865 resultados para Option Price
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We examine the effect of oil price fluctuations ondemocratic institutions over the 1960-2007 period. We also exploitthe very persistent response of income to oil price fluctuations tostudy the effect of persistent (oil price-driven) income shocks ondemocracy. Our results indicate that countries with greater net oilexports over GDP see improvements in democratic institutionsfollowing upturns in international oil prices. We estimate that a 1percentage point increase in per capita GDP growth due to apositive oil price shock increases the Polity democracy score byaround 0.2 percentage points on impact and by around 2 percentagepoints in the long run. The effect on the probability of a democratictransition is around 0.4 percentage points.
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In this paper we study the dynamic behavior of the term structureof Interbank interest rates and the pricing of options on interest ratesensitive securities. We posit a generalized single factor model withjumps to take into account external influences in the market. Daily datais used to test for jump effects. Qualitative examination of the linkagebetween Monetary Authorities' interventions and jumps are studied. Pricingresults suggests a systematic underpricing in bonds and call options ifthe jumps component is not included. However, the pricing of put optionson bonds presents indeterminacies.
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We characterize the Walrasian allocations correspondence by means offour axioms: consistency, replica invariance, individual rationality andPareto optimality. It is shown that for any given class of exchange economiesany solution that satisfies the axioms is a selection from the Walrasianallocations with slack. Preferences are assumed to be smooth, but may besatiated and non--convex. A class of economies is defined as all economieswhose agents' preferences belong to an arbitrary family (finite or infinite)of types. The result can be modified to characterize equal budget Walrasianallocations with slack by replacing individual rationality with individualrationality from equal division. The results are valid also for classes ofeconomies in which core--Walras equivalence does not hold.
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Among the underlying assumptions of the Black-Scholes option pricingmodel, those of a fixed volatility of the underlying asset and of aconstantshort-term riskless interest rate, cause the largest empirical biases. Onlyrecently has attention been paid to the simultaneous effects of thestochasticnature of both variables on the pricing of options. This paper has tried toestimate the effects of a stochastic volatility and a stochastic interestrate inthe Spanish option market. A discrete approach was used. Symmetricand asymmetricGARCH models were tried. The presence of in-the-mean and seasonalityeffectswas allowed. The stochastic processes of the MIBOR90, a Spanishshort-terminterest rate, from March 19, 1990 to May 31, 1994 and of the volatilityofthe returns of the most important Spanish stock index (IBEX-35) fromOctober1, 1987 to January 20, 1994, were estimated. These estimators wereused onpricing Call options on the stock index, from November 30, 1993 to May30, 1994.Hull-White and Amin-Ng pricing formulas were used. These prices werecomparedwith actual prices and with those derived from the Black-Scholesformula,trying to detect the biases reported previously in the literature. Whereasthe conditional variance of the MIBOR90 interest rate seemed to be freeofARCH effects, an asymmetric GARCH with in-the-mean and seasonalityeffectsand some evidence of persistence in variance (IEGARCH(1,2)-M-S) wasfoundto be the model that best represent the behavior of the stochasticvolatilityof the IBEX-35 stock returns. All the biases reported previously in theliterature were found. All the formulas overpriced the options inNear-the-Moneycase and underpriced the options otherwise. Furthermore, in most optiontrading, Black-Scholes overpriced the options and, because of thetime-to-maturityeffect, implied volatility computed from the Black-Scholes formula,underestimatedthe actual volatility.
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Many revenue management (RM) industries are characterized by (a) fixed capacities in theshort term (e.g., hotel rooms, seats on an airline flight), (b) homogeneous products (e.g., twoairline flights between the same cities at similar times), and (c) customer purchasing decisionslargely influenced by price. Competition in these industries is also very high even with just twoor three direct competitors in a market. However, RM competition is not well understood andpractically all known implementations of RM software and most published models of RM donot explicitly model competition. For this reason, there has been considerable recent interestand research activity to understand RM competition. In this paper we study price competitionfor an oligopoly in a dynamic setting, where each of the sellers has a fixed number of unitsavailable for sale over a fixed number of periods. Demand is stochastic, and depending on howit evolves, sellers may change their prices at any time. This reflects the fact that firms constantly,and almost costlessly, change their prices (alternately, allocations at a price in quantity-basedRM), reacting either to updates in their estimates of market demand, competitor prices, orinventory levels. We first prove existence of a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium for a duopoly.In equilibrium, in each state sellers engage in Bertrand competition, so that the seller withthe lowest reservation value ends up selling a unit at a price that is equal to the equilibriumreservation value of the competitor. This structure hence extends the marginal-value conceptof bid-price control, used in many RM implementations, to a competitive model. In addition,we show that the seller with the lowest capacity sells all its units first. Furthermore, we extendthe results transparently to n firms and perform a number of numerical comparative staticsexploiting the uniqueness of the subgame-perfect equilibrium.
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This article analyses the impact of the reference pricesystem on the price-setting strategies of thepharmaceutical firms and on the level of generic usage.This model is the first to take explicitly into accountthe impact of the reference price mechanism on the levelof competition between brand-name and generic drugs andnational pharmaceutical spending. We consider aduopolistic model with one firm producing the brand-namedrug, whose patent has already expired, and the otherproducing the corresponding generic version. We work ina partial equilibrium framework where firms set pricessequentially and consumers face heterogeneous switchingcosts.We show that brand producers compensate thedecline of profits by selling greater quantities insteadof charging higher prices, thus fostering pricecompetition in the pharmaceutical market. This result isa consequence of both the assumption of a verticallydifferentiated model and the introduction of thereference price system.
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We study relative price behavior in an international business cyclemodel with specialization in production, in which a goods marketfriction is introduced through transport costs. The transporttechnology allows for flexible transport costs. We analyze whetherthis extension can account for the striking differences betweentheory and data as far as the moments of terms of trade and realexchange rates are concerned. We find that transport costs increaseboth the volatility of the terms of trade and the volatility of thereal exchange rate. However, unless the transport technology isspecified by a Leontief technology, transport costs do not resolvethe quantitative discrepancies between theory and data. Asurprising result is that transport costs may actually lower thepersistence of the real exchange rate, a finding that is in contrastto much of the emphasis of the empirical literature.
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The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Price-Gouging Rule in Effect in Storm- and Flood-damaged Counties
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It is widely accepted in the literature about the classicalCournot oligopoly model that the loss of quasi competitiveness is linked,in the long run as new firms enter the market, to instability of the equilibrium. In this paper, though, we present a model in which a stableunique symmetric equilibrium is reached for any number of oligopolistsas industry price increases with each new entry. Consequently, the suspicion that non quasi competitiveness implies, in the long run, instabilityis proved false.
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We consider a linear price setting duopoly game with di®erentiatedproducts and determine endogenously which of the players will lead andwhich will follow. While the follower role is most attractive for each firm, we show that waiting is more risky for the low cost firm so that,consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten(1988), allow the conclusion that only the high cost firm will choose towait. Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader.
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We see that the price of an european call option in a stochastic volatilityframework can be decomposed in the sum of four terms, which identifythe main features of the market that affect to option prices: the expectedfuture volatility, the correlation between the volatility and the noisedriving the stock prices, the market price of volatility risk and thedifference of the expected future volatility at different times. We alsostudy some applications of this decomposition.