The effects of corporate and country sustainability characteristics on the cost of debt: an international investigation

We investigate the relationship between corporate and country sustainability on the cost of bank loans. We look into 470 loan agreements signed between 2005 and 2012 with borrowers based in 28 different countries across the world and operating in all major industries. Our principal findings reveal that country sustainability, relating to both social and environmental frameworks, has a statistically and economically impactful effect on direct financing of economic activity. An increase of one unit in a country's sustainability score is associated with an average decrease in the cost of debt by 64 basis points. Our international analysis shows that the environmental dimension of a country's institutional framework is approximately twice as impactful as the social dimension, when it comes to determining the cost of corporate loans. On the other hand, we find no conclusive evidence that firm-level sustainability influences the interest rates charged to borrowing firms by banks. Our main findings survive a battery of robustness tests and additional analyses concerning subsamples, alternative sustainability metrics and the effects of financial crisis.

Privatização aspectos fiscais e dívida pública

Este trabalho analisa os efeitos do programa de desestatização brasileiro sobre acumulação da dívida pública no período 1995-1999. objetivo central avaliar se utilização de receitas auferidas com alienação de ativos estatais concessões de serviços públicos no abatimento de dívidas de curto prazo tem efeito significativo sobre redução ou contenção do crescimento da dívida pública alteração do seu perfil, com reflexos sobre as necessidades de financiamento do setor público. Como possível contribuição adicional, esta dissertação apresenta um conjunto de dados, em geral pouco conhecidos, relativos às empresas estatais, ao programa de desestatização dívida pública, considerados de interesse geral. Dentre os principais aspectos discutidos no trabalho destacam-se os seguintes, referentes ao período 1995-1999. economia de juros obtida por meio do uso de recursos da privatização no resgate da dívida mobiliária interna de emissão do Tesouro Nacional atingiu R$ 8,8 bilhões, contra R$ 0,5 bilhão que Tesouro deixou de arrecadar na forma de dividendos das empresas privatizadas. No que tange aos efeitos da privatização sobre os estoques de dívidas, calcularam-se reduções de R$ 27,6 bilhões R$ 30,8 bilhões no saldo nas emissões de títulos competitivos dessa dívida, respectivamente. redução da dívida líquida do setor público alcançou 8,4% do PIB, tendo as privatizações estaduais contribuído com 3,6% do PIB. Adicionalmente, as necessidades de financiamento do setor público foram reduzidas em 5,4% do PIB. Esses são alguns resultados obtidos, por meio de metodologia de cálculo descrita no trabalho utilizando-se dados efetivamente observados, com os valores em moeda corrente preços de dezembro de 1999. Acrescenta-se esses resultados melhoria do desempenho das estatais remanescentes de alguns indicadores fiscais, com impactos positivos sobre dívida e déficit públicos. análise dos resultados indica que contribuição da privatização para redução da dívida do setor público esforço de ajuste fiscal pode ser significativa, mesmo no curto prazo. utilização de receitas de privatização para abater diversas dívidas governamentais as dívidas transferidas para setor privado reduziram carga de juros incidentes sobre dívida, seu estoque déficit público no período sob análise. privatização possibilitou, ainda, melhoria do perfil da dívida reestruturação de passivos do setor público.

Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties

In infinite horizon financial markets economies, competitive equilibria fail to exist if one does not impose restrictions on agents' trades that rule out Ponzi schemes. When there is limited commitment and collateral repossession is the unique default punishment, Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) proved that Ponzi schemes are ruled out without imposing any exogenous/endogenous debt constraints on agents' trades. Recently Páscoa and Seghir (2009) have shown that this positive result is not robust to the presence of additional default punishments. They provide several examples showing that, in the absence of debt constraints, harsh default penalties may induce agents to run Ponzi schemes that jeopardize equilibrium existence. The objective of this paper is to close a theoretical gap in the literature by identifying endogenous borrowing constraints that rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure existence of equilibria in a model with limited commitment and (possible) default. We appropriately modify the definition of finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996) (see also Levine and Zame (2002)), to encompass models with limited commitment, default penalties and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002), Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and Páscoa and Seghir (2009) the concept of actions with finite equivalent payoffs. We show that, independently of the level of default penalties, restricting plans to have finite equivalent payoffs rules out Ponzi schemes and guarantees the existence of an equilibrium that is compatible with the minimal ability to borrow and lend that we expect in our model. An interesting feature of our debt constraints is that they give rise to budget sets that coincide with the standard budget sets of economies having a collateral structure but no penalties (as defined in Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002)). This illustrates the hidden relation between finitely effective debt constraints and collateral requirements.

