of the mechanisms GSP, VCG, and OPT. We compute and compare the expected revenue earned by the search engine under the three mechanisms when the advertisers are symmetric and some special conditions are satisfied. We also compare the three mechanisms in terms of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and computational complexity. Note to Practitioners-The advertiser-supported web site is one of the successful business models in the emerging web landscape. When an Internet user enters a keyword (i.e., a search phrase) into a search engine, the user gets back a page with results, containing the links most relevant to the query and also sponsored links, (also called paid advertisement links). When a sponsored link is clicked, the user is directed to the corresponding advertiser's web page. The advertiser pays the search engine in some appropriate manner for sending the user to its web page. Against every search performed by any user on any keyword, the search engine faces the problem of matching a set of advertisers to the sponsored slots. In addition, the search engine also needs to decide on a price to be charged to each advertiser. Due to increasing demands for Internet advertising space, most search engines currently use auction mechanisms for this purpose. These are called sponsored search auctions. A significant percentage of the revenue of Internet giants such as Google, Yahoo!, MSN, etc., comes from sponsored search auctions. In this paper, we study two auction mechanisms, GSP and VCG, which are quite popular in the sponsored auction context, and pursue the objective of designing a mechanism that is superior to these two mechanisms. In particular, we propose a new mechanism which we call the OPT mechanism. This mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue subject to achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Bayesian incentive compatibility guarantees that it is optimal for each advertiser to bid his/her true value provided that all other agents also bid their respective true values. Individual rationality ensures that the agents participate voluntarily in the auction since they are assured of gaining a non-negative payoff by doing so.

Empirical Analysis of Competition in Procurement Auctions

A vast amount of public services and goods are contracted through procurement auctions. Therefore it is very important to design these auctions in an optimal way. Typically, we are interested in two different objectives. The first objective is efficiency. Efficiency means that the contract is awarded to the bidder that values it the most, which in the procurement setting means the bidder that has the lowest cost of providing a service with a given quality. The second objective is to maximize public revenue. Maximizing public revenue means minimizing the costs of procurement. Both of these goals are important from the welfare point of view. In this thesis, I analyze field data from procurement auctions and show how empirical analysis can be used to help design the auctions to maximize public revenue. In particular, I concentrate on how competition, which means the number of bidders, should be taken into account in the design of auctions. In the first chapter, the main policy question is whether the auctioneer should spend resources to induce more competition. The information paradigm is essential in analyzing the effects of competition. We talk of a private values information paradigm when the bidders know their valuations exactly. In a common value information paradigm, the information about the value of the object is dispersed among the bidders. With private values more competition always increases the public revenue but with common values the effect of competition is uncertain. I study the effects of competition in the City of Helsinki bus transit market by conducting tests for common values. I also extend an existing test by allowing bidder asymmetry. The information paradigm seems to be that of common values. The bus companies that have garages close to the contracted routes are influenced more by the common value elements than those whose garages are further away. Therefore, attracting more bidders does not necessarily lower procurement costs, and thus the City should not implement costly policies to induce more competition. In the second chapter, I ask how the auctioneer can increase its revenue by changing contract characteristics like contract sizes and durations. I find that the City of Helsinki should shorten the contract duration in the bus transit auctions because that would decrease the importance of common value components and cheaply increase entry which now would have a more beneficial impact on the public revenue. Typically, cartels decrease the public revenue in a significant way. In the third chapter, I propose a new statistical method for detecting collusion and compare it with an existing test. I argue that my test is robust to unobserved heterogeneity unlike the existing test. I apply both methods to procurement auctions that contract snow removal in schools of Helsinki. According to these tests, the bidding behavior of two of the bidders seems consistent with a contract allocation scheme.

