Climate Change, Neutrality and the Harm Principle

This paper aims at evaluating the compatibility of coercive climate policies with liberal neutrality. More precisely, it focuses on the doctrine of state neutrality as associated with the "harm principle". It argues that given the difficulty of attributing causal responsibilities for climate harms to individuals, the harm principle doesn't work in this case, at least if one endorses a liberal atomistic ontology. Furthermore, the definition of what constitutes climate harms implies making moral assumptions, which makes it impossible to justify climate policies in a neutral way. Finally, the paper shows another consequence of applying neutrality to the case of climate change, that is the risk of a shift from political forms of decision-making to technocracy. Focusing too much on liberty of choice may (paradoxically) be to the detriment of political freedom. The paper concludes that climate change is an intrinsically moral issue and that it should be the occasion of a political debate about our current values and lifestyles. It should not be reduced to a mere question of carbon metric.

A narrative journey of teacher reflexivity and authenticity in technological environments /

This qualitative narrative inquiry was driven by my desire to further explore my personal discovery that my utilization of educational technologies in teaching and learning environments seemed to heighten a sense of creativity, which in turn increased reflective practice and authenticity in my teaching. A narrative inquiry approach was used as it offered the opportunity to uncover the deeper meanings of authenticity and reflection as participants' personal experiences were coconstructed and reconstructed in relationship with me and in relationship to a social milieu. To gain further insight into this potential phenomenon, I engaged in 2 conversational interviews with 2 other teachers from an Ontario College in a large urban centre who have utilized educational technologies in their teaching and learning communities and I maintained a research journal, constructed during the interview process, to record my own emerging narrative accounts, reflections, insights and further questions. The field texts consisted of transcriptions of the interviews and my reflective journal. Research texts were developed as field texts were listened to multiple times and texts were examined for meanings and themes. The educational technologies that both women focused on in the interview were digital video of children as they play, learn and develop and the use of an audible teacher voice in online courses. The invitation given to students to explore and discover meaning in videos of children as they watched them with the teacher seemed to be a catalyst for authenticity and a sense of synergy in the classroom. The power of the audible teacher voice came through as an essential component in online learning environments to offer students a sense of humanness and connection with the teacher. Relationships in both online and face to face classrooms emerged as a necessary and central component to all teaching and learning communities. The theme of paradox also emerged as participants recognized that educational technologies can be used in ways that enhance creativity, authenticity, reflection and relationships or in ways that hinder these qualities in the teaching and learning community. Knowledge of the common experiences of college educators who utilize educational technologies, specifically digital video of children to educate early childhood educators, might give meaning and insight to inform the practice of other teachers who seek authentic, reflexive practice in the classroom and in on line environments.

The role of investment specific technological shocks in explaining macroeconomics fluctuations.

Rapport de recherche

Question period of the Liberal Neutrality Conference (May 1-3, 2008)

This is the audio recording of all discussion sessions of the International Conference on the Re-evaluation of Liberal Neutrality organized by CRÉUM, Montreal May 1-3 2008. (The conference announcement is at http://www.creum.umontreal.ca/spip.php?article765) // Ceci est l'enregistrement audio des périodes de discussion du colloque organisé par le CRÉUM (Montréal, 1-3 mai 2008) et portant sur une ré-évaluation de la neutralité libérale. (L'annonce du colloque est à l'adresse http://www.creum.umontreal.ca/spip.php?article765)

Neutrality and the social contract

Given the fact of moral disagreement, theories of state neutrality which rely on moral premises will have limited application, in that they will fail to motivate anyone who rejects the moral premises on which they are based. By contrast, contractarian theories can be consistent with moral scepticism, and can therefore avoid this limitation. In this paper, I construct a contractarian model which I claim is sceptically consistent and includes a principle of state neutrality as a necessary condition. The principle of neutrality which I derive incorporates two conceptions of neutrality (consequential neutrality and justificatory neutrality) which have usually been thought of as distinct and incompatible. I argue that contractarianism gives us a unified account of these conceptions. Ultimately, the conclusion that neutrality can be derived without violating the constraint established by moral scepticism turns out to rely on an assumption of equal precontractual bargaining power. I do not attempt to defend this assumption here. If the assumption cannot be defended in a sceptically consistent fashion, then the argument for neutrality given here is claimed to be morally minimal, rather than fully consistent with moral scepticism.

