Catalogue of a most interesting collection of manuscripts and books, of the poet Gray : the whole in beautiful condition : also of various editions of his works; a posthumous bust; a painting, "View of Gray's tomb and churchyard", by Baron; five original drawings by Westall, R. A.; &c. &c. which will be sold by auction, by Messrs. S. Leigh Sotheby & John Wilkinson ... at their house ... on Thursday, August 28th, 1851.

Library copy includes pen notations of prices realized.

Book-prices current : a record of prices at which books have been sold at auction.

Report year irregular.

Book sales of ... : a record of the most important books sold at auction and the prices realized.

Mode of access: Internet.

Book sales of 1895[-97/98] A record of the most important books sold at auction and the prices realized,

No more published.

The unequalled collection of engraved portraits of Napoleon Bonaparte and his family and marshals, belonging to Hon. James T. Mitchell ... embracing the most important collection of portraits in mezzotinto, aquatint, line, and stipple; including many printed in colors, as well as choice proofs, also the extraordinary collection of caricatures on Napoleon by Cruikshank, Gillray, Rowlandson, and others. To be sold ... December 18 ... and ... December 19, 1908 ... Catalogue compiled and sale conducted by Stan V. Henkels. At the book auction rooms of Samuel T. Freeman & co. ...

Red cancel drawn through the portraits.

Catalogue ... of the renowned library formerly at Britwell Court, Burnham, Bucks, the property of S.R. Christie-Miller ... Which will be sold by auction by Messrs. Sotheby and Co ... 1916-1917.

[14] Apr. 7, 1924. Miscellaneous literature. 652 lots.--[15] March 23, 1925. Early English poetry and other literature. 692 lots.--[16] March 30, 1925. Early English Works on the arts and sciences. 797 lots.--[17] March 15, 1926. Early English poetry and other literature. 707 lots.--[18] March 22, 1926. Early English law and history. 570 lots.--[19] March 28, 1927. Final portion. 2151 lots.--[20] July 11, 1927. Books unsold or returned as imperfect. 183 lots.--[21] July 25, 1927. Books omitted from the sales of the Britwell Court Library. The property of S.R. Christie-Miller. 31 lots. (In Sotheby, firm, auctioneers, London. Catalogue of valuable printed books, illuminated and other manuscripts ... which will be sold ... Monday, 25th of July and two following days ... London [1927] p. 70-75, lots 456-486)

A catalogue of the highly valuable collection of prints, the property of the late Sir Mark Masterman Sykes ... which ... will be sold by auction by Mr. Sotheby ... March-[December] 1824.

Priced.

Essays on Procurement, Scoring Auction, and Quality Manipulation Corruption

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Nonparametric Identication and Structural Estimation of Auction Models

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Composite auction method for suppressing unreasonable electricity price spikes in a competitive electricity market

The existence of undesirable electricity price spikes in a competitive electricity market requires an efficient auction mechanism. However, many of the existing auction mechanism have difficulties in suppressing such unreasonable price spikes effectively. A new auction mechanism is proposed to suppress effectively unreasonable price spikes in a competitive electricity market. It optimally combines system marginal price auction and pay as bid auction mechanisms. A threshold value is determined to activate the switching between the marginal price auction and the proposed composite auction. Basically when the system marginal price is higher than the threshold value, the composite auction for high price electricity market is activated. The winning electricity sellers will sell their electricity at the system marginal price or their own bid prices, depending on their rights of being paid at the system marginal price and their offers' impact on suppressing undesirable price spikes. Such economic stimuli discourage sellers from practising economic and physical withholdings. Multiple price caps are proposed to regulate strong market power. We also compare other auction mechanisms to highlight the characteristics of the proposed one. Numerical simulation using the proposed auction mechanism is given to illustrate the procedure of this new auction mechanism.