O que é isso companheiro?: um estudo sobre o gerenciamento da informação contábil nos municípios brasileiros

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo identificar se a imposição de limites de despesa e receita de operações de crédito, a partir da vigência da Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal e da Lei da Transparência, teve influência na prática do Gerenciamento da Informação Contábil (GIC) por parte dos municípios brasileiros. Considera-se como incentivo suficiente a pratica do GIC a punibilidade decorrente do descumprimento dessas normas. Para identificar tais práticas, utilizou-se o teste t modificado para analisar a distribuição de frequência relativa da diferença entre o valor do parâmetro econômico estudado e o valor efetivamente divulgado pelos municípios. O banco de dados contempla os dados contábeis do exercício de 2010 de 5212 municípios e possibilitou a análise de seis parâmetros: despesa mínima com manutenção de desenvolvimento do ensino, despesa mínima com ações e serviços públicos de saúde, despesa máxima de pessoal consolidado, despesa máxima com o poder legislativo municipal, receita máxima de operações de crédito em relação á receita corrente líquida, e receita máxima de operações de crédito em relação às despesas de capital. Os resultados obtidos apresentaram indícios de gerenciamento da informação contábil para três dos seis parâmetros estudados: despesa mínima com educação, despesa total com poder legislativo e despesa de pessoal consolidado. Como principais implicações, nota-se o impacto do GIC na confiabilidade das informações divulgadas pelo setor público brasileiro, tendo em vista a crescente valorização da transparência, trazida pelas inovações legais recentes, tais como a Lei de acesso à informação.

General equilibrium model with restricted participation in financial markets

The paper analyses a general equilibrium model with financiaI markets in which households may face restrictions in trading financiaI assets such as borrowing constraints and collateral (restricted participation model). However, markets are not assumed to be incomplete. We consider a standard general equilibrium model with H > 1 households, 2 periods and S states of nature in the second period. We show that generically the set of equilibrium allocations ia indeterminate, provided the existence of at least one nominal asset and one household for who some restriction is binding. Suppose there are C > 1 commodities in each state of nature and assets pays in units of some commodity. In this case for each household with binding restrictions it is possible to reduce the set of feasible assets trading and obtain a new equilibrium that utility improve alI those households. There is however an upper bound on the number of households to be improved related to the number of states of nature and the number of commodities. In particular, if the number of households ia smaller than the number of states of nature it is possible to Pareto improve any equilibrium by reducing the feasible choice set for each household.

Inglorious revolution : sovereign debt, tropical credibility, and financial underdevelopment in imperial Brazil

In 1824 the creation of institutions that constrained the monarch’s ability to unilaterally tax, spend, and debase the currency put Brazil on a path toward a revolution in public finance, roughly analogous to the financial consequences of England’s Glorious Revolution. This credible commitment to honor sovereign debt resulted in successful long-term funded borrowing at home and abroad from the 1820s through the 1880s that was unrivalled in Latin America. Some domestic bonds, denominated in the home currency and bearing exchange clauses, eventually circulated in European financial markets. The share of total debt accounted for by long-term funded issues grew, and domestic debt came to dominate foreign debt. Sovereign debt yields fell over time in London and Rio de Janeiro, and the cost of new borrowing declined on average. The market’s assessment of the probability of default tended to decrease. Imperial Brazil enjoyed favorable conditions for borrowing, and escaped the strong form of “original sin” stressed by recent work on sovereign debt. The development of vibrant private financial markets did not, however, follow from the enhanced credibility of government debt. Private finance in Imperial Brazil suffered from politicized market interventions that undermined the development of domestic capital markets. Private interest rates remained high, entry into commercial banking was heavily restricted, and limited-liability joint-stock companies were tightly controlled. The Brazilian case provides a powerful counterexample to the general proposition of North and Weingast that institutional changes that credibly commit the government to honor its obligations necessarily promote the development of private finance. The very institutions that enhanced the credibility of sovereign debt permitted the systematic repression of private financial development. In terms of its consequences for domestic capital markets, the liberal Constitution of 1824 represented an “inglorious” revolution.

