A note on the multiple partners assignment game

In the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik [Shapley, L.S., Shubik, M., 1972. The assignment game. I. The core, International journal of Game Theory 1, 11-130] agents are allowed to form one partnership at most. That paper proves that, in the context of firms and workers, given two stable payoffs for the firms there is a stable payoff which gives each firm the larger of the two amounts and also one which gives each of them the smaller amount. Analogous result applies to the workers. Sotomayor [Sotomayor, M., 1992. The multiple partners game. In: Majumdar, M. (Ed.), Dynamics and Equilibrium: Essays in Honor to D. Gale. Mcmillian, pp. 322-336] extends this analysis to the case where both types of agents may form more than one partnership and an agent`s payoff is multi-dimensional. Instead, this note concentrates in the total payoff of the agents. It is then proved the rather unexpected result that again the maximum of any pair of stable payoffs for the firms is stable but the minimum need not be, even if we restrict the multiplicity of partnerships to one of the sides. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games

Stability of matchings was proved to be a new cooperative equilibrium concept in Sotomayor (Dynamics and equilibrium: essays in honor to D. Gale, 1992). That paper introduces the innovation of treating as multi-dimensional the payoff of a player with a quota greater than one. This is done for the many-to-many matching model with additively separable utilities, for which the stability concept is defined. It is then proved, via linear programming, that the set of stable outcomes is nonempty and it may be strictly bigger than the set of dual solutions and strictly smaller than the core. The present paper defines a general concept of stability and shows that this concept is a natural solution concept, stronger than the core concept, for a much more general coalitional game than a matching game. Instead of mutual agreements inside partnerships, the players are allowed to make collective agreements inside coalitions of any size and to distribute his labor among them. A collective agreement determines the level of labor at which the coalition operates and the division, among its members, of the income generated by the coalition. An allocation specifies a set of collective agreements for each player.

The pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences

In a decentralized setting the game-theoretical predictions are that only strong blockings are allowed to rupture the structure of a matching. This paper argues that, under indifferences, also weak blockings should be considered when these blockings come from the grand coalition. This solution concept requires stability plus Pareto optimality. A characterization of the set of Pareto-stable matchings for the roommate and the marriage models is provided in terms of individually rational matchings whose blocking pairs, if any, are formed with unmatched agents. These matchings always exist and give an economic intuition on how blocking can be done by non-trading agents, so that the transactions need not be undone as agents reach the set of stable matchings. Some properties of the Pareto-stable matchings shared by the Marriage and Roommate models are obtained.

Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game

Starting with an initial price vector, prices are adjusted in order to eliminate the excess demand and at the same time to keep the transfers to the sellers as low as possible. In each step of the auction, to which set of sellers should those transfers be made is the key issue in the description of the algorithm. We assume additively separable utilities and introduce a novel distinction by considering multiple sellers owing multiple identical objects and multiple buyers with an exogenously defined quota, consuming more than one object but at most one unit of a seller`s good and having multi-dimensional payoffs. This distinction induces a necessarily more complicated construction of the over-demanded sets than the constructions of these sets for the other assignment games. For this approach, our mechanism yields the buyer-optimal competitive equilibrium payoff, which equals the buyer-optimal stable payoff. The symmetry of the model allows to getting the seller-optimal stable payoff and the seller-optimal competitive equilibrium payoff can then be also derived.

The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules

A stable matching rule is used as the outcome function for the Admission game where colleges behave straightforwardly and the students` strategies are given by their preferences over the colleges. We show that the college-optimal stable matching rule implements the set of stable matchings via the Nash equilibrium (NE) concept. For any other stable matching rule the strategic behavior of the students may lead to outcomes that are not stable under the true preferences. We then introduce uncertainty about the matching selected and prove that the natural solution concept is that of NE in the strong sense. A general result shows that the random stable matching rule, as well as any stable matching rule, implements the set of stable matchings via NE in the strong sense. Precise answers are given to the strategic questions raised.

Bayesian analysis of the error correction model

This paper presents a method for estimating the posterior probability density of the cointegrating rank of a multivariate error correction model. A second contribution is the careful elicitation of the prior for the cointegrating vectors derived from a prior on the cointegrating space. This prior obtains naturally from treating the cointegrating space as the parameter of interest in inference and overcomes problems previously encountered in Bayesian cointegration analysis. Using this new prior and Laplace approximation, an estimator for the posterior probability of the rank is given. The approach performs well compared with information criteria in Monte Carlo experiments. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Corruption and auctions

We investigate how corruption affects the outcome of a first-price auction (bidding behavior, efficiency and the seller's expected revenue). The auctioneer approaches the winner to offer the possibility of a reduction in his bid in exchange for a bribe. The bribe can be a percentage of the difference between the winning and the second-highest bid or a fixed amount. We show that there exists a symmetric bidding strategy equilibrium that is monotone, i.e., higher valuation buyers bid higher. Corruption does not affect efficiency but both the auctioneer's expected bribe and the seller's expected revenue depend on the format of the bribe payments. We also find the optimal bribe scheme.

Applying linear time-varying constraints to econometric models: With an application to demand systems

When linear equality constraints are invariant through time they can be incorporated into estimation by restricted least squares. If, however, the constraints are time-varying, this standard methodology cannot be applied. In this paper we show how to incorporate linear time-varying constraints into the estimation of econometric models. The method involves the augmentation of the observation equation of a state-space model prior to estimation by the Kalman filter. Numerical optimisation routines are used for the estimation. A simple example drawn from demand analysis is used to illustrate the method and its application.

Small-World Effect in Epidemics Using Cellular Automata

The spread of an infectious disease in a population involves interactions leading to an epidemic outbreak through a network of contacts. Extending on Watts and Strogatz (1998) who showed that short-distance connections create a small-world effect, a model combining short-and long-distance probabilistic and regularly updated contacts helps considering spatial heterogeneity. The method is based on cellular automata. The presence of long-distance connections accelerates the small-world effect, as if the world shrank in proportion of their total number.

Estimating the True Incidence of Rubella

The true incidence of infectious diseases is difficult to determine from surveillance or from notification data. The proportion of new infections of rubella yields a model from serological surveys. The discrepancy between results and official notification data before vaccination era leads one to suspect the presence of hidden infections. Simulation on 80% of effective vaccination coverage shows a similar discrepancy of the total number of infections compared to notification data.

Dynamics and Control of Stray Dog Populations

The population dynamics of stray dogs is simulated to assess the effects of sterilization and euthanasia. From simulations representing less than 5 years, sterilization is less efficient than euthanasia to reduce the stray dog population, considering similar rates, but the total number of sterilized dogs is less than the total number of euthanized dogs per km(2) per year. Over 20 years, both strategies have similar efficiency. Beyond a certain rate of dog abandonment, both strategies are inefficient.

Existence of a semicontinuous or continuous utility function: a unified approach and an elementary proof

In this paper, we present a new unified approach and an elementary proof of a very general theorem on the existence of a semicontinuous or continuous utility function representing a preference relation. A simple and interesting new proof of the famous Debreu Gap Lemma is given. In addition, we prove a new Gap Lemma for the rational numbers and derive some consequences. We also prove a theorem which characterizes the existence of upper semicontinuous utility functions on a preordered topological space which need not be second countable. This is a generalization of the classical theorem of Rader which only gives sufficient conditions for the existence of an upper semicontinuous utility function for second countable topological spaces. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.