Bibliothèque universelle des dames. Physique de l'homme . Tome premier

Collection : Bibliothèque universelle des dames

Optimum power allocation for parallel Gaussian channels with arbitrary input distributions

The mutual information of independent parallel Gaussian-noise channels is maximized, under an average power constraint, by independent Gaussian inputs whose power is allocated according to the waterfilling policy. In practice, discrete signalling constellations with limited peak-to-average ratios (m-PSK, m-QAM, etc) are used in lieu of the ideal Gaussian signals. This paper gives the power allocation policy that maximizes the mutual information over parallel channels with arbitrary input distributions. Such policy admits a graphical interpretation, referred to as mercury/waterfilling, which generalizes the waterfilling solution and allows retaining some of its intuition. The relationship between mutual information of Gaussian channels and nonlinear minimum mean-square error proves key to solving the power allocation problem.

Optimum power allocation for multiuser OFDM with arbitrary signal constellations

This paper formulates power allocation policies that maximize the region of mutual informationsachievable in multiuser downlink OFDM channels. Arbitrary partitioning ofthe available tones among users and arbitrary modulation formats, possibly different forevery user, are considered. Two distinct policies are derived, respectively for slow fadingchannels tracked instantaneously by the transmitter and for fast fading channels knownonly statistically thereby. With instantaneous channel tracking, the solution adopts theform of a multiuser mercury/waterfilling procedure that generalizes the single-user mercury/waterfilling introduced in [1, 2]. With only statistical channel information, in contrast,the mercury/waterfilling interpretation is lost. For both policies, a number of limitingregimes are explored and illustrative examples are provided.

Parental investments in children: how bargaining and educational homogamy affect time allocation

This study examines parental time investment in their children, distinguishing between developmental and non-developmental care. Our analyses centre on three influential determinants: educational background, marital homogamy, and spouses' relative bargaining power. We find that the emphasis on quality care time is correlated with parents' education, and that marital homogamy reduces couple specialization, but only among the highly educated. In line with earlier research, we identify gendered parental behaviour. The presence of boys is an important condition for fathers' time dedication, but primarly among lower educated fathers. To the extent that parental stimulation is decisive for child outcomes, our findings suggest the persistence of important inequalities. This emerges through our special attention to behavioural differences across the educational distribution among households.

On Certain Greedoid Polyhedra, Partially Indexable Scheduling Problems, and Extended Restless Bandit Allocation Indices

We present a polyhedral framework for establishing general structural properties on optimal solutions of stochastic scheduling problems, where multiple job classes vie for service resources: the existence of an optimal priority policy in a given family, characterized by a greedoid (whose feasible class subsets may receive higher priority), where optimal priorities are determined by class-ranking indices, under restricted linear performance objectives (partial indexability). This framework extends that of Bertsimas and Niño-Mora (1996), which explained the optimality of priority-index policies under all linear objectives (general indexability). We show that, if performance measures satisfy partial conservation laws (with respect to the greedoid), which extend previous generalized conservation laws, then the problem admits a strong LP relaxation over a so-called extended greedoid polytope, which has strong structural and algorithmic properties. We present an adaptive-greedy algorithm (which extends Klimov's) taking as input the linear objective coefficients, which (1) determines whether the optimal LP solution is achievable by a policy in the given family; and (2) if so, computes a set of class-ranking indices that characterize optimal priority policies in the family. In the special case of project scheduling, we show that, under additional conditions, the optimal indices can be computed separately for each project (index decomposition). We further apply the framework to the important restless bandit model (two-action Markov decision chains), obtaining new index policies, that extend Whittle's (1988), and simple sufficient conditions for their validity. These results highlight the power of polyhedral methods (the so-called achievable region approach) in dynamic and stochastic optimization.

Money, Fame and the Allocation of Talent: Brain Drain, the Matthew Effect and the Institution of Science

The earning structure in science is known to be flat relative to the one in the private sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In this paper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role of the institution of science in the allocation of talent between the science sector and the private sector. Following works on the Sociology of Science, we model the institution of science as a mechanism distributing fame (i.e. peer recognition). We show that since the intrinsic performance is less noisy signal of talent in the science sector than in the private sector, a good institution of science can mitigate the brain drain. We also find that providing extra monetary incentives through the market might undermine the incentives provided by the institution and thereby worsen the brain drain. Finally, we study the optimal balance between monetary and non-monetary incentives in science.

Financial Repression in a Natural Experiment: Loan Allocation and the Change in the Usury Laws in 1714

If financial deepening aids economic growth, then financial repression should be harmful. We use a natural experiment – the change in the English usury laws in 1714 – to analyze the effects of interest rate restrictions. We use a sample of individual loan transactions to demonstrate how the reduction of the legal maximum rate of interest affected the supply and demand for credit. Average loan size and minimum loan size increased strongly, and access to credit worsened for those with little ‘social capital.’ While we have no direct evidence that loans were misallocated, the discontinuity in loan receipts makes this highly likely. We conclude that financial repression can undermine the positive effects of financial deepening.