Debt and default in a growth model

This paper presents a small open economy model with capital accumulation and without commitment to repay debt. The optimal debt contract specifies debt relief following bad shocks and debt increase following good shocks and brings first order benefits if the country's borrowing constraint is binding. Countries with less capital (with higher marginal productivity of capital) have a higher debt-GDP ratio, are more likely to default on uncontingent bonds, require higher debt relief after bad shocks and pay a higher spread over treasury. Debt relief prescribed by the optimal contract following the interest rate hikes of 1980-81 is more than half of the debt forgiveness obtained by the main Latin American countries through the Brady agreements.

Wealth composition, endogenous fertility and the dynamics of income inequality

This paper analyzes how differences in the composition of wealth between human and physical capital among families affect fertility choices. These in tum influence the dynamics of wealth and income inequality across generations through a tradeoffbetween quantity and quality of children. Wealth composition affects fertility because physical capital has only a wealth effect on number of children, whereas human capital increases the time cost of child-rearing in addition to the wealth effect. I construct a model combining endogenous fertility with borrowing constraints in human capital investments, in which weaIth composition is determined endogenously. The model is calibrated to the PNAD, a Brazilian household survey, and the main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, the model implies that the crosssection relationship between fertility and wealth typically displays a U-shaped pattem, reflecting differences in wealth composition between poor and rich families. Also, the quantity-quality tradeoff implies a concave cross-section relationship between investments per child and wealth. Second, as the economy develops and families overcome their bOlTowing constraints, the negative effect of weaIth on fertility becomes smaller, and persistence of inequality declines accordingly. The empirical evidence presented in this paper is consistent with both implications .

Fiscal adjustment, conditionality and politics in IMF programs

A common feature in programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is the use of conditionalities, macroeconomic and structural measures that a requesting country should adopt to obtain an assistance package. The objective of this work is to conduct an empirical analysis of the economic and political determinants of such conditionalities. In particular, our main contribution consists in the development of a new measure of conditionality, fiscal adjustment, and its comparison with the most used in the literature, the number of conditions. We choose fiscal adjustment because it is an adequate proxy for program austerity, since its implementation carries economic and political costs. In the empirical exercise, we use data from 184 programs in the period of 1999 and 2012, and estimate how our two measures of conditionalities respond to the economic and political factors. Our results suggest that they are quite different. The main determinant of the number of conditions is the political proximity of the borrowing country to the Fund’s major shareholders, the members of G5. On the other hand, the main determinant of fiscal adjustment is the size of the government fiscal deficit. Finally, we did not find correlation between the size of fiscal adjustment and the number of conditions. These results suggest that the analysis of the content of IMF programs should take into account the different measures of agreed conditionality.

The determinants of IMF fiscal conditionalities: economics or politics?

Conditionalites, measures that a borrowing country should adopt to obtain loans from the IMF, are pervasive in IMF programs. This paper estimates the effects of political and economic factors on the number of conditionalities and on the fiscal adjustment requested by the IMF. As found in the literature, political proximity of the borrowing country to the Fund’s major shareholders has an important effect on the number of conditions in an agreement. However, the fiscal adjusment requested by the IMF is strongly affected by the size of a country’s fiscal deficit but not by political proximity. We also find a very small correlation between the number of conditions and the fiscal adjustment requested by the IMF