Managing wetlands sustainably as ecosystems : The contribution of the law (part 1)

The ways in which a society set standards of behaviour and of conduct for its members vary hugely. For example, accepted practices, recognised customs, spiritually or morally inspired norms, judicially declared rules, executively formulated edicts, formal legislative enactments or constitutionally embedded rights and duties. Whatever form they assume, these standards are the artificial construction of the human mind. Accordingly the law - whatever its form - can do no more and no less than regulate or set standards for human behaviour, human conduct, and human decision-making. The law cannot regulate the environment. It can only regulate human activities that impact directly or indirectly upon the environment. This applies as much to wetlands as components of the environment as it does to any other components of the environment or the environment at large. The capacity of the law to protect the environment and therefore wetlands is thus totally dependent upon the capacity of the law to regulate human behaviour, human conduct and human decision-making. At the same time the law needs to reflect the specific nature, functions and locations of wetlands. A wetland is an ecosystem by itself; it comprises a range of ecosystems within it; and it is part of a wider set of ecosystems. Hence, the significant ecological functions performed by wetlands. Then there are the benefits flowing to humans from wetlands. These may be social, economic, cultural, aesthetic, or a combination of some or of all of these. It is a challenge for a society acting through its legal system to find the appropriate balance between these ecological and these human values. But that is what sustainability requires.The ways in which a society set standards of behaviour and of conduct for its members vary hugely. For example, accepted practices, recognised customs, spiritually or morally inspired norms, judicially declared rules, executively formulated edicts, formal legislative enactments or constitutionally embedded rights and duties. Whatever form they assume, these standards are the artificial construction of the human mind. Accordingly the law - whatever its form - can do no more and no less than regulate or set standards for human behaviour, human conduct, and human decision-making. The law cannot regulate the environment. It can only regulate human activities that impact directly or indirectly upon the environment. This applies as much to wetlands as components of the environment as it does to any other components of the environment or the environment at large. The capacity of the law to protect the environment and therefore wetlands is thus totally dependent upon the capacity of the law to regulate human behaviour, human conduct and human decision-making. At the same time the law needs to reflect the specific nature, functions and locations of wetlands. A wetland is an ecosystem by itself; it comprises a range of ecosystems within it; and it is part of a wider set of ecosystems. Hence, the significant ecological functions performed by wetlands. Then there are the benefits flowing to humans from wetlands. These may be social, economic, cultural, aesthetic, or a combination of some or of all of these. It is a challenge for a society acting through its legal system to find the appropriate balance between these ecological and these human values. But that is what sustainability requires.

Developing ethical identities in young offenders through restorative justice practice in Australia

Restorative justice is firmly established in Australian juvenile justice. While the official language used to describe restorative initiatives varies across states and territories, the most common form is a meeting or conference between young offenders and their victims (most commonly known as a family group or youth justice conference). During the past decade, an impressive amount of empirical research has examined how the restorative justice process affects offenders, victims and other participants (such as supporters for young offenders and victims). Results from this line of research are remarkably consistent and show that participants generally regard restorative conferences as procedurally fair and that they are satisfied with the outcomes (eg what young offenders agree to do to make up for their offending behaviour, such as offer a sincere apology or perform work for the victim or the community). What is less common, however, is the perception among participants that restorative conferences achieve the key aim of restoration.By ‘restoration’ we refer to encounters where ‘offenders apologise, their apologies are accepted, victims offer forgiveness,and conferences conclude with a feeling of mutual good will’.

Managing Wetlands Sustainably as Ecosystems: The Contribution of the Law (Part 2)

In this Part 2 attention is turned towards the legal arrangements in nation states for managing wetlands. These national arrangements have effect within the international arrangements already mentioned and any regional arrangements that are relevant. However, each national system is a reflection of its own historical, cultural, political and constitutional background. It is the purpose of this Part 2 to review and assess the national approaches to wetlands management. This involves an analysis of a range of instruments. These are: constitutional rules; strategic rules; regulatory rules; and management rules. Each of these sets of rules performs different functions, assumes different forms and is differentially capable of enforcement.

Court-provided trial technology : efficiency and fairness for criminal trials

In Australia, trials conducted as 'electronic trials' have ordinarily run with the assistance of commercial service providers, with the associated costs being borne by the parties. However, an innovative approach has been taken by the courts in Queensland. In October 2007 Queensland became the first Australian jurisdiction to develop its own court-provided technology, to facilitate the conduct of an electronic trial. This technology was first used in the conduct of civil trials. The use of the technology in the civil sphere highlighted its benefits and, more significantly, demonstrated the potential to achieve much greater efficiencies. The Queensland courts have now gone further, using the court-provided technology in the high proffle criminal trial of R v Hargraves, Hargraves and Stoten, in which the three accused were tried for conspiracy to defraud the Commonwealth of Australia of about $3.7 million in tax. This paper explains the technology employed in this case and reports on the perspectives of all of the participants in the process. The representatives for all parties involved in this trial acknowledged, without reservation, that the use of the technology at trial produced considerable overall efficiencies and costs savings. The experience in this trial also demonstrates that the benefits of trial technology for the criminal justice process are greater than those for civil litigation. It shows that, when skilfully employed, trial technology presents opportunities to enhance the fairness of trials for accused persons. The paper urges governments, courts and the judiciary in all jurisdictions to continue their efforts to promote change, and to introduce mechanisms to facilitate more broadly a shift from the entrenched paper-based approach to both criminal and civil procedure to one which embraces more broadly the enormous benefits trial technology has to offer.