Interconnector Investment for a Well-Functioning Internal Market: What EU regime of regulatory incentives? Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 18/October 2010

Sufficient cross‐border electricity transmission infrastructure is a pre‐requisite for a functioning European internal market for electricity. Also, the achievement of the EU’s energy policy objectives – sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply – critically depends on adequate investment in physical interconnections between the member states. Mainly focusing on the “regulatory path”, this paper assesses different ways to achieve a sufficient level of interconnector investment. In a first step, economic analysis identifies numerous impediments to interconnector investment adding up to an “interconnector investment failure”. Reflecting on the proper regulatory design of an EU framework able to overcome the interconnector investment failure, a number of recommendations are put forward:  All congestion rents should be channeled into interconnector building. Unused rents should be transferred to a European interconnector fund supervised by an EU agency.  Even though inherently sub‐optimal, merchant transmission investment can be used as a means to put pressure on regulated transmission system operators (TSO) that do not deliver. An EU agency should have exclusive competence on merchant interconnector exemptions.  A European TSO organization should be entrusted with supra‐national network planning, supervised by an EU agency.  The agency should decide on investment cost reallocation for interconnector projects that yield strong externalities. Payments could be settled via a European interconnector fund.  In case of non‐compliance with the supra‐national network plan, the EU agency should have the right to organize a tender – financed by the European interconnector fund – in order to get the “missing link” built. Assessing the existing EU regulatory framework, the efforts of the 2009 “third energy package” to fill the “regulatory gap” with new EU bodies – ACER and ENTSO‐E – are acknowledged. However, striking holes in regulatory framework are spotted, notably with regard to the use of congestion rents, interconnector cost allocation, and the distribution of decision making powers on new infrastructure exemptions A discussion of the TEN‐E interconnector funding scheme shows that massive funding can be an interim solution to the problem of insufficient interconnection capacities while overcoming the political deadlock on sensible regulatory topics such as interconnector cost allocation. The paper ends with policy recommendations.

Reforming the Market Design of EU Electricity Markets: Addressing the Challenges of a Low-Carbon Power Sector. CEPS Task Force Report, 27 July 2015

This CEPS Task Force Report focuses on whether there is a need to adapt the EU’s electricity market design and if so, the options for doing so. In a first step, it analyses the current market trends by distinguishing between their causes and their consequences. Then, the current blueprint of EU power market design – the target model – is briefly introduced, followed by a discussion of the shortcomings of the current approach and the challenges in finding suitable solutions. The final chapter offers an inventory of solutions differentiating between recommendations shared among Task Force members and non-consensual options.

Farm size and regional distribution of the benefit under Federal milk market regulation /

At head of title: Economic report.

Distribution and use of electricity,

On cover: Power plant engineering handbook.

Electricity meters: their construction and management. A practical manual for central station engineers, distribution engineers, and students.

Mode of access: Internet.

Genetic algorithm-based spinning reserve dispatching in a competitive electricity market

Power systems rely greatly on ancillary services in maintaining operation security. As one of the most important ancillary services, spinning reserve must be provided effectively in the deregulated market environment. This paper focuses on the design of an integrated market for both electricity and spinning reserve service with particular emphasis on coordinated dispatch of bulk power and spinning reserve services. A new market dispatching mechanism has been developed to minimize the ISO's total payment while ensuring system security. Genetic algorithms are used in the finding of the global optimal solutions for this dispatching problem. Case studies and corresponding analyses haw been carried out to demonstrate and discuss the efficiency and usefulness of the proposed market.

Measuring market power in electricity generation: A long-term perspective using a programming model

This paper focuses on measuring the extent to which market power has been exercised in a recently deregulated electricity generation sector. Our study emphasises the need to consider the concept of market power in a long-run dynamic context. A market power index is constructed focusing on differences between actual market returns and long-run competitive returns, estimated using a programming model devised by the authors. The market power implications of hedge contracts are briefly considered. The state of Queensland Australia is used as a context for the analysis. The results suggest that generators have exercised significant market power since deregulation.

Composite auction method for suppressing unreasonable electricity price spikes in a competitive electricity market

The existence of undesirable electricity price spikes in a competitive electricity market requires an efficient auction mechanism. However, many of the existing auction mechanism have difficulties in suppressing such unreasonable price spikes effectively. A new auction mechanism is proposed to suppress effectively unreasonable price spikes in a competitive electricity market. It optimally combines system marginal price auction and pay as bid auction mechanisms. A threshold value is determined to activate the switching between the marginal price auction and the proposed composite auction. Basically when the system marginal price is higher than the threshold value, the composite auction for high price electricity market is activated. The winning electricity sellers will sell their electricity at the system marginal price or their own bid prices, depending on their rights of being paid at the system marginal price and their offers' impact on suppressing undesirable price spikes. Such economic stimuli discourage sellers from practising economic and physical withholdings. Multiple price caps are proposed to regulate strong market power. We also compare other auction mechanisms to highlight the characteristics of the proposed one. Numerical simulation using the proposed auction mechanism is given to illustrate the procedure of this new auction mechanism.

Electricity market price spike forecast with data mining techniques

Electricity market price forecast is a changeling yet very important task for electricity market managers and participants. Due to the complexity and uncertainties in the power grid, electricity prices are highly volatile and normally carry with spikes. which may be (ens or even hundreds of times higher than the normal price. Such electricity spikes are very difficult to be predicted. So far. most of the research on electricity price forecast is based on the normal range electricity prices. This paper proposes a data mining based electricity price forecast framework, which can predict the normal price as well as the price spikes. The normal price can be, predicted by a previously proposed wavelet and neural network based forecast model, while the spikes are forecasted based on a data mining approach. This paper focuses on the spike prediction and explores the reasons for price spikes based on the measurement of a proposed composite supply-demand balance index (SDI) and relative demand index (RDI). These indices are able to reflect the relationship among electricity demand, electricity supply and electricity reserve capacity. The proposed model is based on a mining database including market clearing price, trading hour. electricity), demand, electricity supply and reserve. Bayesian classification and similarity searching techniques are used to mine the database to find out the internal relationships between electricity price spikes and these proposed. The mining results are used to form the price spike forecast model. This proposed model is able to generate forecasted price spike, level of spike and associated forecast confidence level. The model is tested with the Queensland electricity market data with promising results. Crown Copyright (C) 2004 Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Impact of weather dependency on planning decisions in the australian national electricity market

A long-term planning method for the electricity market is to simulate market operation into the future. Outputs from market simulation include indicators for transmission augmentation and new generation investment. A key input to market simulations is demand forecasts. For market simulation purposes, regional demand forecasts for each half-hour interval of the forecasting horizon are required, and they must accurately represent realistic demand profiles and interregional demand relationships. In this paper, a demand model is developed to accurately model these relationships. The effects of uncertainty in weather patterns and inherent correlations between regional demands on market simulation results are presented. This work signifies the advantages of probabilistic modeling of demand levels when making market-based planning decisions.

A new methodology for generation investment in the national electricity market of Australia

Market administrators hold the vital role of maintaining sufficient generation capacity in their respective electricity market. However without the jurisdiction to dictate the generator types, locations and timing of new generation, the reliability of the system may be compromised by delayed entry of new generation. This paper illustrates a new generation investment methodology that can effectively present expected returns from the pool market; while concurrently searching for the type and placement of a new generator to fulfil system reliability requirements.