Agent-orientated auction mechanism and strategy design

Agent-based technology is playing an increasingly important role in today’s economy. Usually a multi-agent system is needed to model an economic system such as a market system, in which heterogeneous trading agents interact with each other autonomously. Two questions often need to be answered regarding such systems: 1) How to design an interacting mechanism that facilitates efficient resource allocation among usually self-interested trading agents? 2) How to design an effective strategy in some specific market mechanisms for an agent to maximise its economic returns? For automated market systems, auction is the most popular mechanism to solve resource allocation problems among their participants. However, auction comes in hundreds of different formats, in which some are better than others in terms of not only the allocative efficiency but also other properties e.g., whether it generates high revenue for the auctioneer, whether it induces stable behaviour of the bidders. In addition, different strategies result in very different performance under the same auction rules. With this background, we are inevitably intrigued to investigate auction mechanism and strategy designs for agent-based economics. The international Trading Agent Competition (TAC) Ad Auction (AA) competition provides a very useful platform to develop and test agent strategies in Generalised Second Price auction (GSP). AstonTAC, the runner-up of TAC AA 2009, is a successful advertiser agent designed for GSP-based keyword auction. In particular, AstonTAC generates adaptive bid prices according to the Market-based Value Per Click and selects a set of keyword queries with highest expected profit to bid on to maximise its expected profit under the limit of conversion capacity. Through evaluation experiments, we show that AstonTAC performs well and stably not only in the competition but also across a broad range of environments. The TAC CAT tournament provides an environment for investigating the optimal design of mechanisms for double auction markets. AstonCAT-Plus is the post-tournament version of the specialist developed for CAT 2010. In our experiments, AstonCAT-Plus not only outperforms most specialist agents designed by other institutions but also achieves high allocative efficiencies, transaction success rates and average trader profits. Moreover, we reveal some insights of the CAT: 1) successful markets should maintain a stable and high market share of intra-marginal traders; 2) a specialist’s performance is dependent on the distribution of trading strategies. However, typical double auction models assume trading agents have a fixed trading direction of either buy or sell. With this limitation they cannot directly reflect the fact that traders in financial markets (the most popular application of double auction) decide their trading directions dynamically. To address this issue, we introduce the Bi-directional Double Auction (BDA) market which is populated by two-way traders. Experiments are conducted under both dynamic and static settings of the continuous BDA market. We find that the allocative efficiency of a continuous BDA market mainly comes from rational selection of trading directions. Furthermore, we introduce a high-performance Kernel trading strategy in the BDA market which uses kernel probability density estimator built on historical transaction data to decide optimal order prices. Kernel trading strategy outperforms some popular intelligent double auction trading strategies including ZIP, GD and RE in the continuous BDA market by making the highest profit in static games and obtaining the best wealth in dynamic games.

Designing a successful adaptive agent for TAC Ad auction

This paper describes the design and evaluation of Aston-TAC, the runner-up in the Ad Auction Game of 2009 International Trading Agent Competition. In particular, we focus on how Aston-TAC generates adaptive bid prices according to the Market-based Value Per Click and how it selects a set of keyword queries to bid on to maximise the expected profit under limited conversion capacity. Through evaluation experiments, we show that AstonTAC performs well and stably not only in the competition but also across a broad range of environments. © 2010 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Spectrum redistribution for cognitive radios using discriminatory spectrum double auction

With the reformation of spectrum policy and the development of cognitive radio, secondary users will be allowed to access spectrums licensed to primary users. Spectrum auctions can facilitate this secondary spectrum access in a market-driven way. To design an efficient auction framework, we first study the supply and demand pressures and the competitive equilibrium of the secondary spectrum market, considering the spectrum reusability. In well-designed auctions, competition among participants should lead to the competitive equilibrium according to the traditional economic point of view. Then, a discriminatory price spectrum double auction framework is proposed for this market. In this framework, rational participants compete with each other by using bidding prices, and their profits are guaranteed to be non-negative. A near-optimal heuristic algorithm is also proposed to solve the auction clearing problem of the proposed framework efficiently. Experimental results verify the efficiency of the proposed auction clearing algorithm and demonstrate that competition among secondary users and primary users can lead to the competitive equilibrium during auction iterations using the proposed auction framework. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Congestion pricing by priority auction

This paper analyzes a communication network facing users with a continuous distribution of delay cost per unit time. Priority queueing is often used as a way to provide differential services for users with different delay sensitivities. Delay is a key dimension of network service quality, so priority is a valuable resource which is limited and should to be optimally allocated. We investigate the allocation of priority in queues via a simple bidding mechanism. In our mechanism, arriving users can decide not to enter the network at all or submit an announced delay sensitive value. User entering the network obtains priority over all users who make lower bids, and is charged by a payment function which is designed following an exclusion compensation principle. The payment function is proved to be incentive compatible, so the equilibrium bidding behavior leads to the implementation of "cµ-rule". Social warfare or revenue maximizing by appropriately setting the reserve payment is also analyzed.