Strategic Information Acquisition: Applications to Herding and Auctions

The information that the economic agents have and regard relevant to their decision making is often assumed to be exogenous in economics. It is assumed that the agents either poses or can observe the payoff relevant information without having to exert any effort to acquire it. In this thesis we relax the assumption of ex-ante fixed information structure and study what happens to the equilibrium behavior when the agents must also decide what information to acquire and when to acquire it. This thesis addresses this question in the two essays on herding and two essays on auction theory. In the first two essays, that are joint work with Klaus Kultti, we study herding models where it is costly to acquire information on the actions that the preceding agents have taken. In our model the agents have to decide both the action that they take and additionally the information that they want to acquire by observing their predecessors. We characterize the equilibrium behavior when the decision to observe preceding agents' actions is endogenous and show how the equilibrium outcome may differ from the standard model, where all preceding agents actions are assumed to be observable. In the latter part of this thesis we study two dynamic auctions: the English and the Dutch auction. We consider a situation where bidder(s) are uninformed about their valuations for the object that is put up for sale and they may acquire this information for a small cost at any point during the auction. We study the case of independent private valuations. In the third essay of the thesis we characterize the equilibrium behavior in an English auction when there are informed and uninformed bidders. We show that the informed bidder may jump bid and signal to the uninformed that he has a high valuation, thus deterring the uninformed from acquiring information and staying in the auction. The uninformed optimally acquires information once the price has passed a particular threshold and the informed has not signalled that his valuation is high. In addition, we provide an example of an information structure where the informed bidder initially waits and then makes multiple jumps. In the fourth essay of this thesis we study the Dutch auction. We consider two cases where all bidders are all initially uninformed. In the first case the information acquisition cost is the same across all bidders and in the second also the cost of information acquisition is independently distributed and private information to the bidders. We characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium in the first and a pure strategy equilibrium in the second case. In addition we provide a conjecture of an equilibrium in an asymmetric situation where there is one informed and one uninformed bidder. We compare the revenues that the first price auction and the Dutch auction generate and we find that under some circumstances the Dutch auction outperforms the first price sealed bid auction. The usual first price sealed bid auction and the Dutch auction are strategically equivalent. However, this equivalence breaks down in case information is acquired during the auction.

Regional Blocs: Building Blocks or stumbling Blocks? (Book Review)

Reviews the book `Regional Blocks: Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks?,' by A.S. and P. Bhalla.

Book Review: "The Interface: IBM and the Transformation of Corporate Design, 1945-1975", John Harwood, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011

Within the history of twentieth-century design, there are a number of well-known objects and stories that are invoked time and time again to capture a pivotal moment or summarize a much broader historical transition. For example, Marcel Breuer’s Model B3 chair is frequently used as a stand-in for the radical investigations of form and new industrial materials occurring at the Bauhaus in the mid-1920s. Similarly, Raymond Loewy’s streamlined pencil sharpener has become historical shorthand for the emergence of modern industrial design in the 1930s. And any discussion of the development of American postwar “organic design” seems incomplete without reference to Charles and Ray Eames’s molded plywood leg splint of 1942. Such objects and narratives are dear to historians of modern design. They are tangible, photogenic subjects that slot nicely into exhibitions, historical surveys, and coffee-table best sellers...

E-book monopolies and the law

This article will examine the legality of the digital rights management (‘DRM’) measures used by the major e-book publishers and device manufacturers in the United States, European Union and Australia not only to enforce their intellectual property rights but also to create monopolistic content silos, restrict interoperability and affect the ability for users to use the content they have bought in the way they wish. The analysis will then proceed to the recent competition investigations in the US and EU over price-fixing in e-book markets, and the current litigation against Amazon in the US for an alleged abuse of its dominant position. A final point will be made on possible responses in Australia to these issues taking into account the jurisprudence on DRM in other scenarios.

Design of an optimal auction for sponsored search auctions

In this paper we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a mechanism design problem. Using this framework, we design a novel auction which we call the OPT (optimal) auction. The OPT mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue while achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advertisers. We show that the OPT mechanism is superior to two of the most commonly used mechanisms for sponsored search namely (1) GSP (Generalized Second Price) and (2) VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves). We then show an important revenue equivalence result that the expected revenue earned by the search engine is the same for all the three mechanisms provided the advertisers are symmetric and the number of sponsored slots is strictly less than the number of advertisers.