Liberal Neutrality : Constructivist, not foundationalist

In defending the principle of neutrality, liberals have often appealed to a more general moral principle that forbids coercing persons in the name of reasons those persons themselves cannot reasonably be expected to share. Yet liberals have struggled to articulate a non-arbitrary, non-dogmatic distinction between the reasons that persons can reasonably be expected to share and those they cannot. The reason for this, I argue, is that what it means to “share a reason” is itself obscure. In this paper I articulate two different conceptions of what it is to share a reason; I call these conceptions “foundationalist” and “constructivist.” On the foundationalist view, two people “share” a reason just in the sense that the same reason applies to each of them independently. On this view, I argue, debates about the reasons we share collapse into debates about the reasons we have, moving us no closer to an adequate defense of neutrality. On the constructivist view, by contrast, “sharing reasons” is understood as a kind of activity, and the reasons we must share are just those reasons that make this activity possible. I argue that the constructivist conception of sharing reasons yields a better defense of the principle of neutrality.

Neutrality as a Twofold Concept

Under the circumstances of pluralism people often claim that the state ought to be neutral towards its citizens’ conceptions of the good life. However, what it means for the state to be neutral is often unclear. This is partly because there are different conceptions of neutrality and partly because what neutrality entails depends largely on the context in which neutrality is demanded. This paper discusses three different conceptions of neutrality – neutrality of impact, neutrality as equality of opportunity and justificatory neutrality – and analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the different conceptions in different contexts. It suggests that there are two common elements of neutrality in all its exemplifications: a) an element of “hands-off” and b) an element of equal treatment. It therefore argues that while justificatory neutrality is necessary for the state to be neutral it is not sufficient and claims that while conceptions of the good must not enter thejustificationof state regulations, they must be taken into consideration when deliberating theimplementation of these regulations.

An Epistemic Argument in Support of Liberal Neutrality

My aim in the present paper is to develop a new kind of argument in support of the ideal of liberal neutrality. This argument combines some basic moral principles with a thesis about the relationship between the correct standards of justification for a belief/action and certain contextual factors. The idea is that the level of importance of what is at stake in a specific context of action determines how demanding the correct standards to justify an action based on a specific set of beliefs ought to be. In certain exceptional contexts –where the seriousness of harm in case of mistake and the level of an agent’s responsibility for the outcome of his action are specially high– a very small probability of making a mistake should be recognized as a good reason to avoid to act based on beliefs that we nonetheless affirm with a high degree of confidence and that actually justify our action in other contexts. The further steps of the argument consist in probing 1) that the fundamental state’s policies are such a case of exceptional context, 2) that perfectionist policies are the type of actions we should avoid, and 3) that policies that satisfy neutral standards of justification are not affected by the reasons which lead to reject perfectionist policies.

Are Cities Illiberal? Municipal Jurisdictions and the Scope of Liberal Neutrality

One of the main characteristics of today’s democratic societies is their pluralism. As a result, liberal political philosophers often claim that the state should remain neutral with respect to different conceptions of the good. Legal and social policies should be acceptable to everyone regardless of their culture, their religion or their comprehensive moral views. One might think that this commitment to neutrality should be especially pronounced in urban centres, with their culturally diverse populations. However, there are a large number of laws and policies adopted at the municipal level that contradict the liberal principle of neutrality. In this paper, I want to suggest that these perfectionistlaws and policies are legitimate at the urban level. Specifically, I will argue that the principle of neutrality applies only indirectly to social institutions within the broader framework of the nation-state. This is clear in the case of voluntary associations, but to a certain extent this rationale applies also to cities. In a liberal regime, private associations are allowed to hold and defend perfectionist views, focused on a particular conception of the good life. One problem is to determine the limits of this perfectionism at the urban level, since cities, unlike private associations, are publicinstitutions. My aim here is therefore to give a liberal justification to a limited form of perfectionism of municipal laws and policies.

Beyond Equality of What: Sen and Neutrality

Based on a close reading of the debate between Rawls and Sen on primary goods versus capabilities, I argue that liberal theory cannot adequately respond to Sen’s critique within a conventionally neutralist framework. In support of the capability approach, I explain why and how it defends a more robust conception of opportunity and freedom, along with public debate on substantive questions about well-being and the good life. My aims are: (i) to show that Sen’s capability approach is at odds with Rawls’s political liberal version of neutrality; (ii) to carve out a third space in the neutrality debate; and (iii) to begin to develop, from Sen’s approach, the idea of public value liberalism as a position that falls within that third space.