Asia literate schooling in the Asian century [Book review]

In her introduction to this edited collection, Christine Halse lays out the purpose of the book as being about addressing three questions for education in contemporary times: What does Asia literacy mean?; Why is it important?; and How might or ought schools do Asia literacy? As a literacy educator it was these three questions that led to my interest in first reading and then reviewing the book. On numerous occasions I’ve felt the expectation that an expertise in Asia literacy should be a part of my toolbox. And yet I’ve always considered Asia literacy to be the responsibility of those who profess to know about – or have some expertise in – history, politics, or studies of society. But here was an edited collection with chapters from a variety of scholars who have informed my work over many years, framing schooling as a noun that could be described qualitatively as more or less Asia literate. As such, I took on the challenge to open up to these ideas and to the opportunity to think again about literacy and the use of this term in pairings such as Asia literacy. I had my own question to add to those of the editor. Can, or even should, literacy be used to describe the skills, capacities and understandings required for citizens to “reflect and explore cultural differences in the Asian region” (Asia Literacy Teachers’ Association of Australia, n.d.) in ways that support engagement within and with Asian peoples and their cultures?

Optimal auctions for multi-unit procurement with volume discount bids

Our attention, is focused on designing an optimal procurement mechanism which a buyer can use for procuring multiple units of a homogeneous item based on bids submitted by autonomous, rational, and intelligent suppliers. We design elegant optimal procurement mechanisms for two different situations. In the first situation, each supplier specifies the maximum quantity that can be supplied together with a per unit price. For this situation, we design an optimal mechanism S-OPT (Optimal with Simple bids). In the more generalized case, each supplier specifies discounts based on the volume of supply. In this case, we design an optimal mechanism VD-OPT (Optimal with Volume Discount, bids). The VD-OPT mechanism uses the S-OPT mechanism as a building block. The proposed mechanisms minimize the cost to the buyer, satisfying at the same time, (a) Bayesian, incentive compatibility and (b) interim individual rationality.

Book review: "Kozak, M., & Kozak, N. (Eds). 2008. Destination Marketing: An International Perspective. Wallingford, Oxon: Routledge"

This edited volume contains 18 chapters by 40 contributors from many parts the world, and is divided into four thematic sections. The focus of Part 1 is Destination image, and contains five chapters. This has arguably been the most popular topic in the destination marketing literature, underpinned by the knowledge that the image an individual holds of a destination is as important as any tangible features. Yin Chew and Siti Johari attempt to model the relationship between destination image and country image using structural equation modelling. While this does address an important gap in the literature, the measures used to operationalise the constructs are not reported and little of the data analysis is discussed to support the finding that country image is a predictor of destination image. Ana Rodriquez, Antonia Correia and Metin Kozak report the findings of an exploratory study about lakedestination image. They used a neural network content analysis of 40 lake descriptions featuring on an online directory for lake enthusiasts to derive a set of cognitive attribute themes. Yang Zhang and Yi-Wei Xiao explore the relations between literary works and tourism through the Asian voice. Whereas most literary tourism studies have been around Western culture, this is a rare perspective from Chinese culture...

Book Review: "Engin Isin and Evelyn Ruppert, Being Digital Citizens. London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015"

The concept of digital citizenship has become increasingly important to our understanding of the relationship between media and political action, and the possibilities for democratization, decentralization, and diversification of power offered by the Internet. In the era of the digitalization of just about everything, citizenship and its related concepts are in processes of technology-driven transformation, with important implications for the global future of democratic culture. Isin and Ruppert’s book is a timely engagement with these questions, and with the emerging notion of the “digital subject.”

Asymtotic solution of the Frieman and Book equation for the pair-correlation function

Using Thomé's procedure, the asymptotic solutions of the Frieman and Book equation for the two-particle correlation in a plasma have been obtained in a complete form. The solution is interpreted in terms of the Lorentz distance. The exact expressions for the internal energy and pressure are evaluated and they are found to be a generalization of the result obtained earlier by others.